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Abstract
Social trading is a novel phenomenon that integrates social media into
online trading, forming a social trading platform (STP) that allows par-
ticipants to communicate and explicitly copy each other’s trades in real-
time. STPs are governed by a scopic environment, which is character-
ized by high information transparency and constant reciprocal scrutiny
by participants. We categorize participants into two main groups: trade
leaders, who execute original trades and refrain from explicit copying,
and investors, who solely or partially copy trades. This dissertation fo-
cuses on the former.
First, we investigate herding behavior using popular metrics developed
by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Frey, Herbst, and Walter
(2014). We find levels of, and persistence in herding behavior that exceed
those found in traditional financial settings. We argue that this is due
to the scopic environment governing STPs.
Second, we examine the disposition effect of trade leaders. Building on
the learning hypothesis discussed by Dhar and Zhu (2006), we propose
that traders learn not only from their own trades, but also from the trades
of others to adjust for this behavioral bias. We find ample evidence of a
weaker disposition for trade leaders on a STP compared to traders on a
traditional platform. This suggests that high information transparency
erodes this bias.
Third, we investigate the predictive ability of trade leaders in 16 currency
pairs and three commodities. Using methods similar to Henriksson and
Merton (1981) and Fishe and Smith (2012) we find that, although around
50% of traders trade profitably more than half of the time, very few
possess the skill to do so in all market conditions. Nevertheless, our
findings suggest that the scopic environment yields profitable short-term
information that is contained in the order flow.
The concluding chapter reviews the main findings of this thesis and dis-
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In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the role played by social media
in the finance industry, mainly due to the vast amount of data collected by social
platforms, and the ease with which individuals can communicate and obtain infor-
mation in real-time. Researchers and practitioners have studied the relationship
between the information amassed by social networks and the dynamics of financial
markets, which are essentially driven by investor sentiment. For instance, Bollen
et al. (2011) find that the public mood expressed through live Twitter feeds can be
used to predict the daily movements in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
with an accuracy of 87.6%. Moreover, investment firms have quickly adopted so-
cial media tools and capitalized on the opportunities brought forth by social media,
such as Derwent Capital Markets, which pioneered a $40 million hedge fund that
traded on market sentiment using real-time Twitter news feeds (Tweney, 2012).
The innovative integration of social media into finance applications has inaugurated
a new branch of literature called social finance, which investigates the effects of
social interactions on financial outcomes (Knorr Cetina and Preda, 2004; Preda,
2007; Hirshleifer, 2015). One particular phenomenon that has attracted hundreds
of thousands of traders and investors in recent years is known as social trading.
Social trading merges the traditional online trading model with the tools pro-
vided by social media platforms. The result is a pioneering and highly transparent
marketplace called a social trading platform (STP), where participants can com-
municate with each other, collaborate on research tasks, and even explicitly copy
each other’s trades in real-time using a mirror trading algorithm. To elaborate,
an individual can set up his account to mimic all future trades of one or multiple
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traders, thus any trade that is executed by a copied trader is also executed in that
person’s brokerage account at the same time and price. As such, STPs typically
require individuals to reveal their current portfolio holdings, historical trading ac-
tivities, and online social interactions to a network of participants, which is a level
of transparency that is lacking in traditional financial institutions including banks
(Van Roy, 2008; Giannetti, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Flannery et al., 2004),
mutual funds (Haslem, 2007), hedge funds (Goltz and Schro¨der, 2010; Black, 2007;
Anson, 2002), and on exchanges where participants trade against each other and
try to keep their strategies and holdings secret. We call the trading environment
governing STPs a “scopic” regime, which signifies a situation with high information
transparency where participants constantly and reciprocally scrutinize each other’s
actions (Knorr Cetina, 2003). In such an environment, participants do not observe
each other directly, but judge each other based on the available information that
is publicly disclosed every time an action is taken. One reason why participants
accept to share their private information with others is because STPs encourage
participants to build a track record in order to attract potential copiers, and offer
remuneration packages that allow an individual to earn a performance fee based
on the profits generated or on the number of copiers he has. This principal-agent
relationship allows us to categorize participants into two main groups, which we
call trade leaders and investors. The former typically includes experienced traders
who invest the capital allocated to them by the latter in return for monetary com-
pensation. An investor can allocate and diversify his entire capital across several
trade leaders by simply opting to copy these individuals, thus having all their trades
replicated in his account. The copy feature essentially gives rise to a new “socio-
financial” asset, whereby the trader that is being copied may be perceived as a
tradable, long-only asset whose risk and return characteristics are dependent on the
financial instruments being traded, as well as on the behavior of the trader. By
understanding these components, investors can then incorporate the socio-financial
asset class into their portfolios in order to achieve superior risk-adjusted returns.
Investing in socio-financial assets can be done by simply opting to copy the trading
activity of others.
Since little research has been conducted in order to investigate the fundamen-
tal and theoretical differences that separate social trading from mainstream finance,
this thesis explores this novel phenomenon in order to better understand how partic-
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ipants behave in a trading environment that encourages information transparency.
While the research opportunities in this field are numerous, we focus on the behav-
ior and performance of the individuals who are making the trading decisions, the
trade leaders, and investigate three main research questions to better understand
the characteristics of this socio-financial asset class. We examine some behavioral
biases that have been studied extensively in the literature under a traditional finan-
cial setting. The first behavioral bias is herding, which is defined as the tendency
of individuals or entities to copy the actions of others. The second bias is known as
the disposition effect and is defined as the tendency of an individual to realize gains
and hold on to losses. These biases have the potential of adversely affecting perfor-
mance and increasing overall portfolio risk for investors who diversify their capital
across multiple trade leaders. For instance, herding behavior can lead to homogene-
ity among trading styles, which consequently decreases the benefits of diversification
across multiple trade leaders. Regarding the disposition effect, this bias can drive
traders to realize gains prematurely, which also results in high current capital gains
tax expenses. Moreover, we aim to answer the ultimate question that crosses every
investor’s mind, and that is “do trade leaders make informed decisions?” By answer-
ing this question, we are able to assess whether a trade leader’s superior performance
is due to skill or luck. Formulating the above into three main research questions, we
dedicate an entire chapter to investigate each of the following:
1. Does the scopic regime governing STPs lead to levels of, and persistence in
herding behavior among trade leaders that exceed those found in traditional
financial environments?
2. Do trade leaders on STPs exhibit the disposition effect, or does the vast
amount of information and constant investor scrutiny under a scopic regime
erode this behavioral bias?
3. Do trade leaders on STPs possess superior predictive ability such that they
are deemed informed, and if so, what are the trading characteristics of these
informed individuals?
We begin by providing a descriptive overview of the developments in social trad-
ing and the mechanics of STPs, and we highlight some of the key differences between
a scopic regime and a traditional financial setting.
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1.1 Social Trading
1.1.1 Back to the Trading Floor
The concept of social trading is not entirely novel as social interactions, such as com-
munication and physical contact, have been an integral part of open outcry financial
exchanges. In trading pits, traders try to decipher the motives and emotions of other
market participants and adjust their positions accordingly (Fenton-O’Creevy et al.,
2012; Baker, 1984). However, these exchanges have experienced radical technolog-
ical and operational changes since the introduction of electronic communications
networks in the late 1960s, an innovation that relocated traders from trading floors
and positioned them in front of screens (Baptiste et al., 1993). While electronic
trading does have its benefits, such as increased efficiency, speed in trade execution,
fewer mistakes, and lower monitoring costs, several academics have highlighted the
benefits of floor trading that arise from trader interactions on the floor, which was
lacking in early electronic systems (Ates and Wang, 2005). For instance, Benveniste
et al. (1992) developed a model where floor participants interact prior to and after
trading. Specifically, the authors find that in an equilibrium, where informed and
uninformed traders are brought together, a market specialist can employ ex-post
sanctions to force traders to a priori disclosure of trade information, which results
in reduced information asymmetry and lower transaction costs. In a similar study,
Chan and Weinstein (1993) show that floor traders develop a reputation within the
pit, which is enhanced by signaling whether trades are informed or not. As such,
the authors conclude that this information leads to lower transaction costs for all
traders. Several academics have compared floor trading to electronic trading and
found increased volatility and widening spreads after the switch was made from floor
to electronic platforms (Venkataraman, 2001; Hendershott and Moulton, 2011). In
addition, Ates and Wang (2005) provide an extensive comparison of the differences
in operational efficiency and informational efficiency between the two types of trad-
ing settings. In particular, the authors find that floor traders 1) know who they are
bidding against, 2) can select their counter-party as opposed to electronic trading,
and 3) can quickly change their price quotes by a simple hand signal thus canceling
any previous offer or bid, which is a very valuable option in highly volatile markets.
STPs come as a modern and innovative transition “back to the trading floor”,
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by combining the strategic information generated from trader interactions as docu-
mented in floor trading systems, with the increased efficiency and speed of electronic
trading. This amalgamation has resulted in several unique features which render
STPs an entirely new trading environment. In particular, STPs are based on vol-
untary, full disclosure of historical trading activities and current portfolio holdings,
thus allowing traders to observe and easily copy each other’s actual strategies. This
is in contrast to the behavior observed in pit exchanges where traders attempt to
decipher the motives and emotions of other participants, who in turn try to hide
their strategies (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012). In fact, STPs encourage, and have
incentivized information sharing by compensating traders based on the number of
copiers they attract, or the amount of assets under management.1 This also leads
to collaboration among participants on several activities including the pooling of
funds, allocation of research tasks, and sharing of valuable trading information. As
a consequence, participants on STPs have access to high quality order flow as well as
social information, which is essential for making informed trading decisions. This is
one of the main advantages for small retail traders who seek high-quality information
related to market outlook but are often faced with the challenges of a clandestine
and very costly traditional investment system. Hence, STPs are a materialization of
what an ideal market would look like in the eye of an investor (Kirzner, 2006), and
it is this transparent environment that is attracting a larger crowd of retail traders,
which would theoretically increase market efficiency and improve price discovery.
While investors always seek to gather as much information as possible in order
to make informed decisions, too much information can also have adverse effects on
the investment process. We discuss one potential drawback of excess information,
which has been documented in the literature as information overload.
1.1.2 Information Overload
The process of decision making often requires an individual to evaluate and integrate
multiple information cues simultaneously. Although the presence of information is
necessary to make good decisions, excess information may impede one’s ability to
do so. Several early studies such as Miller (1994), Newell and Simon (1972), and
Driver and Mock (1975) have presented evidence showing that the capacity of human
1Doering et al. (2015) discuss some of the most common compensation schemes offered by STPs.
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decision makers is limited, and that people tend to make sub-optimal decisions when
that limit is reached. This phenomenon is known as information overload, which
arises when the input to a system exceeds its processing capacity (Milford and
Perry, 1977). In addition to a decrease in quality of decision making (Abdel-Khalik,
1973; Snowball, 1980; Chewning Jr and Harrell, 1990), studies have also found that
information overload increases the time required to make a decision and generates
a higher degree of confusion regarding the decision (Cohen, 1980; Malhotra et al.,
1982). As a result of lower quality, and increased time and confusion of decisions
under information overload, consumers are more likely to decrease the time and
effort they expend the more complex the decision (Payne et al., 1988, 1996).
Researchers have identified a number of factors that may contribute to infor-
mation overload. One potential source of overload is related to how information is
presented to investors. Simply bombarding investors with unstructured information
about investment choices may be detrimental to a sound decision making process.
Conversely, the literature on the economics of information suggests that consumers
are willing to use additional information more competently if it is less costly and does
not require significantly more time to acquire (Stigler, 1961; Nelson, 1970, 1974).
This means that when information is readily available at a very low cost, such as on
a STP, consumers are more likely to incorporate it in the decision making process.
For example, studies on nutritional labeling show that standardized information
printed on labels have a significant impact on how consumers use the information
to make and justify their product choice (Roe et al., 1999; Ippolito and Mathios,
1990, 1994; Moorman, 1996). Since the vast amount of information on STPs can
be overwhelming to individual retail traders, these platforms standardize the infor-
mation and present it using a range of financial and social indicators that can be
interpreted more easily by the trader. Nevertheless, the standardization process may
result in loss of information, which may be of value to the trader. In addition, each
platform summarizes the information differently, thus the trader should be aware of
the methods and processes used by the STP provider to calculate these indicators.
Another source of information overload is related to the number of choices an
individual has when faced with a decision. Studies have shown that too many op-
tions impede decision making. For instance, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) compare
consumers’ reactions when they were exposed to two displays of jam; the first com-
posed of six varieties and the second with twenty-four. The authors found that,
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while consumers expressed more interest in the larger selection, it was the smaller
selection that prompted more purchases. The results of this experiment suggest that
consumers not only expend less effort when a decision becomes overwhelming, but
they may also abstain from the task completely. These findings are also documented
in investment behavior, where increasing the number of fund choices results in a sig-
nificant decline in 401(k) contributions (Iyengar et al., 2004). Similarly, Weaver
(2002) finds that the large number of options provided in Sweden’s public pension
program may be a key influence driving the majority of participants — over 80% of
new eligible participants— to select the default pension program. In the context of
social trading, investors face the decision of selecting from thousands of trade leaders
to copy, which can become increasingly overwhelming given all the indicators that
are provided by the platform. As such, STPs provide filtering tools and ranking
algorithms, which help investors narrow the pool of potential trade leaders to copy.
While this may help investors reach a decision faster, it may also drive them to
copy the same trade leaders who are currently in the spotlight. This scenario is an
example of unintentional herding among investors (Barber et al., 2009; Barber and
Odean, 2008).
The final source of information overload we discuss is an individual’s personal
financial knowledge. Research has shown that there is a concave relation between
information search and knowledge, such that a person with an average amount of
knowledge would search the most prior to making a decision (Bettman and Park,
1980). On the contrary, experts do not feel the need to conduct substantial research
because they already possess plenty of knowledge on the subject, while novice in-
vestors typically have a basic understanding and become bewildered rather quickly
when faced with a choice task. It is important to note that while novice investors
would benefit the most from a thorough research exercise, it is unlikely that they
would undertake one. Due to this paradox, one can presume that people with aver-
age knowledge will search the most since they possess a fundamental understanding
that enables them to analyze and benefit from new information. If an investor lacks
the basic concepts to compare between the different investment options available to
them, then the whole decision making process may become even more intimidating,
thus increasing the probability they will select an easy default option.
STPs try to help participants advance their financial knowledge by providing
them with a collection of material on finance principles and trading techniques.
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Moreover, participants can open a demo account to get hands on experience re-
garding the tools and information that are provided to them by the platform. This
may help individuals become more comfortable with the indicators that they can
utilize in their investment decisions, thus decreasing the likelihood of experiencing
information overload.
While we do not investigate information overload on STPs in this thesis, it is
nonetheless important to understand that these platforms provide a vast amount of
information that is unparalleled in any other financial environment. In the following
section, we discuss in detail the mechanics of STPs, and highlight some of the main
sources of information available to participants.
1.1.3 Mechanics of STPs
As mentioned earlier, a STP is a web-based platform that allows participants to fol-
low, chat with, and even explicitly copy each other’s trades using a mirror trading
algorithm. Given this algorithm, we can categorize participants on a STP into two
main groups. The first, called trade leaders, includes individuals who are suppos-
edly experienced traders, are unique in their trading strategies and research, and
make trading decisions based on their own analysis. The second group is made up of
investors who entrust trade leaders with the task of managing their wealth, by ex-
plicitly copying the trades of these trade leaders. While some individuals personally
invest some of their capital and allocate the rest to be managed by trade leaders,
we categorize these individuals as investors throughout this thesis. The argument
behind this categorization is that the copied trades do not signify autonomous and
unique decisions, which may lead to biased inferences about the behavior and per-
formance of trade leaders. For example, consider a scenario where a profitable trade
leader has many copiers, and an unprofitable trade leader has very few or no copiers.
If we include both trade leaders and copiers in our analysis and consider each copied
transaction as an independent decision, one would conclude that the majority of in-
dividuals on the STP are skilled, when in fact only two individuals made the trading
decisions. While investors may possess the ability to identify skilled trade leaders,
this research question is not part of the scope of this thesis, which only focuses
on trade leaders and not on the relationship between trade leaders and investors.
Hence, we only examine the trades executed in the trade leaders’ accounts, and we
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define a trade leader as an individual who has only executed original manual trades
(i.e. refrained from explicitly copying others) throughout the period of study. In
other words, executing trades manually signifies that the trader is knowledgeable,
skilled, and confident enough not to resort to explicit copying.
In general, participants open brokerage accounts through the STP and start by
filling out their personal information, which may be made public depending on the
platform’s privacy policies. After researching and back-testing a trading strategy,
trade leaders start executing orders based on the signals provided by their strate-
gies and using their own money. Some STPs, such as Ayondo, allow trade leaders
to start their career as money managers using virtual money. Trade leaders aim
to build a reputation on the STP, where their track record and historical trades
are published on their personal profile page in real-time. STPs also publish a wide
range of performance and risk metrics such as holding period return, profit and
loss, volatility, maximum drawdown, number of different assets invested in, and
trading frequency to name a few, as well as social indicators including the num-
ber of followers and ranking relative to others. At first encounter, it may seem
irrational for a trade leader with a profitable trading strategy to disclose all his
historical trades and portfolio holdings to complete strangers; however, STPs have
incentivized this behavior by providing remuneration packages that are similar to
those offered by investment funds. Some STPs adopt a performance-based compen-
sation scheme where trade leaders are compensated depending on the return they
generate for their copiers. Other platforms employ a neo-asset-based compensation
scheme that links the trade leader’s remuneration to the number of copiers, instead
of the amount of assets under management. Doering et al. (2015) argue that the
latter remuneration model decreases moral hazard as trade leaders have an incen-
tive to build a good yet persistent track record in order to attract an increasing
number of investors. This compensation scheme is adopted by eToro, the STP on
which this dissertation is based. Nevertheless, a trader’s choice of which STP to use
may be largely dependent on the compensation scheme offered — as in the case of
mutual funds (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) — which suggests that each platform
attracts a different type of audience. Hence, based on their analysis of the various
compensation schemes provided by STPs, Doering et al. (2015) find that traders
on the Ayondo and ZuluTrade STPs engage in riskier transactions than traders on
eToro and Currensee. It is important to note that STPs can, and do change the
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compensation schemes they offer in order to potentially attract more traders, and to
retain incumbent ones. Nevertheless, we describe the compensation package offered
by eToro to participants as at the time of this study, which is 2013.
eToro compensates trade leaders with a fixed remuneration, which is a function
of the number of copiers and the consistency of that trader’s performance. Trade
leaders on eToro may receive up to $10 per month for each follower who has an
account in excess of $100, and the total compensation is limited to a maximum of
$10, 000. In addition, the remuneration is contingent on having executed at least
ten trades during a period of one month. This implies that eToro compensates
traders irrespective of their performance and assets under management. However,
this compensation model resembles an asset-based compensation model in the sense
that trade leaders have an incentive to increase the number of copiers, which would
subsequently increase their assets under management (Doering et al., 2015). It
follows that a trade leader can initially adopt a highly aggressive trading strategy in
order to attract copiers, after which he can switch to a more conservative strategy
to retain these copiers. This is often observed in the hedge fund industry, where
fund managers start off with a risk-seeking approach and later switch to a risk-averse
strategy to preserve their reputation and compensation (Boyson, 2010). Nevertheless
this thesis does not investigate the effects of the different types of compensation
schemes on trader behavior, thus we end this discussion here.
Unlike an institutional fund management setting, the unprecedented high level
of transparency offered by STPs allows investors to easily examine the past and
current performance of trade leaders, which is calculated using raw data, in order
to select the top trade leaders to copy. This also highlights a key attribute of
STPs, in that they offer a formal ranking of traders and a range of performance
measures that are constantly updated. For example, eToro ranks participants based
on aggregate profit and loss, in addition to several other indicators such as minimum
number of opened and winning positions in a given period, number of active days,
average position duration, maximum average leverage ratio, and minimum equity
invested in a given period to name a few. The STP Ayondo assigns traders to
one of five career levels, where individuals can progress to the next level if they
meet certain performance criteria within a given time period. This is in contrast to
the non-frequent performance assessment of fund managers of traditional financial
institutions such as hedge funds, who are not legally obligated to disclose their past
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performance and strategies, but may selectively do so in a manner that suits their
interests.
The initial step for investors who do not have the time or skills to trade, but want
to have their money invested by a more experienced trader, is to analyze the profile
and performance of trade leaders on the network. Investors would then choose to
follow a select group of traders who are judged to possess superior trading skills
based on performance in prior periods, or who yield valuable information through
discussions. In order to reduce skepticism regarding the authenticity of the trade
leaders, investors may choose to gather additional information by getting in direct
contact with them through instant messaging tools or via discussion posts.
Once the investor completes his due diligence and finds experienced trade leaders
with trading styles that comply with his own investment goals, he can set up his
account to automatically mimic the traders’ activities in real-time using the mirror
trading algorithm provided by the STP. This means that any trade executed by
the trade leaders that the investor is copying is simultaneously executed in the
investor’s account at a price identical to that received by the trader, and without
the need for manual confirmation. The investor does not need to intervene except for
terminating the copying relationship. Since all trades are executed automatically,
the investor can simply allocate his capital to be managed by other more experienced
traders, and can diversify his investments across multiple trade leaders with different
trading styles with the aim of decreasing overall portfolio volatility. Alternatively,
if an investor wishes to remain involved in the trading process but does not possess
the skills or time to conduct his own due diligence and analysis, he can choose to
copy a specific trade after assessing the trade leader’s rationale behind it. This
requires the investor to manually click on the copy button that pertains to each
trade, and is typically employed when the investor receives a notification in real-
time about a potentially promising trade executed by others. It is important to
note that while an investor can set up his account to mirror that of a trade leader,
the investor still enjoys the authority to modify the copied trades as he pleases.
For example, an investor might copy a market order from a trader to buy a certain
currency pair, but wishes to add or alter the stop-loss level. Even though the
investor changed the terms of the trade, such an action is still considered a copied
trade. Nevertheless, the relationship between trade leaders and copiers is largely
informal, as there are no official sanctions should trade leaders go rogue, deviate
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from their advertised strategy, or lose their investors’ money. Similarly, investors
can terminate the copying relationship at any time without facing any repercussions.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the typical information and transaction flows on a STP.
Traders on STPs do not trade the actual asset, but instead open a position
through a standardized contract for difference (CFD) that is written on the asset.
A CFD is an electronic contract between a trader and a broker (the CFD provider),
whereby the trader forgoes physical ownership of the underlying asset for a contract
with the broker that provides the same economic exposure (Norman, 2009). CFDs
are essentially derivative instruments that allow traders to gain exposure and specu-
late on the direction of the underlying asset without the need for ownership. These
contracts allow the trader to take both long and short positions in the underlying
asset. The payoff from the CFD is equal to the difference between the purchase
price of the underlying asset and the price at which the contract is closed. Addi-
tionally, CFDs are settled daily, hence the gains and losses of open positions are
realized at the end of the trading day and are subsequently rolled-over to the next
trading day. A trader with a long (short) position in a CFD would profit if the
price of the underlying asset rises (falls). Moreover, CFDs are traded on margin,
thus the trader may deposit an amount of capital that is considerably less than the
asset’s notional value, potentially leading to highly leveraged positions. The trader
should always keep enough capital in the account in order to cover the minimum
margin requirement set by the CFD provider, otherwise the trader’s positions may
be liquidated.
In his book CFDs: The Definitive Guide to Contracts for Difference, Norman
(2009) discusses some of the risks associated with (but not limited to) CFD trading,
which we summarize as follows:
• Systematic risk: The main risk of investing in CFDs is the market or sys-
tematic risk, since CFD prices reflect the real-time bid-offer prices of the un-
derlying asset. CFDs replicate the point-for-point movement in the underlying
asset. Moreover, since CFDs are traded on margin, the leveraging effect mag-
nifies market risk significantly, making these financial instruments popular for
speculation on movements in financial markets, spread betting, or hedging ex-
isting positions. The most common way traders limit their market risk is by
avoiding leveraged positions and using stop loss orders.
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• Liquidation risk: Traders face risk of liquidation when the price of the
underlying asset moves adversely to their position in the CFD (Norman, 2009).
When an open position starts accruing losses, additional variation margin is
required to replenish the account back to the initial margin level. Hence, the
CFD provider issues a margin call to the trader to deposit additional capital to
cover the potential losses should they be realized. If the trader fails to satisfy
the margin requirement, the CFD provider may liquidate the positions at a
loss.
• Counter-party risk: Many over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives deals are
prone to counter-party risk. This is also applicable to CFDs where the trader
could potentially incur a loss even if the underlying asset moves in a favor-
able direction. This risk arises from dealing directly with the CFD provider,
which results in a principal-to-principal transaction rather than an agent-to-
principal transaction (which is the typical case in a stock trade) (Norman,
2009). The degree of counter-party risk is defined by the credit risk of the
party holding the opposite end of the deal, which in this case is the CFD
provider. Counter-party risk includes the safety of the deposited capital, the
probability of insolvency of the CFD provider, and operational drawbacks. A
trader can mitigate, or at least decrease the likelihood of counter-party risk by
checking the CFD provider’s policies regarding the separation of client funds
from general operating expense accounts, and the protection of client funds
by an underwriter through a certificate of insurance.
Despite these risks, CFDs are a key component for the success of STPs due to
the great flexibility they offer, which is crucial for the implementation of mirror
trading. As such, CFDs make it possible for traders to copy each other’s trades
instantaneously and efficiently.
1.2 Social Trading Data
Before expanding on the research questions and findings of this thesis, we briefly
present an overview of the social trading data set that is used in all three studies.
We obtain a data set from the highly popular eToro STP, which includes around 63
million trades executed by all participants during 2013. eToro offers participants a
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wide range of assets from several markets such as foreign exchange, commodities,
equities, and indices, which are listed in Table 1.1. Table 1.2 presents descriptive
statistics of the full data set. As explained in the previous section, participants on
eToro do not trade the actual asset, but rather open a position through a CFD that
is written on the asset. eToro records the details of each trade, which include the
opening and closing prices, the equity and leverage used, the direction, whether the
trade was a market or limit order, and the opening and closing timestamps. The
STP also records a wide range of other social information about each participant
including discussion posts and active time; however, this was not made available
to us due to confidentiality reasons. Since this thesis focuses on the behavior of
trade leaders — who are the individuals conducting market research and executing
their own trades — we apply a strict criterion where we identify an individual
as a trade leader if all of his trades were entered by him personally (or his trading
algorithm) into the STP throughout the period of study. Hence, we exclude from our
analysis any individual who has partially or fully utilized the mirror trading feature
offered by the STP. The reason is that all copied trades are simply a reflection of the
original trade, thus including them in our analysis may result in erroneous statistical
inferences due to the perfect correlation between these trades. Moreover, this thesis
focuses on examining the effects of the scopic environment on the behavior of the
trade originator, and not on the relationship between trade leaders and investors.
Due to all these reasons, we only include trade leaders in our analysis, as defined
above.
The final sample contains over 2.6 million trades executed by 77,476 trade lead-
ers. Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the final sample. Currencies
constitute around 83% of trades, while commodities, indices, and stocks make up
around 11%, 4%, and 2%, respectively. We calculate several trading behavior char-
acteristics, which are first averaged across all trades of each trade leader, and then
across all trade leaders. In general, trade leaders engage in both long (66% of trades)
and short positions. They take on high levels of risk, with a mean leverage ratio of
175 to one, and hold positions for around six days. They execute around 34 trades
annually, and trade in around three different assets.
We go into further details about the social trading data set in each of the chapters
depending on the data and parameters that we use.
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1.3 The Socio-Financial Asset
STPs have given a new literal meaning to the phrase “investing in people”. To
elaborate, a trade leader can be perceived as a long-only tradable asset whose risk
and return characteristics are driven by two components; the performance of the fi-
nancial assets traded and the behavior of the trader. An investor can better manage
risk and make informed investment decisions in socio-financial assets by understand-
ing the behavioral biases and trading characteristics of trade leaders. As such, this
thesis aims to provide insight into the behavioral characteristics of trade leaders, in
order to better understand the dynamics of this novel asset class. In particular, we
investigate two behavioral biases that have been widely documented in behavioral
finance literature: herding behavior and the disposition effect. Moreover, we aim to
answer a key question which crosses every investor’s mind: do trade leaders possess
superior predictive ability?
1.3.1 Herding Behavior Among Trade Leaders
Research question 1: Does the scopic regime governing STPs lead to levels of and
persistence in herding behavior among trade leaders that exceed those found in tra-
ditional financial environments?
The first study we conduct investigates herding behavior among trade leaders,
which is understood as the tendency of traders to end up on the same side of the
market, either intentionally by mimicking the actions of others or unintentionally as
a result of acting on correlated information. In an institutional context, such as in
the fund industry, herding generally arises due to reputational concerns (Scharfstein
and Stein, 1990; Dasgupta and Prat, 2008), remuneration based on performance
benchmarking (Maug and Naik, 2011), or information differentials in the market
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992). Other studies on individual investors have
shown that herding appears to be primarily driven by correlated speculative motives
(Dorn et al., 2008), and cognitive biases such as the representativeness heuristic,
limited attention, and the disposition effect (Barber et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the
general consensus in the literature is that herding levels among individual traders
(Dorn et al., 2008; Barber et al., 2009; Merli and Roger, 2013) are much higher
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compared to the herding levels found among institutional investors (Grinblatt et al.,
1995; Wermers, 1999; Wylie, 2005; Frey et al., 2014).
In our study, we investigate herding behavior among trade leaders in order to
test whether constant investor scrutiny and permanent information disclosure induce
high levels of herding behavior, or motivate trade leaders to adopt differentiated
trading styles. Our hypothesis is that the scopic regime governing STPs increases
the tendency of trade leaders to herd, and that this level of herding is greater and
persists more compared to the levels found in traditional trading settings. To test
this, we use a data set of transactions executed by 77,476 trade leaders during 2013
on the highly popular eToro STP, and calculate the two herding measures developed
by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) (LSV henceforth) and Frey, Herbst, and
Walter (2014) (FHW henceforth) to provide a range for the true level of herding
as proposed by Bellando (2012). We find that the overall level of herding for the
entire sample of trade leaders lies between the lower LSV measure of 16.5% and the
upper FHW measure of 23.9%. These figures exceed the herding levels reported in
the literature for both institutional and retail investors in traditional trading envi-
ronments. Moreover, we estimate herding for sub-samples of trade leaders selected
based on three trading behavior characteristics; trading intensity, leverage used, and
trade size. First, we find that as the number of active trade leaders in a security
increases, the level of herding decreases proportionally. We show that this is due to
higher herding levels in less traded assets, which is evidence of information herding
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Hence, trade leaders tend to herd more when market
information is scarce, such that they look at other’s actions as a source of valu-
able information. Second, we find that the relationship between herding and risk
appetite is concave, which is in line with the hypothesis that overconfident traders
take on more risk and tend to herd less. This is because these individuals are more
confident in their own research and analysis, thus they refrain from following or
mimicking others. When we examine the association between herding and trade
size, we find a u-shape relation. In particular, the larger the trade size, the more
a trader has to lose, thus increasing the likelihood of herding with the general con-
sensus. As for small trades, we report a high level of herding, which may be the
result of trade leader sophistication (Doering et al., 2015). Hence, small trades
may be regarded as an option for the trade leader to imitate others, such that one
can increase exposure if the strategy is profitable, or simply cut losses should the
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strategy be unprofitable. Finally, we investigate persistence in herding behavior by
computing the mean contemporaneous and time-series correlations of purchase in-
tensities based on the method presented by Barber et al. (2009). The results show a
significant and almost perfect contemporaneous correlation of 98.5%, which further
confirms our earlier findings on herding levels under a scopic regime. This high cor-
relation means that one can explain almost all the variation in purchase intensities
across assets of a certain random group of trade leader by looking at the purchase
intensities of another random group of traders. In addition, we report significant
evidence on persistence in herding across several time horizons, which fades away
slowly relative to what is reported in the literature for retail traders in a traditional
trading environment (Barber et al., 2009; Merli and Roger, 2013). This is in line
with our argument that a scopic regime increases the likelihood of constant and
perpetual herding, as individuals try to emulate the success of other participants by
mimicking their current as well as historical trades.
1.3.2 Disposition Effect of Trade Leaders
Research question 2: Do trade leaders on STPs exhibit the disposition effect, or does
the vast amount of information and constant investor scrutiny under a scopic regime
erode this behavioral bias?
In the second study, we examine whether trade leaders exhibit the disposition
effect, which is understood as the tendency to realize gains and hold on to losses (She-
frin and Statman, 1985). Under the assumption of an efficient market, a greater de-
gree of information transparency allows market participants to make better-informed
decisions. Moreover, many studies including Shapira and Venezia (2001), Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001), Feng and Seasholes (2005), Dhar and Zhu (2006), Chen et al.
(2007), Boolell-Gunesh et al. (2009), and Seru et al. (2010) show that individuals
with more financial knowledge and experience exhibit a lower disposition effect com-
pared to individuals with little or no financial knowledge. We build on this finding
and propose that, as market information becomes more abundant and accessible,
the disposition effect should cease to exist as participants adjust for it by learning
from past trades. Since the scopic regime governing STPs requires participants to
disclose all their past and current trades, trade leaders are able to learn not only
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from their personal historical trading activity, but also from the trades of all other
participants on the network. We argue that there should be weak or no evidence of
the disposition effect in an information-rich environment such as a STP, compared
to a traditional trading platform.
We use a data set from the popular eToro STP with over 2.6 million trades
executed by 77,476 trade leaders in 2013, in order to test whether exposure to a
transparent and information-rich environment decreases the disposition effect. To
do so, we adopt two empirical methods: the first, proposed by Odean (1998a), re-
quires the calculation of the disposition spread, which is the difference between the
proportion of gains realized and the proportion of losses realized, and the second is
based on the Cox proportional hazards model. Moreover, we compare the results
obtained for trade leaders on eToro to those of traders on a traditional online trading
platform, which we call Anonymous, that does not offer integrated social trading
and networking features. In general, both empirical methods show weaker evidence
of the disposition effect in the scopic environment compared to the traditional finan-
cial setting, which suggests that the high degree of information transparency and
the abundance of information erode this behavioral bias, although not completely.
This finding contradicts what has been reported by Heimer (2015), who examines
a sample of retail traders on a STP, and finds that exposure to large amounts of
information leads to an increase in the disposition effect. Nevertheless, there are
significant differences between our data set and the one used by the author, which
we discuss in more detail in our study. Our finding concurs with the learning hy-
pothesis discussed in the literature, where individuals on a STP can adjust for this
behavioral bias by learning not only from their own historical trades, but also from
the trades of others. Hence, as information on order flow becomes more accessible,
trade leaders learn from these “experiences” in order to adjust for the disposition
effect. Nevertheless, this does not mean that traders in a traditional financial envi-
ronment do not learn from their own historical trades. Thus, we argue that traders
in a scopic environment learn at a faster rate compared to traders in a traditional
trading setting. Another potential explanation for the weak evidence of the dis-
position effect in the scopic environment is that the constant scrutiny by investors
may drive trade leaders to close losing positions with almost the same propensity of
closing winning positions in order to avoid holding unjustifiable paper losses. Our
findings show that, by simply increasing information transparency regarding order
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flow, individuals can learn to avoid selling winners early and holding on to losses for
too long, thus improving their performance.
1.3.3 Do Trade Leaders Make Informed Decisions?
Research question 3: Do trade leaders on STPs possess superior predictive ability
such that they are deemed informed, and if so, what are the trading characteristics
of these informed individuals?
In the third study, we investigate the predictive ability of trade leaders under a
scopic regime in the foreign exchange and commodities markets, where individuals
have access to high quality order flow data. This differentiates our study from early
research done on the predictive power of technical analysis (Abbey and Doukas,
2012). It also parallels the work of Hayley and Marsh (2015) on the performance
and learning ability of currency traders in a traditional trading environment. Addi-
tionally, it expands on the evidence presented by Nolte and Nolte (2016), who show
that the information contained in the aggregate order flow of individual traders has
significant predictive power. An informed trader is defined as an individual whose
actions convey valuable short-term price information (Fishe and Smith, 2012). We
specifically focus on the foreign exchange market, where a decentralized structure
and lack of aggregate order flow data have ensued a debate of whether information
differentials could allow traders to place informed trades (Goodhart, 1988; Lyons,
1997). Researchers including Lyons (2001) have argued that there exist several
channels, such as order flow, through which private information plays an important
role. Moreover, several early studies such as Goodhart (1988), Lyons (1997), Peiers
(1997), and Covrig and Melvin (2002) discuss how private data on order flow in
the foreign exchange market may result in information differentials that can be ad-
vantageously used by brokerage firms and money managers in order to gauge the
fundamental value of currencies. Nevertheless, the scope of these early studies was
confined due to the limited access to order flow data, which prevented in-depth anal-
ysis of individual trader behavior in the foreign exchange market (Lyons, 1995). As
such, a large portion of the literature on informed trading focuses on futures traders,
since information was more readily accessible from the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), and on individual stock traders.
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In the futures markets, the evidence on informed trading has been mixed. Stud-
ies such as Bessembinder (1992), Leuthold et al. (1994), De Roon et al. (2000),
Wang (2001), Dewally et al. (2013), and Fishe and Smith (2012) present evidence of
informed trading that supports the risk premium theory proposed by Keynes (1930)
and Hicks (1946), which states that rational futures speculators would only enter
the market if expected profits are positive. Other studies such as Fama and French
(1987), Hartzmark (1987), Hartzmark (1991), and Kolb (1992) argue that the pro-
portion of individuals with consistent forecasting ability is no more than one would
expect due to luck. Moreover, studies on individual stock traders such as Odean
(1998a,b, 1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) argue that the trading characteristics
of individual investors are affected by behavioral biases, which in turn negatively
impact performance.
Given the mixed empirical evidence in the literature, and despite potential be-
havioral biases, we expect that an environment that is highly transparent regarding
order flow information should increase the overall prospects of informed trading.
Thus, we aim to answer the following: are trade leaders on STPs actually informed?
To investigate this, we use a data set from the highly popular eToro STP and clas-
sify over 700 thousand transactions executed by 41,072 position trade leaders —
traders who keep positions open for more than one trading day — and over 1.7
million transactions executed by 48,691 intraday trade leaders in 19 different assets
during 2013. These assets comprise of 16 currency pairs and three commodities. We
employ empirical techniques similar to those proposed by Henriksson and Merton
(1981) and Fishe and Smith (2012) in order to identify trade leaders as either po-
sition informed, intraday informed, momentum, contrarian, or uninformed. First,
we use two binary profit rules based on unrealized profits (or position profits) and
realized profits (or daily trading profits), separately, to assess whether position trade
leaders are informed. In addition, we apply to each profit rule an unconditional test
and a conditional test similar to the method proposed by Henriksson and Merton
(1981) (HM test henceforth), where the former is a binomial test for the expectation
of being profitable more than 50% of the time, and the latter tests whether traders
are able to correctly predict future price movements in both upward and downward
trending markets. Second, we analyze intraday profits and the relationship between
position direction and past price movements in order to identify intraday trade
leaders as either informed, momentum, contrarian, or uninformed. Since we have
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thousands of trade leaders, which results in thousands of test statistics, a multiple-
testing problem arises where some tests may be significant due to chance. In order
to control for these luck events, we use the false discovery rate (FDR) method de-
veloped by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) with a 5% critical value. This ensures
that at least 95% of trade leaders that are identified as informed are truly informed.
For position trade leaders, the unconditional test identifies around 50% of these
individuals as informed, meaning that half of the position traders have profitably
executed more than 50% of their trades. When we apply the HM test, the pro-
portion of traders identified as position informed drops between 0.11% and 1.31%.
This suggests that, while many position trade leaders can consistently predict price
changes in a specific state of the market, very few possess the skill to do so in all
market conditions. We use a series of logistic models to examine the characteristics
of position informed trade leaders, where the dependent binary variable indicates
whether a trade leader is informed depending on the profit rule and test used. Since
the daily trading profits rule signifies the ultimate decision of the trader, and since
the models based on this rule have a superior fit, we focus the discussion on these
results. In particular, we find that position informed trade leaders under the un-
conditional test tend to use greater leverage, apply limit orders to realize gains and
limit losses, use less equity per trade, are generally successful in long trades, have
longer trade durations, trade less frequently, and trade in multiple assets. When we
analyze the characteristics of position informed traders under the HM test, we find
that these individuals use less leverage, employ limit orders effectively, use more
equity per trade, are able to short-sell profitably, have long trade durations, trade
more frequently, and trade in multiple assets. While both tests assess whether or not
an individual is informed, each test has a different definition of “being informed.”
Hence, the key differences between the characteristics of informed position trade
leaders under the unconditional test and under the HM test are that informed in-
dividuals who can predict price movements in any state of the market tend to 1)
use less leverage, 2) use more equity per trade, 3) short-sell profitably, and 4) trade
more frequently. In other words, these individuals are risk-averse, are more confi-
dent in their trading decisions, can more accurately predict the overall direction of
the market, and aim to seize a larger number of potentially profitable opportunities.
With respect to intraday trade leaders, we identify around 15%, 49%, 29%,
and 0.3% of the sample as informed, momentum, contrarian, and uninformed, re-
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spectively. We also examine the characteristics of these types of intraday traders
using logistic regressions, and find the highest explanatory power for the intraday
informed model. Specifically, we find that intraday informed trade leaders use rela-
tively lower leverage ratios, employ limit orders to automatically realize gains and
minimize losses, use more of their equity in each trade, are more successful in short
trades, have relatively longer trade durations, trade more frequently, and diversify
their trades in multiple assets.
Our findings suggest that an environment characterized by high transparency
regarding order flow information — such as a scopic regime — can create short
term information differentials that generate profitable opportunities in the foreign
exchange as well as the commodities markets.
1.4 Contribution
This thesis contributes to the growing phenomenon of social trading, in order to
better understand the impact of this unique trading environment on trader behav-
ior. Our findings help traders and investors identify and mitigate behavioral biases,
which constitute a significant risk component, as well as make more informed in-
vestment decisions. In particular, we first examine herding behavior among trade
leaders, which has not been studied before in such a trading environment, and report
significant evidence of herding. This finding is valuable to investors who wish to di-
versify their investments across multiple trade leaders, since herding can diminish the
benefits from diversification as the correlation between the trading strategies of trade
leaders converges to one. As social trading increases in popularity and becomes an
integral component of portfolios of both retail and institutional investors, account-
ing for herding behavior becomes imperative since it affects the overall volatility of
the portfolio. Hence, understanding the drivers behind this behavioral bias allows
investors to manage risk more effectively. The second behavioral bias we investigate
is the disposition effect, where we find weak evidence of this effect for trade leaders
in a scopic environment. In contrast to what has been found by Heimer (2015), our
results suggest that heightened exposure to information can decrease the disposition
of traders to realize gains and hold on to losses. By learning to adjust for this bias,
traders and investors benefit as they avoid paying taxes on current capital gains
by keeping winning trades open, and reduce their current tax expense by realizing
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losses. Dhar and Zhu (2006) suggest that brokerage firms should educate their clients
about the disposition effect and how to avoid it in order to adhere to a tax-efficient
strategy. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that high information transparency and
free access to order flow data is all that is required for traders to efficiently learn on
their own to avoid this bias. The third contribution of this thesis aims to answer
whether trade leaders possess superior predictive skills such that they are deemed
informed, and if so, what are their trading behavior characteristics. Our findings
show that, while around half of position trade leaders trade profitably more than
half of the time, few of them possess the ability to correctly forecast future price
changes in both good and bad market conditions. This means that investors should
either try to identify trade leaders who can predict price changes in all market con-
ditions and passively copy their trades, or adjust their exposure to trade leaders
who possess predictive skill in a specific state of the market, which entails a more
active investment approach.
The contributions of this thesis provide insight into the characteristics of this
novel socio-financial asset class. Moreover, our findings provide a basis on which
future research can investigate the relation between socio-financial assets and other
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Does a Scopic Regime Produce
Conformism? Herding Behavior
among Trade Leaders on Social
Trading Platforms
Abstract
Herding has been widely studied in traditional financial markets. In this paper, we
empirically examine herding behavior of a group of traders, which we label as trade
leaders, in a novel financial environment called social trading. Social trading plat-
forms (STPs) are highly transparent online markets, governed by a scopic regime,
where participants are subject to constant reciprocal scrutiny. We use a data set
from the popular eToro STP, with over two million transactions executed by 77,476
aspiring trade leaders, in order to test whether a scopic regime produces excess levels
of herding over and above those found in other market settings. We show that the
scopic regime results in excess levels of herding. Additionally, we find that herding
among aspiring trade leaders is relatively high when market information is scarce,
relatively low among risk-seeking traders, and that herding increases as investment
size increases. Moreover, small-sized trades are used in an experimental fashion in
order to emulate potentially profitable strategies. Finally, we find that herding be-
havior highly persists across several time periods, at much higher levels compared
to what has been reported in other market environments.
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2.1 Introduction
A common phenomenon that has been documented in behavioral finance literature
is that investors have a tendency to herd, thus accumulating on the same side of the
market. Herding behavior occurs when investors make the same decisions, either by
intentionally mimicking other’s investment strategies, or unintentionally as a result
of acting on common information. While the latter type of herding is seen as a
result of efficient markets, intentional herding has the potential to increase volatility
and destabilize markets (Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh, 2003). This is due to the fact
that individual investors who follow the crowd, also referred to as noise traders,
have the capacity to affect asset prices since their correlated actions are systematic
(Barber et al., 2009). In recent years, the notion of herding has been capitalized on
by many brokerage firms, and incorporated into online trading, thus resulting in a
new trading environment known as social trading.
Social trading is a novel concept that combines online trading with the tools
provided by social media platforms, the result of which is a highly transparent trad-
ing marketplace known as a social trading platform (STP), where traders come
together to communicate, collaborate on research tasks and trading strategies, and
even explicitly copy each other’s trading activities in real-time using a mirror trad-
ing algorithm. This system requires complete disclosure from participants regarding
their real-time portfolio holdings and historical trading activities. Hence, STPs are
governed by what is known as a “scopic regime”, which designates a situation where
participants do not observe each other directly but can see the results of each other’s
actions (Knorr Cetina, 2003). Consequently, participants are judged based on their
actions, and are cognitively positioned in a hierarchy of status levels. One manifes-
tation of this concept is the categorization of STP participants into two main groups:
trade leaders (signal providers) and investors (signal followers or copiers), where the
former presumably includes experienced traders of a superior status who manage the
funds allocated to them by investors in return for monetary compensation (Doering
et al., 2015). Trade leaders compete to attract potential investors by signaling their
status as leaders, which is attained by executing original trades. In other words,
entering trades manually into the STP signifies that the trader is knowledgeable,
skilled, and confident enough not to resort to explicit copying. Investors can simply
click a button to copy a single trade or all future trades of a certain trade leader,
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and do not need to intervene except for terminating this copying relationship. An
investor can diversify his investments across multiple trade leaders with different
trading styles in aim of decreasing his overall portfolio volatility. It is important to
note that the investor still has the authority to modify the terms of a copied trade,
such as adding a stop-loss level, in which case the trade is still considered to be
copied. It follows that a trade is considered to be unique (i.e. not explicitly copied)
only in the case where it has been manually entered by a trader into the trading
platform. Moreover, the relationship between trade leaders and investors is largely
informal, as there are no official sanctions should a trade leader go rogue, deviate
from his advertised strategy, or lose his copiers’ money.
While the principal-agent relationship between trade leaders and investors is also
found in the fund industry, it differs greatly in two key aspects that render STPs a
highly unique trading environment. First, STPs are based on the notion of complete
disclosure of order flow data, which is particularly valuable to individual investors
who seek high-quality and unbiased information for financial decision making. More-
over, order flow data is used by STPs to provide a ranking of trade leaders that is
updated in real-time. This is in contrast to the non-frequent performance assess-
ment of fund managers of traditional financial institutions such as hedge funds, who
are not legally obligated to disclose their past performance and strategies but may
selectively do so in a manner that suits their interests. Second, STPs encourage
collaborative trading, a concept which is extremely different to what is observed on
trading floors, where participants tend to keep their information and strategies pri-
vate, and attempt to decipher the motives and emotions of others (Fenton-O’Creevy
et al., 2012).
Very few would argue against an environment that promotes information trans-
parency, as this increases market efficiency and price discovery. While investors on
STPs can use the disclosed information to allocate their capital to the most suc-
cessful trade leaders, trade leaders can similarly use this information to imitate the
trading activities of their more successful peers. Such intentional herding allows
traders who are new to the platform, do not have sufficient time to analyze the mar-
kets, or simply do not possess superior trading skills, to jump-start their career as
money managers and start earning performance compensation by manually entering
orders identical to those of successful trade leaders as they are being published in
the real-time feed. This conformity can have significant consequences for investors
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who diversify their investments across trade leaders, since it results in higher cor-
relation among trading strategies, which in turn diminishes the volatility-reduction
benefits obtained from diversification. Nevertheless, the main puzzle we aim to
solve is whether the scopic regime induces herding behavior among trade leaders, or
motivates trade leaders to adopt differentiated trading styles.
Our hypothesis is that the scopic regime governing STPs increases the likelihood
of herding behavior among trade leaders, and that this level of herding exceeds those
found in traditional financial environments. To test this, we use a unique propri-
etary data set of transactions executed by 77,476 trade leaders during 2013 on the
highly popular eToro STP, and compute the two herding measures developed by
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) (LSV henceforth) and Frey, Herbst, and
Walter (2014) (FHW henceforth) to provide a range for the true level of herding.
Based on these two measures, the overall level of herding for the entire sample of
trade leaders is estimated to lie between the lower LSV measure of 16.5% and the
upper FHW measure of 23.9%. These figures exceed the levels presented in the liter-
ature for both institutional and retail investors in traditional trading environments.
Furthermore, we estimate herding for sub-samples selected according to three trad-
ing behavior characteristics; trading intensity, risk appetite (proxied by leverage),
and trade size. First, we find that as the number of active traders in a security
increases, the level of herding decreases proportionally. This is shown to be due to
increased herding behavior in securities that have less market information, which
results in informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Regarding herding
and risk appetite, we find evidence of an inverted u-shaped relationship, which is in
line with the hypothesis that overconfident traders take on more risk and tend to
herd less. When examining the association between herding and trade size, we find
a u-shape relation. The larger the trade size, the more a trader has to lose, thus
increasing the likelihood of following the general consensus. As for small trades, the
herding level is relatively high and may be the result of trade leader sophistication
(Doering et al., 2015). The idea is that small trades may be regarded as an option
for the trade leader to imitate others; one can increase exposure if the strategy is
profitable, or simply cut losses should the strategy be unprofitable. Finally, we in-
vestigate persistence in herding behavior by computing the mean contemporaneous
and time-series correlations of purchase intensities based on the method presented
by Barber et al. (2009). The results show a significant and almost perfect contempo-
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raneous correlation of 98.5%, which further confirms our earlier findings. Moreover,
we report significant evidence on persistence in herding across several time horizons,
which fades away relatively slowly compared to what is reported for retail traders
in a conventional trading environment (Barber et al., 2009; Merli and Roger, 2013).
This is in line with our argument that a scopic regime increases the likelihood of
constant herding.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 covers the
theoretical and empirical literature on herding behavior. Section 2.3 details the
methodology and the two herding measures that are employed to estimate herding
among trade leaders. In section 2.4, we present the data that is used along with key
descriptive statistics on the trading behavior of trade leaders. Furthermore, section
2.5 is dedicated to the discussion of the findings of this study. The final section
recaps the results and highlights some of the implications arising from herding on
STPs.
2.2 Literature Review
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine herding behavior in
a social trading context. Hence, the literature we present focuses on herding among
participants in traditional financial settings, and serves as a point of comparison of
herding behavior between a scopic and a traditional environment.
2.2.1 Theoretical Literature
Recent finance theory has differentiated between intentional, and unintentional or
spurious herding. Intentional herding is driven by sentiment and entails the ex-
plicit imitation of the activities of others, which may lead to inefficient markets
where prices fail to reflect fundamental information, in addition to increased volatil-
ity and destabilization of markets (Persaud, 2000; Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh, 2003).
Nonetheless, several researchers have proposed theories and models portraying inten-
tional herding as a rational behavior. For instance, models on informational herding
are based on the notion that reliable market information is scarce. The possibility
that some investors are more knowledgeable about the market may motivate a less
informed investor to try and infer information from past or even current trades of
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others, leading to informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992).
Nevertheless, Avery and Zemsky (1998) argue that if asset prices are endogenous,
then they should reflect all information inherent in past transactions. As a conse-
quence, prices should ultimately converge to reflect fundamental information, such
that investors would have no incentive to follow the crowd. Another branch of liter-
ature rationalizes intentional herding as a consequence of institutional schemes such
as reputation and compensation. For example, Maug and Naik (2011) find that
remuneration packages may give fund managers an incentive to herd, especially
when the amount of compensation received by the manager is based on performance
relative to a benchmark. Similarly, studies by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Das-
gupta and Prat (2008) examine the relationship between reputation and herding,
and show that managers would sacrifice the potential to generate high returns as a
trade-off against not tarnishing their reputation due to relative underperformance.
In other words, fund managers may decide to disregard private valuable information
and simply follow the crowd due to career concerns related to underperforming their
peers (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Graham, 1999). Hence, when a manager’s repu-
tation and compensation are based on his performance relative to a benchmark or
to the average performance of comparable peers, it becomes tempting to mimic this
benchmark and sacrifice potential superior returns. As such, the more the managers
are concerned about their careers, the greater the degree of conformity among them.
Finally, a third reason why intentional herding may arise is due to weak market reg-
ulation or concentrated ownership (Borensztein and Gelos, 2003; Viet et al., 2008;
Oehler et al., 2008).
On the other hand, unintentional herding is mainly caused by investors acting on
the same or highly correlated information, leading them to arrive at similar trading
decisions (Hirshleifer et al., 1994). Barber et al. (2009) conduct a study on individual
investors and argue that coordinated trading is primarily driven by three behavioral
factors. The first is representativeness heuristics, where investors with similar beliefs
about an asset’s performance persistence are likely to trade the same asset. This
argument echoes the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and De Bondt (1993),
who argue that investors tend to make decisions where they expect the distribution
of a small sample or short time series to be representative of that of the population.
Moreover, another form of representativeness heuristics is discussed by Falkenstein
(1996), who argues that managers may share a preference towards assets with specific
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risk or liquidity characteristics. The second factor is based on investors’ attention,
the reason being that individual investors do not have the capacity to analyze all
assets available to them for investment, and may simply focus on the ones that
are currently in the news spotlight. Barber and Odean (2008) and Odean (1999)
hypothesize that individual investors are often faced with the dilemma of searching
through thousands of stocks to invest in. Due to limited time and human capacity
to analyze the entire universe of assets, investors tend to focus mostly on stocks that
have caught their attention. While investors do not buy all stocks that catch their
attention, their investments are highly likely to be chosen from this subset. Finally,
the third factor is the disposition effect, where investors tend to avoid the regret
related to selling losing investments, thus sell winning ones instead. As such, herding
arises when investors sell an asset that has recently increased in value. Overall, we
can identify two main categories of explanatory factors that induce herding behavior:
institutional, and cognitive-psychological.
2.2.2 Empirical Literature
Measuring herding behavior can be difficult in practice (Bellando, 2012). Nonethe-
less, a notable paper by LSV presented a simple statistic to empirically estimate
correlated trading among groups of investors, which has since become a standard
measure of herd behavior despite the drawbacks it presents. The main idea un-
derlying the LSV measure is that it analyzes the aggregate buying pressure on a
specific asset for a selected subgroup of traders over a period of time. Theoretically,
for the entire universe of traders, herding does not exist since the number of buyers
equal the number of sellers. However, when one focuses on a subgroup of traders
in a particular asset, there can be a majority of buyers or sellers, which may be
attributed to herding.
LSV apply their measure to U.S. equity pension fund managers and find an
overall mean herding level of 0.027. The following quote by LSV (1992: p. 30) aids
in the understanding of how this figure is interpreted:
“. . . it implies that if p, the average fraction of changes that are in-
creases, was 0.5, then 52.7% of the money managers were changing their
holdings of an average stock in one direction and 47.3% in the opposite
direction.”
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Many empirical studies on herding among institutional investors have been based
on the seminal work of LSV. For instance, Grinblatt et al. (1995) use a sample of
274 mutual funds from December 1974 to December 1984 and find weak evidence
of herding with a mean LSV measure of 2.5%. Graham (1999) uses a more recent
sample of U.S. mutual funds from 1975 to 1999 and reports a slightly higher herding
measure of 3.4%. Similarly, Wermers (1999) uses the LSV measure on 20 years of
U.S. mutual fund data and confirms the evidence of herding among U.S. mutual
funds presented by earlier studies. In contrast to the U.S. market, researchers have
estimated herding to be higher in emerging markets and several European markets
such as in Germany (Walter and Moritz Weber, 2006; Frey et al., 2014; Kremer and
Nautz, 2013), Finland (Kyrolainen and Perttunen, 2003), the U.K. (Wylie, 2005),
France (Arouri et al., 2013), Poland (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005), and Portugal
(Lobao and Serra, 2007). For example, (Lobao and Serra, 2007) estimate herding
behavior among 32 equity mutual funds in Portugal between 1998 and 2000, and
find a mean LSV measure of 11.38% over the three-year period. Another study
by Chang et al. (2000) examines herding behavior of fund managers in the U.S.,
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong using the herding measure proposed
by Christie and Huang (1995). The authors find evidence of herding in Taiwan and
South Korea but not in other markets. Similar evidence is presented by Choe et al.
(1999) who report surprisingly high herding levels in the Korean stock market in
1997. The higher level of herding in these developing markets is attributed to the
stage of development of the financial system (Walter and Moritz Weber, 2006; Oehler
et al., 2008), ambiguous information (Lobao and Serra, 2007), highly concentrated
stock ownership (Viet et al., 2008), or incomplete market regulation especially in
the area of market transparency (Borensztein and Gelos, 2003). Hence, deficiencies
in corporate disclosure and low quality of information raise doubts among market
participants on the reliability of market information, which consequently impedes
fundamental analysis (Gelos and Wei, 2002). As such, Kallinterakis and Kratunova
(2007) argue that, given weak financial regulation, investors tend to base their in-
vestment decisions on the actions of others.
LSV postulate that estimating herding across the entire population would the-
oretically result in no herding due to the fact that for each share bought there is a
share sold. Hence, herding is more likely to be detected within subsets of investors.
While all the aforementioned studies report significant evidence of herding behavior
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for the entire samples they use, they are nonetheless analyzing a sample of one sub-
set, such as mutual funds, pension funds, or individual traders in a specific country,
where herding behavior can exist. Given this argument, researchers have examined
herding within subgroups of investors that are selected according to specific char-
acteristics. For instance, LSV find more pronounced herding in small-cap stocks,
where they estimate a herding level of 6.1% for the smallest market-cap quantile,
which is in contrast to the low figure of 1.6% they report for the largest market-cap
quantile. Similar evidence is presented by Voronkova and Bohl (2005). Since mar-
ket capitalization of firms is often used as a proxy for the amount and quality of
information available, one may infer that higher herding levels in small-cap stocks
is evidence of intentional herding in situations where information is scarce. This
finding is in line with the theory of information availability discussed by Wermers
(1999), whereby investors are more likely to herd in situations where there is very
little market information. Opposing evidence is presented by FHW, who apply both
the LSV measure as well as their proposed herding measure to a data set of mutual
funds specializing in German stocks from 1998 to 2004. The authors report a de-
creasing relationship as well as below average herding levels for smaller stocks based
on the LSV measure; however they find that the number of fund managers active
in a stock is positively related to market capitalization. Consequently, one should
expect higher herding estimates for larger stocks due to the lower bias. The FHW
measure, on the other hand, shows a u-shaped relationship with a higher level of
herding for the smallest stocks. The study by Merli and Roger (2013) on individual
investors also shows evidence of higher herding levels for large market capitalization
stocks; however, this result is not obtained for all quarterly periods and is not ro-
bust when using the FHW measure. In particular, the authors find herding to be
higher for larger capitalization stocks in 23 out of the 31 quarter when using the
LSV measure, and higher for small capitalization stocks in 18 out of the 31 quarters
when using the FHW measure.
Several studies, including Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wermers (1999), Wylie (2005),
Lobao and Serra (2007), and Frey et al. (2014), examine herding behavior in rela-
tion to trading intensity by progressively increasing the minimum threshold for the
number of transactions in each asset. The evidence presented by these studies is
mixed. For instance, Grinblatt et al. (1995) report stronger evidence of herding in
stocks with a high trading intensity. Similarly, Wylie (2005) reports a positive and
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monotonic relationship between herding and trade intensity, with herding levels of
2.5% and 9% for minimum trading intensities of five and twenty five transactions,
respectively. FHW report evidence supporting these findings under the LSV mea-
sure, which they argue is due to the bias inherent in the calculation of the herding
measure. However, the authors find a u-shaped association under their proposed
FHW herding measure. In their study on individual investors, Merli and Roger
(2013) divide their data into low, medium and high trading intensity categories, and
find that the LSV herding measure is higher for stocks with a high trading volume.
Nonetheless, they do not obtain the same results when using the FHW measure. On
the other hand, Wermers (1999) finds little variation in the level of herding across the
different thresholds for trading intensity. The author shows that herding decreases
to just over 3% as trading intensity increases to more than 50 funds, and notes that
the highest trading activity is found in large-cap stocks, which exhibit lower levels
of herding. As such, the author argues that increasing the minimum threshold of
trade intensity implicitly changes the sample to larger and more liquid stocks, which
may overshadow any increase in herding that might arise from a larger number of
funds active in the stocks. The results presented by Rubbaniy et al. (2014) also
show a decreasing trend in the overall level of herding; however, the authors show
that herding increased as the number of active traders increased from two to ten,
and then again from twenty five to higher.
Other studies have investigated the relationship between herding behavior and
the state of the market. For instance, Choe et al. (1999) find evidence of high
levels of herding prior to the Asian crisis of 1997. Similar evidence is reported by
Bowe and Domuta (2004) using data from the Jakarta Stock Exchange following
the crisis, and Chiang and Zheng (2010) in developed markets not including the
U.S. In addition, FHW examine herding in sub-periods and find the highest level
of herding at the peak, and during the bursting of the internet bubble from 2000
to 2001. Rubbaniy et al. (2014) argue that the higher overall herding levels during
times of crisis was primarily due to sell-side herding, which appeared to be driven by
less risky assets. To elaborate, the authors argue that during a crisis, fund managers
increase their portfolio allocation to less risky assets, such as bonds. Nonetheless,
market turbulence negatively affects the prices of equities leading to a gap between
strategic and actual equity allocations. To reduce this gap, fund managers should
increase their allocation to equities, but are less confident in their private information
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due to increased market volatility. Therefore, fund managers tend to herd in order
to avoid potential underperformance against their peer group resulting from high
market instability. These findings suggest that heightened herding in an institutional
context is situational, in the sense that it increases as uncertainty increases.
Another branch of literature focuses on herding behavior among individual or
retail investors. Using a sample of daily transactions executed by more than 37,000
individual investors at a German discount broker from February 1998 to May 2000,
Dorn et al. (2008) report a mean LSV estimate of 8.3%. The authors argue that
the high level of herding appears to be primarily driven by correlated speculative
motives. In other words, investors buy the same asset because they share the belief
that this particular asset will appreciate in the future, and not because the asset
is an optimal addition to a well-diversified portfolio. Moreover, a study performed
by Barber et al. (2009) uses two data sets, the first composed of 66,465 investors
obtained from a discount broker, and the second containing 665,544 investors at
a retail broker. The authors report LSV herding measures of 6.81% and 12.79%,
respectively for these data sets. Finally, Merli and Roger (2013) use a sample of
87,373 French retail investors obtained from a major European broker house for the
period January 1999 to December 2006. Depending on the period used, the authors
report higher herding levels compared to previous studies and conclude that herding
among French individual investors falls between the lower LSV limit of 12.63% and
the upper FHW limit of 21.70%.
Given the findings presented above, the general consensus in the literature is
that herding behavior among individual investors is higher and more persistent as
compared to institutional investors. While these studies examine herding behavior
under traditional trading environments, the scopic regime governing STPs raises
the following question. What happens when participants find themselves in an en-
vironment that embraces the free flow of information? Does the availability of order
flow data, and constant scrutiny by investors increase the level of, and persistence
in herding behavior among trade leaders over and above those found in non-scopic
environments? We expect that an information-rich scopic environment, in which
trade leaders are permanently scrutinized will increase their tendency to herd, as a
mechanism for preserving their status. In order to empirically test this proposition,
we begin by presenting the methodologies proposed by LSV and FHW.
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2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 The LSV Herding Measure
LSV developed one of the most popular herding measures used in the literature,
(HLSV henceforth), which estimates the tendency of traders to gather on the same
side of the market in a particular asset during a given period. The idea underlying
this measure is that trading (buying or selling) is a binary decision with a random
distribution for all assets and periods given the hypothesis of no herding. Hence,
excessive trading of an asset in a certain direction and in a given period can be
interpreted as herding behavior. More specifically, herding occurs when the propor-
tion of traders in a given asset trading in the same direction (buying or selling) is
greater than the proportion of traders in the entire asset universe that are in that
direction under the null hypothesis that trading decisions are independent. The
HLSV measure can be expressed as:
HLSVi,t = |pii,t − pˆit| − E
[∣∣∣∣∣ b˜i,tni,t − pˆit





where pii,t = bi,t/ni,t is the buy proportion of traders, such that bi,t is the number
of traders buying, and ni,t is the total number of active traders in security i during




is the average proportion of traders buying
relative to the total number of active traders in the entire asset universe I in period
t, which is also the expected probability of being a buyer under the null hypothesis
of no herding. pˆit is subtracted in order to account for liquidity shocks. For example,
when the majority of traders are buying securities, this does not necessarily mean
that they are herding. Such a phenomenon can simply be due to the fact that
these securities offer more attractive risk-adjusted returns. As investors realize and
take advantage of this opportunity they are likely to have invested in the same
direction, thus ending up on the same market side. Therefore, subtracting pˆit will
take into account the general shifts in and out of the market and would separate
this phenomenon from herding behavior. Since the term on the left in equation
2.1 will be positive even under the null hypothesis (due to the stochastic nature
of trades), the second term, AFi,t, is an adjustment factor that corrects for this
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expected dispersion. The adjustment factor allows for random variation around pˆit
under the null hypothesis of independent trading decisions, and is the expected value
of the left-hand term in equation 2.1, when the number of buyers b˜i,t is binomially
distributed with probability pˆit and ni,t independent draws.
1 The overall degree of
herding behavior is measured by averaging HLSVi,t across all security-periods, i, t.
A positive and significant HLSV measure indicates the existence of herding behavior
among traders under the assumption of normality. This can be formally written as:
H0 : HLSV ≤ 0 and HA : HLSV > 0.
The HLSV measure has been criticized by many academics in the literature be-
cause it suffers from several drawbacks. First, Oehler (1998) and Bikhchandani and
Sharma (2000) highlight the fact that this measure only considers the number of buy-
ers and sellers and does not take into account the volume of the asset being traded.
If funds or traders are more homogeneous for large volume trades as compared to
low volume trades, then assigning equal weights to all transactions will undervalue
the level of herding. To illustrate this point, consider the scenario where there ex-
ists an equal number of buyers and sellers, but the amount of the security that is
collectively bought is much larger than the aggregate amount sold. In this case,
the HLSV measure would not detect herding behavior in the security even though
it exists. Second, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) argue that the LSV measure
captures both intentional and unintentional herding. Differentiating between these
two types of herding behavior is crucial since the latter is an expected product of
an efficient market, while the former has the potential of increasing volatility and
destabilizing markets. Third, the HLSV measure does not allow us to identify in-
tertemporal changes in herding behavior. While we are able to study how investors
herd in a given security over time, this measure does not permit us to examine
whether it is the same individuals that continue to herd in that asset. Finally, FHW
and Bellando (2012) demonstrate that under the alternative hypothesis of herding,
the HLSV measure has a positive value in expectations, resulting in a downward
bias relative to the true herding measure that increases with the level of herding.
However, these two studies show that the bias decreases as the number of active
1See Appendix A for an example on how to compute the adjustment factor, AFi,t, and its effect
on the HLSV measure.
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traders in the asset during the period increases. This is empirically proven by Merli
and Roger (2013) who present evidence supporting the notion that herding increases
when a minimum threshold for the number of active traders is imposed. Ignoring
the adjustment factor in the HLSV measure would overstate true herding behavior
since a portion of the dispersion is inevitable due to the stochastic nature of trading
decisions. Nonetheless, the adjustment factor results in an over-correction of the ex-
cess dispersion which leads to a downward bias of the herding statistic (Frey et al.,
2014). To overcome this issue, FHW propose an alternative measure of herding be-
havior, which they claim is an unbiased and consistent estimate of the true level of
herding. However, Bellando (2012) shows that their measure is only unbiased in the
specific scenario they consider in their simulation, where the expectations of both
buying and selling assets are equal. Moreover, Bellando (2012) shows that when
this condition is not satisfied, the FHW herding measure becomes biased, and is
actually the upper bound of the true herding level, while the LSV measure is the
lower bound. Building on this important point, we present the herding measure
developed by FHW in the following section.
2.3.2 The FHW Herding Measure
FHW propose a new herding measure (labeled HFHW henceforth), which they argue
is a consistent estimate of the true herding level, δ. The rationale behind this
measure is similar to that of the HLSV, in the sense that it calculates the excess
dispersion of trades on either side of the market (buy or sell). However, instead of
using the first absolute moment, the HFHW measure employs the second moment,
which is the traditional statistical measure of dispersion.2
Since the HFHW measure employs parameters that are similar to those used in
the calculation of the HLSV measure, similar notations will be utilized to write the
mathematical expression. Namely, pˆit is the average proportion of traders buying
relative to the total number of active traders in the entire asset universe I in period
t. In addition, bi,t is the number of traders buying and ni,t is the total number of
active traders in security i during period t, such that pii,t is the proportion of buy
2See Katti (1960) for more information on absolute moments of discrete distributions.
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transactions. Given these parameters, we write:
H2i,t =
(bi,t − pˆitni,t)2 − ni,tpˆit(1− pˆit)
ni,t(ni,t − 1) . (2.2)
The numerator in equation 2.2 is the empirical variance minus the expected variance
of a binomial distribution with ni,t number of draws and a buy probability of pˆit.
It is important to note that this measure is the complement of the HLSV measure,
except for using the second moment and the normalization in the denominator,
which yields more desirable statistical properties.3
The H2 measure is averaged across securities and periods to obtain an estimate
of the overall herding behavior. Let the set of all security-periods i, t be denoted by







In order to make the aggregated herding measure comparable to the HLSV, the




The HFHWA term is the one of interest in this study. In contrast to the HLSV
measure, the following statistical properties can be derived for the HFHW measure
and its variants in closed form.
1. H2i,t is an unbiased estimator of (δi,t)2.
2. H2A is an unbiased estimator of (δA)2.
3. HFHWA is a consistent estimator of δA as #A →∞.
3FHW show that equation 2.2 can be re-written in a manner similar to HLSV such that,
HLSVi,t = |pii,t − pˆit| − E










where E[.] is the expected value under the hypothesis of no herding.
4When the H2 term is negative, which is possible for low number of observations and a minimal
level of herding, the square root of the absolute value of H2 multiplied by -1. However, such a case
rarely occurs given the high levels of herding and the large number of observations in empirical
studies.
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The hypothesis that we test can be expressed as:
H0 : HFHW ≤ 0 and HA : HFHW > 0.
While HLSV is biased under the alternative hypothesis of herding, but performs
well under the null hypothesis, the opposite is true for HFHW. FHW argue that
given a small number of traders n, HFHW would exhibit a downward bias which
stems from the non-linearity of taking the square root of the unbiased estimator H2.
Additionally, HFHW is not reliable under the null hypothesis of no herding; however
it is a consistent estimator if there exists a significant level of herding in the sample.
If significant herding behavior is confirmed using the HLSV or H2 measures, then
the level of herding can be estimated consistently using the HFHW statistic.
One criticism of the HFHW measure is that it is only unbiased in the particular
environment considered by the authors, where pˆi = 0.5 (i.e. where the probability
that a stock is bought is equal to the probability that it is sold). Bellando (2012)
argues that when the probability of no herding is not null, HFHW exhibits an upward
bias, which arises when aggregating the H2 measure across all security-periods i, t
as expressed in equation 2.3. In particular, the bias occurs due to the fact that the
square root of a sum is not (except in unique cases) the sum of the square root of
estimates. While it is practically impossible to compute the true herding level, the
author shows that this value is bounded by the lower HLSV estimate and the upper
HFHW estimate.5
2.4 Data
The data set used in this study is obtained from eToro, one of the largest and
most popular STPs, and contains over 63 million transactions executed by all trade
leaders and investors during 2013. eToro offers traders a wide range of assets from
5Bellando (2012) proposed a modified version of the HFHW estimate which, given the real
probabilities of buying and selling a specific security, would provide the theoretical true herding








where pˆibuyt and pˆi
sell
t are the probabilities of buy-side and sell-side categories of securities. The
author states that the corrected method is not very tractable since it requires prior knowledge of
the herding level and the probabilities pˆibuyt and pˆi
sell
t , which may be difficult to estimate.
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several markets, including currencies, commodities, and equities, which are listed in
Table 1.1. Participants on eToro do not trade the actual asset, but instead open
a position through a standardized contract for difference (CFD) that is written on
the asset. A CFD is an electronic contract between a trader and a broker (the CFD
provider), whereby the trader forgoes physical ownership of the underlying asset for a
contract with the broker that provides the same economic exposure (Norman, 2009).
CFDs are essentially derivative instruments that allow traders to gain exposure and
speculate on the direction of the underlying asset, without the need of ownership.
These contracts are traded on margin, thus the trader may deposit an amount of
equity that is considerably less than the asset’s notional value, potentially leading
to highly leveraged positions. The STP records the details of each CFD transaction,
including the opening and closing prices, the amount bought or sold, the leverage
used, the direction, as well as the time-stamp of each trade. Since this study is
focused on the herding behavior among trade leaders, we apply a strict criterion
where we only select traders whose transactions were all entered manually into the
STP during 2013. It is important to note that many traders can have a mix of
manual as well as explicitly copied trades; however, these traders are not considered
to be trade leaders but rather investors who reserve a portion of their capital for
personal trading. Executing only manual trades signals potential superior status,
confidence, and skill, whereby the trade leader is seen by investors as a unique and
autonomous entity with the ability to add value.
The final sample encompasses over 2.6 million transactions executed by 77,476
trade leaders. These transactions can be categorized according to the asset traded
as follows: currencies constitute the majority with 83.14% of transactions, whereas
commodities, indices, and stocks make up 11.21%, 3.6% and 2.05%, respectively.
Moreover, we calculate several behavioral trading characteristics, which are first
averaged across all transactions for each trade leader, and then averaged across all
trade leaders. These statistics are presented in Table 2.1. On average, 66.11% of
transactions are long positions, with a mean leverage ratio of 175. These results
are consistent with the notion that trade leaders are considered to be sophisticated,
such that they enter in both long and short positions (Engelberg et al., 2012, 2014),
and are confident enough in their trading abilities to employ high levels of leverage.
Regarding the average duration of a trade, trade leaders keep transactions open
for approximately 6 days, which indicates that they are aware of the impact of
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rollover costs on profits associated with keeping positions open over the weekend.
Similarly, the average number of annual trades for trade leaders is around 34, which
is much lower than that of the entire sample of participants — the average for the
entire sample is 207 —, indicating that trade leaders account for trading costs when
optimizing their strategies. Finally, we find that trade leaders on average trade in
around three to four different assets, which suggests that they tend to be specialized
in specific assets.
2.5 Results
In order to test whether the scopic regime governing STPs leads to excess herding,
we compute the HLSV and HFHW measures for the entire sample of trade leaders
and compare the results to herding levels among fund managers and retail investors
in traditional trading environments. The results presented in the first row of Table
2.2 (i.e. where n ≥ 0 and there are no restrictions on trade intensity) show that the
level of herding among trade leaders ranges between the lower HLSV limit of 16.5%
and the upper HFHW limit of 23.9% (based on monthly periods), and is significantly
higher compared to results from studies on institutional and retail investors. Since
trade leaders are essentially retail traders who happen to trade on a STP instead
of a traditional online platform, a comparison between trade leaders and individual
investors is more appropriate. As a recap of the literature on individual investors,
Dorn et al. (2008) estimate a mean herding level of 8.3%, Barber et al. (2009) find
herding levels of 6.81% and 12.79% for each of the data sets they use, and Merli and
Roger (2013) conclude that herding among French individual investors falls between
the lower HLSV limit of 12.63% and the upper HFHW limit of 21.70%.
The evidence we present clearly indicates that herding behavior among trade
leaders on STPs is much higher compared to both institutional and individual in-
vestors on non-STPs. While a proportion of herding among trade leaders — who are
essentially retail traders — may be explained by behavioral factors such as the rep-
resentativeness heuristic, limited attention, and the disposition effect as explained
by Barber et al. (2009), the excess herding may be attributed to the scopic regime
of STPs.
In the following sections, we examine herding in sub-samples of trade leaders
selected according to three behavioral factors: trading intensity, leverage, and trade
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size.
2.5.1 Herding and Trading Intensity
We estimate the HLSV and HFHW herding measures using the full sample of trade
leader transactions based on quarterly, monthly and weekly subperiods. The pro-
cess is then repeated by applying various thresholds to the minimum number of
trades in each security. A higher minimum threshold implies greater trading in-
tensity in the sample. Table 2.2 shows the results of both herding measures, in
addition to the number of security-periods and the average number of trades for
each threshold. We do not report the weekly results for all the analyses conducted
in this paper, since they provide the same conclusion as the quarterly and monthly
estimates. As expected, the HFHW estimates are higher than the HLSV estimates
for all threshold levels. A more interesting finding is the relationship between herd
level and the number of traders active in a security. In particular, we observe that
as the number of traders active in a security increases, both the HLSV and HFHW
herding measures decrease linearly. This finding is similar to the evidence presented
by Wermers (1999), and may be explained by the theory of information availabil-
ity and informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992). Securities
with low liquidity are generally not extensively covered by analysts, resulting in
scarcity of information regarding these securities. Due to the lack of sufficient infor-
mation, these securities attract a small number of active traders who may turn to
interpreting other traders’ transactions as a scarce source of valuable information.
By doing so, herding levels in illiquid securities are likely to be higher compared to
those where information is more abundant. In order to test this hypothesis, we re-
estimate the herding measures at the various thresholds; however, we use a sample
containing only the most liquid securities. This sample includes the major currency
pairs: EUR/USD, GBP/USD, NZD/USD, USD/CAD, USD/JPY, USD/CHF, and
AUD/USD. The estimates for the HLSV and HFHW measures for all thresholds
using quarterly (monthly) sub-periods are constant and equal to 0.089 (0.098) and
0.120 (0.133), respectively. As a consequence, the high herding levels found in less
liquid securities can be attributed to lack of sufficient market information.
65
2.5.2 Herding and Leverage
The second relationship that we examine is between herding and the degree of
leverage used by trade leaders, which is an indication of their risk appetite. We
estimate HLSV and HFHW for the different leverage subgroups using quarterly,
monthly, and weekly subperiods. The results presented in Table 2.3 show that
the relationship between the degree of leverage and both herding measures follows
an inverted u-shape. In particular, highly risk-averse traders such as those with a
leverage ratio of 2 to 1 exhibit relatively lower herding levels compared to less risk-
averse traders (or medium risk takers with leverage ratios between 10 to 1 and 50
to 1). One possible reason for this result is the scarcity of observations in the lowest
leverage subgroups. By looking at the last two columns of Table 2.3, specifically for
the leverage ratios 2 to 1 and 5 to 1, it is clear that the average number of trades
are relatively low compared to the figures shown for other leverage ratios. As a
consequence, FHW show using Monte Carlo simulation that, unless the number of
trades in a security-period is extremely large, then both herding measures will be
biased downward. Another behavioral explanation for low herding among trades
with low leverage, is that these trades can be seen as experimental, where trade
leaders try out new strategies without taking on too much risk.
With respect to herding behavior of risk-seeking trade leaders, the results show
that herding levels are lower than those of their medium-risk counterparts. This
phenomenon is well documented in the literature by studies such as Scharfstein
and Stein (1990) and Gu¨mbel (2005), who find that fund managers who are likely
to herd are more risk averse than non-herding managers. The idea here is that
overconfident traders take on more risk because they tend to underestimate risk and
overestimate the conditional expected return from their trading strategies (Odean,
1998; Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001). Analogously, it follows that high risk takers are
overconfident in their trading skills and strategies, hence they tend to herd less with
each other (De Long et al., 1990, 1991; Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001).
Being risk-prone and overconfident does not necessarily mean that one is more
knowledgeable. Highly leveraged trades can be seen as “black swan” trades, which
are executed by traders who have a particularly high level of confidence and tolerance
for volatility. This can deter other trade leaders from herding, since they would suffer
great financial losses and taint their reputation in case the black swan trade goes
66
sour. The safest herding strategy to preserve status as a trade leader would be to
stand in the middle of the risk spectrum, and imitate moderately risky trades where
a loss will not have a detrimental impact on reputation. In addition, allowing highly
leveraged traders to fly solo would work to one’s advantage when their trades accrue
losses, as this thins out the competition among trade leaders.
2.5.3 Herding and Trade Size
The third analysis examines the variation in herding depending on trade size. Many
studies on hedge funds and mutual funds have shown that as fund managers mature,
they are more likely to herd because they have more to lose in terms of compen-
sation (Boyson, 2010; Graham, 1999; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Following this
reasoning, we propose that traders with larger positions are likely to herd more in
order to avoid the disappointment of underperforming their peers.
In order to test this proposition, we first divide the data into quintiles based on
trade size, then we compute the herding measures for each quintile using quarterly,
monthly, and weekly subperiods. Quintile 1 encompasses the trades with the largest
trade sizes while quintile 5 contains the smallest trades. The results presented in
Table 2.4 show a u-shaped association between trade size and herding. In particular,
as trade size decreases (from quintile 1 to quintile 4) so does the level of herding. This
finding is consistent with our proposition that the larger a trader’s investment, the
more he has to lose, and the more he is likely to herd. With respect to the smallest
trade size quintile, herding is estimated to be relatively high. This may be attributed
to trade leader sophistication. This argument draws from the conclusion of Doering
et al. (2015) who find significant correlations between social trading returns from
eToro and almost all the hedge fund trading strategies they consider, indicating that
eToro attracts relatively more experienced traders. Hence, this study contends that
herding behavior for the smallest trade size quintile may be interpreted as follows: a
trader invests a very small portion of his wealth to buy an option that allows him to
mimic the trades of others. Similar to a financial option, the downside risk is limited
to the trader’s small investment, while there is unlimited upside potential. This real
option allows the trader to either continue herding and increase his exposure to the
other trader if the copied strategy performs well, or to simply cut his losses in case
the strategy performs poorly. Nevertheless, Doering et al. (2015) do not test the
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significance of their model on sub-samples of traders with different trade sizes, thus
further analysis is required in order to understand the relationship between trader
sophistication and trade size.
2.5.4 Persistence in Herding
In our final analysis, we adopt an approach similar to that applied by Barber et al.
(2009) to test whether trade leaders’ trading decisions are correlated. Moreover, we
examine the persistence in herding such that persistence exists if the autocorrelation
of purchase intensities pii,t is high. In other words, a high (low) purchase intensity
in asset i at time t is followed by a high (low) purchase intensity in future periods.
To conduct this analysis, we divide the data set into two equally sized random
groups of traders, labeled G1 and G2, respectively. For each of the two groups,
we calculate the monthly purchase intensities for every asset, which are denoted by
piG1i,t and pi
G2
i,t , respectively. We subsequently calculate the contemporaneous corre-
lations between the purchase intensities, resulting in a time-series of 12 monthly
correlations. If the traders’ trading decisions are independent, then no correlation
between piG1i,t and pi
G2
i,t is expected. To test this hypothesis, we calculate the aver-
age mean contemporaneous correlation, followed by a test of significance to check
whether the correlation is different from zero. Barber et al. (2009) explain that the
null hypothesis of no correlation between the purchase intensities is synonymous to
the null hypothesis of no herding behavior when applying the HLSV and HFHW
measures. While this analysis does not allow us to differentiate between intentional
and unintentional herding, it simply indicates whether or not trading decisions are
correlated.
Next, we measure the degree of persistence in herding behavior by calculating
the monthly correlations between the purchase intensities at time t and t+ τ , where
τ = 1→ 11. Recall that the contemporaneous correlations to test the null hypothesis
of no herding are obtained by setting τ = 0. When τ > 0, then the degree of
persistence in herding behavior is computed. For example, by setting τ = 1, the
correlation between the purchase intensities between month t and the consecutive
month t + 1 is computed. This results in a time series of 11 correlations that are
averaged to obtain the degree of persistence for a time horizon equal to 1 period. This
calculation is repeated with different values for τ , and is conducted on each of the
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two random groups of traders, separately. Moreover, this calculation is also applied
to both groups together in a manner similar to the analysis of the contemporaneous
correlations, which is essentially the specific scenario where τ = 0. In other words,
we calculate the correlations between the purchase intensities of the first group of
traders G1 at time t, and those of the second group G2 at time t+ τ .
Table 2.5 presents the results for both the contemporaneous and time-series
correlations of the purchase intensities. The first row of the table (where τ = 0)
shows that the contemporaneous correlation of pii,t between G1 and G2 is 98.5%.
This figure indicates almost perfect correlation between the trading decisions of the
two groups of traders in a given month, and is around 14% and 24% higher than the
results reported by Merli and Roger (2013) and Barber et al. (2009), respectively.
This correlation, as explained by Barber et al. (2009), has an intuitive interpretation,
such that the square of the contemporaneous correlation is equivalent to the R2
obtained from regressing the purchase intensities of G1 on those of G2. In our
analysis, the R2 = 97.02%, meaning that we can explain almost all the variation
in the purchase intensities of one group of trade leaders by knowing the purchase
intensities of another group. This confirms our earlier findings on herding behavior
based on the HLSV and HFHW measures.
The remaining results show the correlations between the purchase intensities at
time t and t + τ , for τ = 1 → 11. In general, all the correlations are significant as
indicated by their respective t-statistics. Moreover, the correlations obtained in this
study are much larger than those reported by Merli and Roger (2013) and Barber
et al. (2009). For instance, given a time horizon of τ = 1, Merli and Roger (2013)
report correlations of 30.27% and 31.50%, and Barber et al. (2009) report values
between 46.7% and 48.2% for the large discount broker and 55.8% and 58.6% for the
large retail broker. On the other hand, our study shows much higher correlations
ranging between 91.3% and 93.0% for the same time horizon. Similar results are
found for the rest of the time horizons, indicating that persistence in herding behav-
ior is significantly higher among trade leaders on STPs. Another important finding
of this analysis is that persistence fades away very slowly compared to the results
reported by both Barber et al. (2009) and Merli and Roger (2013). For example, we
find that the correlations between groups 1 and 2 are equal to 80.0% and 69.9% for
the two time horizons τ = 6 and τ = 11, respectively. Barber et al. (2009) report
correlations of 17.9% and 10.3% for the same time horizons at the large discount
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broker, and 31.8% and 23.2% at the large retail broker, while Merli and Roger (2013)
report correlations of 8.21% and 3.55% for the two time horizons, respectively.
The strong persistence in herding over the various time horizons indicates that
this phenomenon is not due to momentary events of increased uncertainty. Herding
remains relatively high even for a horizon of 11 months. The significant difference in
the rate of decay of persistence in herding behavior over time between trade leaders
on STPs and retail investors on non-STPs indicates that social trading, through its
scopic regime, has an additional conformism effect on participants. Trade leaders
do not imitate each other at specific points in time, but rather do so continuously
across multiples time periods. This is possible since STPs publish current as well
as historical order flow data, which can be easily accessed by all STP participants.
Therefore, persistence in herding behavior is expected to be high and to fade away
slowly as traders may be tempted to replicate the past trades of others, which are
conveniently documented by the STP.
2.6 Conclusion
This is the first paper to investigate herding behavior of traders under a scopic
environment. Using a unique data set of 77,476 trade leaders obtained from the
STP eToro, we examine the herding behavior of trade leaders by computing the
measures proposed by LSV and FHW to provide a range for the true level of herding.
In general, the overall level of herding based on the entire sample of trade leaders
exceeds the estimates presented in the literature for both institutional as well as
retail investors in traditional financial environments. The excess level of herding is
attributed to the scopic regime governing STPs. Moreover, we compute the herding
measures for sub-samples of trade leaders chosen according to three trading behavior
characteristics. First, we find that as the number of active traders in a security
increases, herding decreases linearly. This finding can be explained using the theory
of information availability, such that herding is expected to be higher in less liquid
securities where information is scarce. Second, the association between herding
and the degree of leverage used is found to follow an inverted u-shape relation.
Highly risk averse traders exhibit lower herding levels compared to medium leverage
traders, which may be attributed to the scarcity of observations that bias the herding
measures. Regarding risk-seeking trade leaders, herding levels are also found to
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be lower than those of their medium-risk counterparts. This may be related to
overconfidence of risk-seeking traders who tend to have more confidence in their own
trading strategies and skills. As such, the scopic regime encourages herding mostly
among medium-risk takers, where there is a modest trade-off between maintaining
status quo as leaders and maximizing risk-adjusted returns. The third relation that
we examine is between herding and trade size, where we find that trade leaders
who have more to lose are more likely to herd. The u-shaped relationship obtained
indicates that, as trade size decreases, so does the level of herding. Moreover,
herding is high for the smallest sized trades, which may be due to trade leaders
using very small portions of their capital to try and emulate potentially profitable
trades. Finally, we investigate persistence in herding behavior, and find high levels
of persistence across several time horizons. Additionally, we show that persistence
in herding among trade leaders fades away much slower compared to herding among
traders in traditional trading environments. This difference may be attributed to the
high degree of transparency on STPs, which grants traders access to each other’s
trading activities. On a theoretical level, we add to the literature on herding by
showing that status concerns impact herding not only at the institutional level, but
also at the retail level and in a highly informal environment. The scopic regime of
STPs, with its permanent disclosure of information, produces herding levels among
trade leaders that exceed and persist more than those documented in non-scopic
environments for similar categories of retail traders.
The high level of, and persistence in herding behavior among trade leaders on
STPs unveils several implications. From a macroeconomic perspective, it has been
argued that intentional herding increases market volatility due to the high corre-
lation among trades (Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh, 2003; Barber et al., 2009). This
issue may quickly materialize as STPs become more popular among retail traders,
while regulators remain largely absent from monitoring these platforms and setting
pre-emptive protocols to protect na¨ıve investors. With respect to investors who wish
to diversify across multiple trade leaders, the benefits of diversification are greatly
diminished in the presence of herding. This is because trade leaders who herd are es-
sentially trading the same assets in the same direction and at the same time. Hence,
investors should proceed with caution and take into account herding behavior when
selecting the trade leaders they wish to allocate their funds to. Finally, STPs offer
performance compensation programs to trade leaders based on the number of copiers
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they attract or on their actual trading performance. While trade leaders who are
authentically skilled should be compensated for their efforts and added value, others
who simply herd should not be compensated similarly, since this may drive truly
skilled traders to exit the social trading network.
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Table 2.5: Mean Contemporaneous and Time-Series Correlation of Pur-
chase Intensities by Trade Leaders. The table below presents the mean contem-
poraneous correlation in percent across groups in the first row. The other rows show
the mean temporal correlations in percent from one to 11 months. The correlation
between the two randomly selected groups of trade leaders represents the tempo-
ral correlation of purchase intensities by group one in month t with the purchase
intensities by group two in month t + τ , where τ = 0 → 11. The t-statistics are
calculated based on the mean and standard deviation of the correlations. For τ = 11
the t-statisitcs for the correlations of each group with itself cannot be computed due
to the lack of degrees of freedom.
Correlation of pii,t between






















0 100 100 98.5 NA NA 282.3
1 93.0 91.3 91.9 58.8 44.0 76.7
2 90.7 89.8 89.9 39.8 37.5 54.7
3 84.8 83.6 84.1 36.4 32.9 48.1
4 80.7 81.4 80.9 25.8 28.9 37.7
5 79.1 78.2 78.7 26.2 26.3 36.7
6 79.1 81.1 80.0 20.7 25.5 33.8
7 77.3 77.5 77.1 17.1 24.0 29.6
8 77.5 79.8 78.3 23.5 26.4 33.5
9 75.3 76.8 75.9 36.3 29.3 34.6
10 71.3 75.9 73.0 75.8 15.1 29.0




The following example demonstrates how to calculate the adjustment factor and the
HLSV herding measure. Let the total number of traders active in security i during
period t be ni,t = 5, out of which the number of buyers is bi,t = 3. Moreover, assume
that the expected fraction of buyers pˆit in period t is 0.55 (i.e. 55% of all transactions
are buys). Given the HLSV measure presented below,
HLSVi,t = |pii,t − pˆit| − E
[∣∣∣∣∣ b˜i,tni,t − pˆit




calculating the left-hand term only without the adjustment factor would result
in |3/5− 0.55| = 0.05; however, this is not the true degree of herding since the real
proportion of buyers cannot be 0.55 if there are five active traders. As such, the
HLSV result should be adjusted for security i during period t by subtracting the
expected outcome of |pii,t − pˆit| considering only five traders are active in the stock.
The expected outcome of |pii,t− pˆit| is the sum of all possible outcomes, multiplied
by their probability of occurring. The probability is given by,






b × (1− pˆit)n−b
where n is the total number of active traders, b is the number of buyers, and pˆi
is the expected proportion of buyers. The table below shows the calculations for
E[|pii,t − pˆit|].
Bi,t = b P (B = b) pii,t pˆit |pii,t − pˆit|
0 0.01845 0 0.55 0.01015
1 0.11277 0.2 0.55 0.03947
2 0.27565 0.4 0.55 0.04135
3 0.33691 0.6 0.55 0.01685
4 0.20589 0.8 0.55 0.05147
5 0.05033 1 0.55 0.02265
E[|pii,t − pˆit|] = 0.18194
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Consequently, the HLSVi,t measure including the adjustment factor is |3/5 −
0.55|−0.18194 = −0.13193. This number represents the proportion of traders on one
side of the market above (or in this case below due to the negative sign) expectations
given the expected fraction of buyers during that period. By ignoring the adjustment
factor, the estimate for the level of herding would have been overstated.
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Chapter 3
A Smart Man Learns from his
Mistakes, A Wise Man Learns
from the Mistakes of Others:
Investigating the Disposition
Effect of Trade Leaders on Social
Trading Platforms
Abstract
There is ample evidence showing that traders can adjust for behavioural biases
such as the disposition effect by learning from their past decisions. We investigate
this hypothesis in the context of a social trading platform, which is governed by a
scopic regime, and characterized by high information transparency regarding order
flow and social interactions. We expect that traders in a scopic environment should
exhibit weaker evidence of the disposition effect compared to traders in a traditional
financial setting, since the former can learn not only from their own past trades, but
also from the historical trades of all other participants disclosed by the platform.
Using the disposition spread proposed by Odean (1998a), and the Cox proportional
hazards model, we find ample evidence of a weaker disposition effect for traders in
the scopic environment. Our results suggest that increased exposure to information
allows traders to learn and adjust for the disposition effect more efficiently. This is
opposite to what has been reported in an earlier study by Heimer (2015) who finds
that heightened exposure to information leads to increases in the disposition effect.
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3.1 Introduction
“Cut your losses” is a common saying that is told to encourage a person to stop
wasting time or money on something that is seen as failing. Although this may seem
as the logical path to follow, some individuals do not quite abide by this prescription.
For instance, a well-known and distinctive phenomenon that has been investigated
in behavioral finance is the tendency of investors to realize their gains and hold on
to their losses. This behavior has been identified by Shefrin and Statman (1985)
as the “disposition effect,” which opposes rational economic models. Studies such
as Odean (1998a), and Seru et al. (2010) have shown that investors who exhibit
this bias tend to perform poorly. Nevertheless, many researchers have presented
evidence that investors can learn from their past trading activity to decrease the
disposition effect (Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Feng
and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Chen et al., 2007; Boolell-Gunesh et al.,
2009; Seru et al., 2010). The reason, as financial economists advocate, is that more
information allows investors to make better-informed investment decisions. More-
over, the efficient market hypothesis suggests that, as market information becomes
more abundant and accessible, behavioral biases should cease to exist. Hence, given
the findings in the literature, we argue that one should expect to find no (or weak)
evidence of the disposition effect in an information-rich environment.
One such environment that has attracted an increasing number of retail traders
is social trading, which embeds the traditional online trading model into a social
media network. This novel concept is acclaimed for the high level of information
transparency and disclosure that occurs in real-time, and the tools that are provided
by these social trading platforms (STPs), which allow participants to interact with
each other and even copy each other’s trades using a mirror trading algorithm that
is provided by the platform. We call this environment a “scopic regime” because it
permits constant and reciprocal scrutiny of participants by the online community
(Knorr Cetina, 2003). Participants on STPs can be divided into two main groups,
which we label as trade leaders and investors (or copiers). The former are typically
experienced traders who manage the funds allocated to them by the latter in return
for monetary compensation that may be directly or indirectly based on performance
(Doering et al., 2015). An investor can allocate his funds using the mirror trading
algorithm, by easily and explicitly copying the future trades of another participant
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with a click of a button, thus receiving a price identical to that received by the
copied participant. Nevertheless, our study focuses on the behavior of trade leaders,
hence we define a trade leader as an individual who only manually enters trades into
the STP. In other words, a trade leader is someone who executes original trades and
refrains from explicitly copying others.
Given this definition, we use a unique data set from the highly popular eToro
STP and we identify over 2.6 million trades executed by 77,476 trade leaders in
2013. We test whether exposure to a transparent and information-rich environment
decreases the disposition effect. To do so, we adopt two methods: the first, proposed
by Odean (1998a), calculates the disposition spread, and the second is based on the
Cox proportional hazards model. Furthermore, we compare the results obtained for
trade leaders on eToro to those of traders on a traditional online trading platform,
which we call Anonymous, that does not offer integrated social networking features.
We use overlapping periods and assets for the two data sets in order to examine
whether the difference in disposition of traders between the two platforms is due to
the characteristics of the trading environment.
In general, both empirical methods used show that trade leaders exhibit a weaker
disposition effect compared to traders on the traditional trading platform, meaning
that the high degree of information transparency and the abundance of financial
as well as social information erode this behavioral bias, although not completely.
On the one hand, this finding is in agreement with the efficient market hypothesis
and the argument that, as information becomes more accessible, traders learn from
these experiences in order to adjust for the disposition effect (Shapira and Venezia,
2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006;
Chen et al., 2007; Boolell-Gunesh et al., 2009; Seru et al., 2010). Another potential
explanation for this finding is that the constant scrutiny by participants on STPs
may drive trade leaders to close losing positions with almost the same propensity of
closing winning positions, in order to avoid holding unjustifiable paper losses. On
the other hand, our results oppose what has been reported by Heimer (2015), who
examines a sample of retail traders on an STP, and finds that exposure to large
amounts of information leads to significant increases in the disposition effect. The
author argues that this relationship is driven by traders who strategically increase
their search efforts for mutually beneficial peer-connections during times of pros-
perity. Hence, this conditional sharing of information and formation of connections
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naturally increases the disposition effect. Nevertheless, there are great differences
between our data set and the one used by Heimer (2015). For instance, our sample
only includes trade leaders who manually enter trades into the STP and avoid ex-
plicit copying, while Heimer (2015) uses all participants on the STP, and does not
account for explicitly copied trades. This may bias the results in the direction of
trade leaders with the most copiers. We discuss the latter study in more detail in
section 3.3.2.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a detailed
description of social trading platforms. Section 3.3 covers the theoretical and empir-
ical literature on the disposition effect. Section 3.4 presents the two methods that
are used in this study to estimate the disposition effect of trade leaders. The data
sets from both eToro and Anonymous are presented in section 3.5, along with some
statistics about the behavior characteristics of traders on the two platforms. Section
3.6 is dedicated to the discussion of the results. Finally, section 3.7 concludes the
study.
3.2 Mechanics of STPs
STPs are founded on the notions of complete disclosure and free flow of informa-
tion, thus allowing participants unlimited access to the profile information, current
portfolio holdings and actual historical trading activity of traders. The high level of
transparency on STPs, one that is not present in an institutional fund management
setting, facilitates the constant scrutiny of past and current performance of traders.
This unique feature differentiates STPs from traditional financial institutions, such
as mutual funds and hedge funds, where performance is only disclosed quarterly
by the former and voluntarily by the latter. Another key aspect that characterizes
STPs is that they encourage cooperation between participants and facilitate discus-
sions related to market research and trading strategies. This is because information
sharing is incentivized through compensation schemes where trade leaders can earn
monetary benefits for managing their investors’ wealth.
In general, participants open an account on an STP that is directly linked to
a brokerage account, or they can link their existing brokerage account to an STP,
such as the platform used in the study by Heimer (2015). Next, they begin by
posting their personal information on their profile page, which is publicly disclosed.
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Whenever participants execute a trade on an STP, they transmit a trade signal,
which can be defined as a set of rules to buy or sell a certain asset once the price
reaches a predetermined level (Doering et al., 2015). We define a trade leader as
an individual who only executes manual trades and refrains from explicitly copying
the trades of others using the mirror trading algorithm provided by the platform.
This group typically includes experienced traders who aspire to become leaders by
building their reputation and displaying their skills through the trades they place.
Trade leaders usually research and implement original trading strategies using their
own capital; however, some STPs such as Ayondo allow individuals to become trade
leaders by trading virtual money. Most STPs allow trades to be automatically
executed by an automated trading algorithm if specific criteria are met. Hence,
trade leaders typically aim to identify trades that are likely to yield significant profits
in order to develop their track record, which is published on their profile page in
real-time. Moreover, trade leaders are unrestricted in their competition to appeal to
potential investors, which may be done by executing original manual trades, since
such trades are an indication of a trader’s knowledge, skills, and confidence.
Conversely, investors or copiers are less experienced traders who wish to have
their capital managed by more experienced traders. They begin by conducting
due diligence in order to evaluate the performance of trade leaders, and identify
those who adopt a trading strategy that best suits their own investment goals and
restrictions. Any additional information that investors may wish to attain in order to
reduce uncertainty concerning the authenticity of the trade leaders may be collected
via direct contact with the latter through instant messaging tools and discussion
posts. This can result in a close, personal, and informal relationship between the
parties involved. After investors evaluate the profile and performance of the different
trade leaders, they can then set up their accounts to automatically copy the trades
of specific trade leaders in real-time using the mirror trading algorithm offered by
the STP. In other words, trades executed by the trade leader are instantaneously
executed in the investor’s account at a price identical to that received by the trade
leader, without the need for manual confirmation. Unless the investor chooses to
be involved in the daily investment process, it is unnecessary for him to interfere
except for terminating the copying relationship. Conversely, if the investor chooses
to remain involved in the investment process but is unable to organize his own
thorough analyses, he may decide to copy only certain trades after evaluating the
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rationale behind them by clicking on the copy button pertaining to each trade.
Trading on STPs requires opening a position via a standardized Contract for
Difference (CFD) that is written on an asset, since traders on STPs do not trade
the actual asset. A CFD is an electronic contract between a trader and a CFD
provider (or broker), which entails that the trader relinquish physical possession of
the underlying asset for a contract with the CFD provider who offers an identical
economic exposure (Norman, 2009). CFDs are considered derivative instruments
that enable traders to obtain exposure to, and speculate about the direction of the
asset, without ownership requirements. Such contracts allow the trader to take both
long and short positions, where the payout is equivalent to the difference between
the buy price of the underlying asset and the closing price of the contract. In
general, a trader profits if he has a long (short) position in a CFD and the price of
the underlying asset rises (falls). Moreover, the profits and losses of open positions
are realized at the closing of the trading day and are then rolled-over to the next
day, due to the fact that CFDs are settled daily. Furthermore, CFDs are traded
on margin, thus the trader may deposit an amount of capital that is significantly
smaller than the asset’s notional value, which may lead to exceedingly leveraged
positions. Traders must constantly maintain a sufficient amount of capital in their
accounts in order to satisfy the minimum required margin established by the broker,
otherwise the trader’s positions may be liquidated.
3.3 Literature Review on the Disposition Effect
Many studies have provided evidence on the disposition effect, both theoretically
and empirically. In general, the disposition effect has been found to have a negative
impact on financial performance; however, several studies have shown that individ-
uals can learn through experience to adjust for the disposition effect. We discuss
the most relevant studies in the following sections.
3.3.1 Theoretical Studies
According to Shefrin and Statman (1985) the disposition effect can be attributed
to an amalgamation of regret aversion, mental accounting, and problems with self-
control, but with the fundamental explanation of this phenomenon being prospect
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theory as discussed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Unlike utility theory, prospect
theory states that decision are made based on the potential values of gains and losses
instead of the final outcome, and that the gains and losses are evaluated according
to certain heuristics. For instance, gains and losses are typically compared to a
certain reference point. As such, failing to acclimate to changes in price and relying
on the original buying price as a benchmark would lead to referring to a rise in asset
price as a sure gain if the asset is to be sold versus a risky decision if an investor is
to hold on to it. The opposite is true for a decrease in asset price, where selling a
stock would be considered as a sure loss, while holding on to it would be considered
as an investor’s affinity towards uncertainty and risk. This highlights the impor-
tant role that an asset’s purchase price plays in the disposition effect. Nevertheless,
in reality, a certain reference point may develop via the combination of purchase,
highest, and lowest prices since the investment date (Kahneman, 1992). Moreover,
when the reference price and the current price are similar to each other, the degree
of the disposition effect is reduced (Weber and Camerer, 1998).
Realizing gains and thus acquiring utility has been labeled as “realization utility”
by Barberis and Xiong (2009, 2012), where the authors observe a disposition effect
in circumstances where gains and losses are assessed at the time they are realized.
Utility theory has been studied further by Frydman et al. (2014) who employ brain-
imaging techniques to investigate buying and selling decisions, and found that when
an individual sells a winner, he experiences a surge in utility. This brings forth the
notion of emotions and how they may affect or even generate the disposition effect.
For instance, Summers and Duxbury (2012) find that when experimental subjects
do not actively decide on which stocks to add to their portfolios, no disposition effect
is found. Furthermore, the authors find that if the subjects do not feel responsible
for their choices, they cease to sell winning stocks more willingly than losing stocks.
Accordingly, this implies that emotions such as regret and pride may play an integral
role in behavioral patterns of the disposition effect. The emotion of regret has also
been documented by Strahilevitz et al. (2011), who provide evidence that individual
investors have a higher propensity of repurchasing an asset that they had already
sold if the price has since decreased. The authors ascertain that such an action is
due to the regret one endures when repurchasing at a higher price than what it is
sold at, and to the rejoice one feels when repurchasing at a lower price. Further
research has corroborated this aspect of emotion, where experiments have shown
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that participants demonstrate such a behavior solely when they are liable for the
initial sale, signifying that investors attempt to avoid the feeling of regret resulting
from the repurchasing of assets at prices higher than the original selling prices.
The relationship between the disposition effect and prospect theory has been
challenged by several recent studies and the evidence has been mixed. For instance,
Barberis and Xiong (2009) argue that prospect theory only explains disposition in
some cases, while it predicts the opposite in other cases. Henderson (2012) show that
investors have more affinity towards realizing gains than losses. Lehenkari (2012)
studies the differences in the degree of disposition between investors who inherited
stocks and those who purchased the stocks, and reports a higher disposition effect
for the latter group of investors. From a different standpoint, other researches have
found dissimilar results. For example, a preference for prospect theory may 1)
result in holding on to both winning and losing investments (Kaustia, 2010), 2) may
lead investors to cooperate with others who have constant relative risk aversion,
thus usually leading to a negative-feedback trading tendency and encouraging both
disposition effect and contrarian behavior (Yao and Li, 2013), and 3) may even drive
investors not to purchase assets from the start (Hens and Vlcek, 2011).
Nevertheless, the dominant argument in the literature is that the effects of the
reference point are “cognitive illusions” that cannot be easily removed; however,
individuals can still attempt to understand them and aim to prevent such predispo-
sitions via a more systematic analysis of market conditions (Kahneman and Riepe,
1998). Consequently, Wegener and Petty (1995) suggest that correcting mechanisms
may arise when one obtains a better understanding of circumstances. When an in-
vestor is conscious about his affinity towards holding on to a losing asset, he may
be able to assess the outcomes of his decisions over time, thus giving rise to an
alteration of his behavior. Researchers including Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001),
Feng and Seasholes (2005), and Dhar and Zhu (2006) study whether an investor’s
prospects of learning is responsible for the difference in the willingness to keep losers,
and find that an investor to whom information is available exhibits a much lower
disposition effect compared to others. This brings forth the argument of whether an
individual utilizes the experiences he gains in order to adjust for this behavioral bias.
In other words, the influence of the disposition effect is assumed to be less evident
with traders who are more experienced, since the acquired experience diminishes the
effects of this behavioral bias. The existence of learning effects has been observed
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in experimental markets, where start-up and equilibrium behavior are shown to be
dissimilar to each other (Knez et al., 1985). Moreover, Dhar and Zhu (2006) provide
evidence showing that traders who operate more frequently are less likely to exhibit
the disposition effect than those who do not trade as often, thus verifying that one
can learn through experience to adjust for the disposition effect.
While the “learning through experience” argument has been verified by many
studies, this paper takes a different approach and aims to investigate whether the
amount and quality of information made available to individuals have a supplemen-
tary adjustment influence on the disposition effect. In particular, we argue that a
transparent and information-rich environment such as a scopic regime, allows indi-
viduals to learn not only from their own experience, but also from the experiences
of all other participants in order to adjust for the disposition effect.
3.3.2 Empirical Studies
Only one paper has empirically examined the disposition effect of traders on STPs,
as such, we discuss this paper in detail in order to highlight some key differences
compared to our study. Heimer (2015) uses data obtained from a STP, where re-
tail traders can link their existing account at a foreign exchange brokerage to their
social account on the STP. This allows the STP to access a trader’s entire trading
record, including transactions executed before the date of joining the STP. All new
trades are entered through the retail brokerage platform, but are also recorded in
the STP’s database. This process differs compared to that adopted by the STP in
this study, since eToro provides both the social as well as the brokerage services
to the traders, hence there is no need for the trader to open an account with an
independent broker. This also ensures homogeneity among traders in our sample in
terms of services provided by the brokerage firm. The sample used by Heimer (2015)
only includes participants who traded before and after joining the STP, resulting
in around one million transactions executed by 2,598 participants from early 2009
until December 2010. It is critical to note two key differences between the data
set used by the author and the one employed in this study. First, his study does
not differentiate between traders who execute manual trades only and those who
explicitly copy others, as we do in this study. This results in perfectly correlated
transactions, which may lead to inaccurate statistical inferences. Second, the par-
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ticipants in the author’s study are the same individuals who trade before and after
joining the STP. As such, these individuals may learn from their past trades in order
to correct for the disposition effect as argued in the literature. On the contrary, our
study employs two data sets, each having its unique set of traders who trade in
an overlapping period. With respect to the methodology, Heimer (2015) applies a
discrete-time model, where the dependent variable is recorded at ten-minute inter-
vals, and takes the value of one if the trader reduced his holdings in the asset and
zero otherwise. We argue in section 3.4.2 that the time interval used is arbitrary and
may lead to loss of information, especially since the transactions are time-stamped.
Heimer (2015) finds that the disposition effect of traders prior to joining the social
network is around 2.1%, and that this figure almost doubles to around 3.7% after
joining the network, indicating that exposure to the social network increases the
disposition effect. Moreover, the results are unaffected after the inclusion of trader
fixed-effects. He also studies the relationship between the rate of issuing communica-
tion through the platform’s messaging service and the disposition effect, and finds a
negative relationship. Additionally, he also finds that the rate of receiving messages
is independent of the disposition effect. Nevertheless, the key finding presented by
the author is that increased access to social networks and information leads to large
increases in the disposition effect.
Many studies have presented empirical evidence on the disposition effect in tradi-
tional financial environments. For instance, Odean (1998b) uses the trading records
of 10,000 accounts at a large U.S. discount brokerage from 1987 to 1993, and ob-
serves that gains are 50% more likely to be realized relative to losses. This finding
has also been corroborated by Weber and Camerer (1998) who find that, in an
experimental stock market, winning stocks are 50% more likely to be sold relative
to losing stocks. Moreover, the authors also discern that the requirement to sell
and then repurchase all positions alleviates the disposition effect. Similar results
have also been found in a sample of Finnish investors between the years 1995 and
1996, where the propensity to hold on to losers was also empirically documented
(Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Specifically, a stock that has experienced a capital
loss of up to 30% is around 21% less likely to be sold compared to a stock that
has increased in value, while a stock that has experienced more than a 30% capital
loss is 32% less likely to be sold (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Similar results
are also found using hazard rate models where Feng and Seasholes (2005) employ
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a sample of 1,511 Chinese investors in 2000, and show that these investors have a
32% less propensity of realizing a loss. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2007) examine the
transactions of 50,000 investors at a Chinese brokerage firm between 1998 and 2002
and find a 67% higher chance of selling a winning asset than a losing one.
The substantial evidence on the disposition effect has motivated researchers to
study the relationship between this bias and other individual characteristics, such
as investor sophistication, experience, and the use of automated trading systems
(Richards et al., 2015; Nolte, 2012; Boolell-Gunesh et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2007;
Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Feng and Seasholes, 2005).
There is no consensus in the literature on how to define investor sophistication,
which has resulted in the use of several proxies that differ greatly across studies.
For instance, Shapira and Venezia (2001) use the professional occupation of an
individual, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Brown et al. (2006) classify institu-
tional investors as sophisticated, Seru et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2007), and Dhar
and Zhu (2006) consider wealth and income, and Feng and Seasholes (2005) and
Boolell-Gunesh et al. (2009) look at the degree of diversification of an individual’s
portfolio. Nevertheless, regardless of the measure used, the general findings show
that the disposition effect decreases the higher the level of investor sophistication.
For example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find a higher propensity of not selling
losing investments among households, governmental and non-profit institutions, as
well as non-financial corporations as compared to financial and insurance institu-
tions. Feng and Seasholes (2005) show that the most sophisticated investors have
a reduced sensitivity to selling losing investments of at least 67%. Dhar and Zhu
(2006) also confirm that the disposition effect for individual investors is less pro-
nounced for wealthy and professional traders. This finding is robust even after the
authors account for potential confounding effects between income and occupation.
A similar conclusion is also echoed in the work of Calvet et al. (2009) who use a
sample of Swedish investors between 1999 and 2002, and find that households are
more likely to fully sell stocks that have performed well. Furthermore, Barber et al.
(2007) examine the disposition effect for several types of institutional investors (such
as mutual funds, corporations, dealers, and foreigners) and find that this effect is
more pronounced for individual investors. More specifically, they examine transac-
tion records for investors in the Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1995 and 1999, and
find that although both institutional as well as individual investors experience the
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disposition effect, the latter are four times more likely to sell a winning stock than
a losing one. Furthermore, Nolte and Voev (2011) examine the relation between
portfolio performance and the disposition effect for sophisticated investors as mea-
sured by trade size. The authors find that those who traded larger positions were
more likely to close positions when the performance of the portfolio was positive,
and that this behavior was absent among smaller investors. This is an indication
that more sophisticated investors employ a broader portfolio investment strategy,
while smaller, less sophisticated investors are more narrow-framed and less mindful
of the dependencies between positions in their portfolio.
The disposition effect has also been found to be most prominent in financially in-
experienced investors. For instance, Feng and Seasholes (2005) measure experience
based on an individual’s number of cumulative trades, and show that the disposition
effect disintegrates as time passes after the first transaction. This is similar to the
results obtained by Seru et al. (2010), who scrutinize transaction records for indi-
vidual Finnish investors between 1995 and 2003, and observe that the disposition
effect decreases with investor experience. It is important to note, however, that this
effect is only found when trading experience is measured in number of transactions,
but declines significantly when measured in years. Nevertheless, Chen et al. (2007)
report that investors with more years of investment experience exhibit a lower dis-
position effect. Thus, it can be concluded that trading experience, wealth, as well
as investor sophistication decrease the disposition effect. In other words, investors
can learn through experience to avoid or adjust for the disposition effect.
Studies have also examined the association between automated trading systems
and the disposition effect. Linnainmaa (2010) examines sell limit orders that were
placed above the purchase price of the stock, and finds that such a trading strategy
increased the disposition effect exhibited by investors. This result is intuitive since
an increase in price would trigger the sell limit order, which would consequently turn
paper gains into realized gains. Nolte (2012) investigates the effects of both take
profit and stop loss limit orders on the disposition of traders in the foreign exchange
market. Take profit orders are similar to sell limit orders, such that they increase
the disposition effect, while stop loss orders are used to limit losses. The author
argues that there exists an inverse disposition effect for trades with small profits
and losses, and that this phenomenon is due to traders’ use of stop loss and take
profit strategies. A more recent study by Richards et al. (2015) uses trading records
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of individual investors in the U.K. from 2006 to 2009 and applies hazard models to
investigate the effect of stop loss orders on the disposition effect. The authors show
that traders who use stop loss orders have a higher conditional probability of selling
stocks at a loss, relative to the baseline. Moreover, traders who use stop loss orders
have a lower probability of realizing the gains of good performing stocks. These
findings suggest that using stop loss orders decreases the disposition effect.
Investors’ reluctance to realize losses is inconsistent with a tax-efficient strategy.
Such a strategy would posit that one should ideally postpone realizing taxable gains
by holding on to these winning investments, and realize losses in order to decrease
tax liability. For instance, Constantinides (1984) demonstrates that when one takes
into account transaction costs, and when there is no difference between long-term
and short-term tax rates, investors should gradually increase their tax-loss selling
from January to December. Barber and Odean (2004), examine the disposition
effect of traders for taxable and tax-deferred accounts using two large data sets
of individual traders from January 1998 to June 1999. The authors report that,
for traders at both the discount and full-service brokers, the disposition effect is
reversed in the month of December in taxable accounts, but not in tax-deferred
ones. A similar study by Ivkovic´ et al. (2005) applies a Cox proportional hazards
model to a data set obtained from a U.S. discount brokerage and finds evidence
of a reverse disposition effect in taxable accounts, not only in December, but also
throughout the year. These findings, along with many others (Feng and Seasholes,
2005), suggest that while taxes do influence the trading behavior of investors, they
do not explain the disposition effect exhibited by individual traders.
Given the theoretical contributions and empirical evidence in the literature, we
argue that the scopic regime governing STPs should induce a supplementary adjust-
ment impact on the disposition effect, whereby trade leaders learn not only from
their personal historical trading activity, but also from the trades of others. As such,
we expect trade leaders on STPs to exhibit a weaker disposition effect compared to




In this study, we employ two methods for estimating the disposition effect of trade
leaders on STPs. The first was developed by Odean (1998a) to calculate the dis-
position spread, while the second method is based on the Cox proportional hazards
model. We present these methods in the following sections.
3.4.1 Disposition Spread
To investigate whether the scopic regime decreases a trade leader’s propensity to sell
profitable trades and hold on to losing ones, we look at the frequency with which
they realize gains and losses relative to their opportunities to close each of these
positions. Following Odean (1998a), we calculate for each trade leader i, during the
trading period t the realized gains RGit, paper gains PG
i
t, realized losses RL
i
t, and
paper losses PLit in terms of number of trades as well as net dollar values. It is very
important to note that most of the studies in the literature deal with institutional or
individual investors who trade the actual asset, and who have long term investment
horizons where they may hold an asset for a prolonged period without incurring any
overnight fees. Moreover, the data employed by these studies show the quarterly
holdings of these investors, thus the previously mentioned parameters are computed
on a quarterly basis. In our study on the contrary, trade leaders on STPs trade
assets through CFDs, thus they do not hold ownership of the assets and they incur
overnight fees for positions held until the next trading day. Nevertheless, the high
levels of leverage employed by trade leaders allow them to benefit from the slightest
price swing, hence, these traders have a very short time horizon. Due to these
reasons, calculating the above mentioned parameters based on a quarterly trading
period would result in inappropriate estimates of the disposition effect since trade
leaders are highly likely to close their positions within a few weeks or even days of
opening them. To illustrate, consider a simple scenario with a single trader who
buys two assets A and B on day one, and that both these assets appreciate over the
next few days. Assume that the trader closes his position in asset A on day one,
and his position in asset B on day two. If we consider a trading period of one day,
we would obtain count values for RG and PG equal to one and one, respectively on
day one, and values of one and zero, respectively on day two. Averaging across these
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two trading period would result in RG of one and PG of 0.5. Now, consider the
scenario where the trading period is two days; thus, we would obtain count values
for RG and PG of two and zero, respectively. As such, choosing a longer trading
period in the context of short term trading would mean that most positions would
have been closed, regardless of whether the trade was a win or a loss. This example
clearly shows that the values computed for the realized and paper gains and losses
are highly dependent on the trading period chosen. Due to this, we compute these
parameters for different trading durations, t = [1→ 14] days.
Next, we aggregate the abovementioned parameters across all trade leaders, and
over all trading periods, in order to calculate the proportion of gains realized (PGR)

























The overall disposition spread, DISP , is calculated as the difference between the
two proportions such that DISP = PGR−PLR, where a large positive (negative)
spread means that trade leaders are more willing to realize gains (losses). The
hypothesis to be tested is that trade leaders tend to close winning positions and
hold on to losing ones, provided that one uses a reasonable trading period. The null
and alternative hypotheses can be written in terms of proportions of realized gains
and losses as:
H0 : PGR ≤ PLR and HA : PGR > PLR,
where a one-tailed test can determine whether to reject the null hypothesis. Note
that the test for significance in this case counts each realized gain, paper gain,
realized loss, and paper loss as a separate independent observation, which are then
aggregated across all traders.1 This independence assumption will not hold perfectly
in the context of social trading, since trade leaders have a tendency to herd and
imitate each other’s trading activities (Gemayel and Preda, 2015). As such, the
1The t-statistic is calculated as follows:






lack of independence will result in an inflated t-statistic; however, it does not bias
the calculated proportions of realized gains and losses. Odean (1998a) argues that
when the test statistic is large enough, as presented in our results, some lack of
independence is not problematic. However, when t-statistics are close to the critical
thresholds of statistical significance, one should analyze the results with caution.
In aim of decreasing the likelihood of dependence among transactions, we propose
using a very short trading period, which makes it less likely that trades within that
short time frame are correlated. This argument is based on the findings of Gemayel
and Preda (2015) who show that herding persists across time; hence, using a short
trading period would decrease the degree of correlation among trades within that
time frame. Choosing a short trading period would also allow us to adequately
examine the disposition effect for short-term traders who would otherwise have all
their positions closed if we compute the proportions of realized gains and losses using
a long trading period.
Odean (1998a) proposes an alternative way of calculating the disposition spread
by making different independence assumptions. Instead of assuming that indepen-
dence exists at the trade level, we assume that it only exists at the trade leader level.
This means that there may exist some form of relationship among the proportion of
gains and losses realized within a trader’s account but not across accounts. Again,
this assumption may not hold entirely given the evidence on herding among traders
in a scopic environment (Gemayel and Preda, 2015). The PGR and PLR variables
are calculated for each trader during every trading period, and are then differenced
to obtain the DISP spread. We then average this spread for each trader across all
trading periods in order to obtain a disposition spread for each trader separately.












While the first method of calculating the proportions of gains and losses realized
weights each trader by the number of realized and paper gains and losses, this
alternative method weights each trader account equally. As such, the latter method
ignores the fact that traders who are more active and execute more transactions
result in more accurate estimates of their true PGR and PLR values. Going back
to the subject of observation independence, choosing a short trading period may
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decrease the likelihood of having correlated trades within the same trading period;
however, this manoeuvre in itself results in another issue. To elaborate, we draw
on our finding that trade leaders on eToro and traders on Anonymous have weekly
trading frequencies of 1 and 2.15, respectively. These figures amount to less than
one trade a day. For the purpose of simplicity, assume a trading period of one day,
where a trader opens and closes one trade within a trading day. Hence, that trader
would have either a PGR equal to one and PLR equal to zero if the trade was a
win, or a PGR equal to zero and PLR equal to one if the trade was a loss. In these
two scenarios, the DISP spread will take on the value of either 100% or -100%. As
Odean (1998a) notes that the proportions of realized gains and losses will be smaller
for traders who trade frequently compared to those who trade less frequently. Hence,
given that traders in our two samples are not likely to have multiple trades opened
at once, this results in extreme values for the DISP spread, which may not reflect
the true disposition effect of the trader. Moreover, as the values of the parameters
used in calculating the DISP spread will be relatively low, this will result in a very
low test statistic.
Given that the two methods presented above for calculating the disposition
spread vary greatly depending on the trading period used, and on the indepen-
dence assumption made, one must analyze these results with caution. While the
test statistics may be somewhat biased and not very reliable when they are close
to the traditional critical values of significance, the estimated disposition spreads
are not, and provide a sensible starting point to investigate disposition differentials
between the two data sets.
Finally, Odean (1998a) highlights that, while the disposition spread is useful for
assessing whether entities are more likely to realize gains than losses, this measure is
not appropriate for cross-sectional comparisons. The reason is due to the mechanical
relationship between the disposition spread and the size of the portfolio. To illustrate
this point, we reproduce the example provided by Cici (2012). Assume that trader A
has a portfolio consisting of 12 winners and 12 losers, while trader B has a portfolio
with three winners and three losers. Moreover, let both traders be equally influenced
by the disposition effect, such that they are both twice as likely to realize a gain
relative to a loss. Therefore, both traders would sell two winning assets and one
losing assets, resulting in PGR and PLR values of 2/12 and 1/12, respectively for
trader A, and PGR and PLR values of 2/3 and 1/3, respectively for trader B. Based
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on these figures, this means that the DISP spread of trader B is four times larger
compared to that of trader A, despite both traders having the same propensity to
realize winners relative to losers.
The disposition ratio, denoted by DISP RATIO and calculated as the ratio of
PGR to PLR, overcomes this issue by correctly estimating the disposition to sell
winners compared to losers. In the previous example, both traders would have the
same disposition ratio, hence we also present this measure in our analysis.
The disposition spread and ratio are good metrics to calculate the likelihood of
realizing gains versus losses, especially for entities that have long term investment
horizons such as investment funds. Nevertheless, several issues arise when applying
these measures in the context of short term trading, as mentioned earlier. Hence,
we also adopt a survival analysis approach to estimate the disposition effect while
controlling for trader characteristics, and dependence among trades.
3.4.2 Cox Proportional Hazards Model
We apply survival analysis techniques to measure the duration until an event occurs,
which in our case is the closing of a trade. This allows us to estimate regression
models where the dependent variable is a measure of the rate of event occurrence.
Hence, one must specify an “origin time” based on which the event time is measured,
since the risk of the event varies as a function of time since that origin. While in
many studies the origin time is ideally the same for all observations, our data includes
many trades that are executed at different points in time. Fortunately, an important
feature of survival analysis is that it can handle truncated data, for which there is
a systematic exclusion of survival times from the sample, and where the sample
itself is dependent on the survival time (Allison, 2010). One particular type is left
truncation, which is also known as delayed or late entry into the sample. In our
study, left truncation occurs because trades are executed at different points in time,
thus entering the sample at delayed but known dates.
Many of the techniques used in survival analysis assume that time is measured
as a continuous variable. While it may be true that events occur in continuous time,
such an assumption may lead to computationally intensive processes. Hence, some
researchers have proposed using discrete-time models, where events are recorded in
grouped form and are considered to occur at discrete time points. In this case, even
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though the exact time of an event is known, one may choose to divide continuous
time into small discrete time intervals and create a binary variable representing
whether or not the event has taken place within that time interval. This method
may be less computationally intense compared to continuous time models, and is
not an unreasonable exploratory technique; however, it is far from ideal, especially
when one already knows the exact dates of the event occurrences. In addition to
the known limitations of employing a dummy dependent variable in a multivariate
regression (Goldberger, 1964), dichotomizing data over discrete time intervals is
highly arbitrary and wasteful of information (Allison, 1982). For instance, Heimer
(2015) applies a discrete time method by transforming time-stamped transactions of
traders on the STP into ten-minute intervals. This approach is arbitrary because the
ten-minute interval does not hold any meaning, and it ignores the variation on either
side of the interval cutoff point. For example, one might argue that a trader who
closes his position one minute after the trade exhibits a gain has a higher propensity
towards realizing gains relative to losses compared to a trader who closes his losing
position after nine minutes. However, since both these trades are closed within the
ten-minute interval in a discrete-time context, this method does not account for the
variation that allows us to differentiate between the disposition to close a position
contingent on being a gain or a loss. Thus, a critical issue to be considered is the
length of the time interval used for grouping events relative to the typical rate of an
event occurring. The smaller the ratio of the former to the latter, the more suitable
it is to utilize a continuous-time specification (Allison, 1982; Jenkins, 2005).
In order to avoid such subjectivity in selecting an appropriate discrete time
interval, and given that the transactions in our data sets are time-stamped, we use
a continuous-time model.2 In particular, we apply the Cox regression proposed in
the seminal work of Cox (1972), which is one of the most widely used techniques for
modeling hazard rates. This model is often referred to as semi-parametric since it
does not make specific assumptions regarding the probability distribution of event
occurrences, and it uses a partial-likelihood method of estimation.
2It is important to note that as the time interval becomes smaller, the discrete-time hazard rate
gets closer to the continuous-time hazard rate, and the discrete-time survival function converges
to the continuous-time one (Jenkins, 2005).
103





where, λ(t,Xi) is the hazard rate at time t conditional on a set of observed predictor
variables, Xi. The baseline hazard rate, λ0(t), is the hazard rate when all predictor
variables are null. Since transactions executed by a trader may exhibit dependence,
we incorporate into our framework unobserved individual heterogeneity. Given the
set of i transactions that are executed by j independent individuals, we denote
by bj the random cluster effect that induces correlation among the transactions in
the same cluster j, where we assume that the random effects b1, . . . , bj are i.i.d.
random variables with bj ∼ N(0, σ2). Hence, observations from different clusters
are independent; however, the dependence between observations within a cluster
j is induced by bj, such that the observations within cluster j are independent,
conditional on bj. Note that using random effects — especially in this study where we
examine thousands of traders — can substantially decrease the number of estimated
parameters compared to a fixed-effects model. The random-effects Cox model is
expressed as:
λij(t,Xij, Zij) = λ0(t)e
β′Xij+b′jZij (3.4)
where λ0 is an unspecified baseline hazard function, which is the hazard rate when
all covariates take on the value of zero. X and Z are the design matrices for the
fixed-effects and random-effects, respectively, and β and b are the fixed-effects and
random-effects coefficients, respectively. The hazard rate, λij(t,Xij, Zij), is the prob-
ability density function of the event occurrence at time t conditional on the survival
to that time. Inference under the random-effects Cox regression is conducted using
the full likelihood.
The survival time in our study is computed in seconds as the difference between
the closing and opening time-stamps of each transaction. Moreover, all positions in
both data sets have been closed, meaning that the hazard event has occurred for all
observations. The predictor variables employed in the analysis include the following:
• Gain: a dichotomous variable to estimate the disposition effect, which takes
the value of one if the transaction is a gain and zero if it is a loss;
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• Long: a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one for a long position
and zero for a short position;
• Leverage: a categorical variable that captures the degree of leverage used
based on the leverage levels offered by the trading platforms3;
• T/P : a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the position is
closed due to a take profit order, and zero otherwise; and
• S/L: a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the trade is closed
due to a stop loss order, and zero otherwise.
We conduct a series of interrelated regression models based on the Cox pro-
portional hazards method discussed above on the two data sets. First, we fit an
unadjusted model labeled Model (1), where we only use the Gain variable in order
to investigate whether there is a difference in the magnitude of the disposition effect
between the two trading environments. Next, we run an adjusted model, labeled
Model (2), where we include the remaining control variables listed above. In this
model, we allow for interaction between the variables, and we include asset fixed-
effects. Finally, we fit a third model, labeled Model (3), that includes all variables
from Model (2), in addition to trader random-effects. We conduct these analyses
for each data set separately, and then repeat them for subsets that are selected by
only considering the overlapping time frame and the common assets traded on the
two platforms.
For all these models we report the coefficients, odds ratios (OR), and standard
errors (S.E.) for all covariates. Moreover we report the concordance index, or Har-
rell’s C, which is one of the most widely used performance metrics for survival mod-
els (Harrell, 2013). This measure is interpreted as the probability of concordance
between the predicted and the actual survival times (Harrell et al., 1982).
3.5 Data
We make use of two data sets in order to compare the disposition effect of traders un-
der a scopic and a traditional trading environment. We describe the characteristics
of the two data sets in the sections below.
3The Anonymous platform offers only a leverage ratio of 200 to one, hence we do not include
this variable when fitting the models to this data set.
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3.5.1 Data from eToro
The first data set is obtained from the highly popular eToro STP, and contains over
63 million trades executed by all participants during 2013. Participants can trade
in a wide range of assets including currencies, commodities, equities, and indices.
Table 1.1 provides a list of the entire investment universe available to traders. The
STP records the details of each transaction, including the opening and closing prices,
amount traded, leverage used, direction, as well as the opening and closing time-
stamps. Since we aim to study the disposition effect of traders who execute personal
trades and refrain from explicitly copying others, we select trade leaders by applying
a strict criterion where only participants whose trades were all entered manually into
the platform during 2013 are included in our sample. Note that traders can execute
a mix of manual and copied trades; however, we consider these individuals to be
investors who allocate part of their capital to be managed by trade leaders, yet
reserve a portion for personal trading.
The final sample contains over 2.6 million trades executed by 77,476 trade lead-
ers. We present some descriptive statistics in Table 3.2. Trades can be categorized
based on the asset traded as follows: currencies constitute 83.14% of trades, whereas
commodities, equities, and indices make up 11.21%, 3.6% and 2.05%, respectively.
Moreover, around 63% of these trades are personally closed by the traders, while
22% and 13% are triggered by stop-loss and take-profit orders, respectively. Next, we
compute several behavioral trading characteristics, which are first averaged across
trades of each trader and then across all trade leaders. On average, we find that
trade leaders engage in both long (66.11%) and short positions, and employ a lever-
age ratio of 175 to one. These findings support the notion that trade leaders are
considered to be sophisticated traders, since they take both long and short positions
(Engelberg et al., 2012, 2014), and are confident enough in their trading skills to
use high levels of leverage. With respect to the duration of trades, trade leaders
keep positions open for an average of six days, which indicates that they are aware
of the impact of rollover costs on profits associated with keeping positions open
overnight. The average frequency of annual trades across trade leaders is around
34, which is considerably low compared to that of the full population of participants
(207). This suggests that trade leaders are more aware of the impact of transaction
costs on profits. Finally, we find that trade leaders are more specialized since they
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trade in a fewer number of assets (3.6 on average) compared to the full population
of participants (6.5).
3.5.2 Data from Anonymous
The second data set is obtained from a foreign exchange broker, which we call
Anonymous, and contains over 6.9 million trades in 22 currency pairs, executed by
22,545 traders over the period January 2011 to September 2013. Anonymous does
not offer participants any social trading features such as mirror trading, thus we
consider all trades to be unique. The list of currency pairs offered by Anonymous
is presented in Table 3.1. Around 66.48% of trades are personally closed by the
trader while 14.41% and 19.11% of trades are closed due to stop-loss and take-profit
orders, respectively. Moreover, we calculate several trader behavior characteristics,
which are first averaged across trades of each trader, and then across all traders.
We present these statistics in Table 3.3. On average, we find that 47% of a trader’s
positions on the Anonymous platform are buys, which is around 20% less compared
to trade leaders on eToro. This suggests that traders on Anonymous are more
comfortable with riskier short selling strategies. Regarding trade duration, we find
that the average trade on Anonymous is around 1.19 days, which is considerably less
than the duration of trades on eToro. This means that most traders on Anonymous
are day traders who close their positions at the end of the trading day. As such, they
tend to minimize their exposure to overnight fluctuations in prices. With respect to
the average number of annual trades, we report a figure of around 111 trades, which
is almost three times the value reported for trade leaders from eToro. Given that
traders on Anonymous are day traders, the higher trade frequency indicates that
these traders seek to exploit intraday price swings. Finally, we find that traders on
Anonymous trade in an average of 5.7 different currency pairs. While this number is
low, indicating that these traders specialize in a few currencies, this figure is slightly
higher than that of trade leaders, meaning that traders on Anonymous have a wider
scope when searching for trading opportunities to exploit.
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3.6 Results
In what follows, we present the results obtained from the two methods discussed
previously for each of the data sets.
3.6.1 Disposition Spread Results
3.6.1.1 No Trader Clustering
We begin by calculating the disposition spread, DISP , by aggregating the real-
ized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and paper losses on the basis of both trade
counts and dollar values across all transactions and traders, before calculating the
proportions of gains and losses realized. This analysis is repeated by varying the
trading duration, t = [1 → 14], and the results are presented in the four panels
of Table 3.4. We first conduct the analysis using all the observations in both data
sets. Panel A shows that trade leaders on eToro exhibit a positive and significant
disposition spread irrespective of the trading period or the basis used to calculate
the parameters. This means that across all assets traded in 2013, trade leaders close
a greater proportion of their winning positions than of their losing ones. Given
the high t-statistics across all trading periods, we reject the null hypothesis that
PGR ≤ PLR. The average DISP spread, PGR, PLR, and DISP RATIO across
all trading periods are 11.41%, 84.4%, 72.98%, and 1.22, respectively, when param-
eters are calculated based on trade count, and 11.62%, 45.11%, 33.49%, and 1.49,
respectively, when parameters are based on trade dollar values. The disposition
ratios indicate that positions exhibiting gains are between 22% and 49% more likely
to be closed from one day to the next compared to positions that are losing. We also
point out that as the trading period increases, both the PGR and PLR approach
100%, and the DISP RATIO converges to one. This is expected in the context of
short term trading since all positions, regardless of profitability, will be closed when
considering a long trading period.
Regarding traders on Anonymous, the results presented in Panel B of Table
3.4 show that, over the period January 2011 to September 2013, traders exhibited
positive and significant disposition spreads, which are also considerably greater than
those reported for trade leaders on eToro across all trading periods considered. The
average DISP spread, PGR, PLR, and DISP RATIO across all trading periods
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are 16.24%, 87.01%, 70.78%, and 1.38, respectively, when using trade counts, and
27.05%, 78.44%, 51.39%, and 3.72, respectively, when using dollar values. These
values clearly show that traders on Anonymous exhibit a greater disposition effect
compared to trade leaders on eToro.
In order to conduct a more comparable analysis, we recalculate the disposition
spread parameters using an overlapping time frame between the two data sets, from
January 2013 to September 2013. Additionally, we only consider the common subset
of the assets traded on the two platforms, which includes 16 currency pairs. The
results for eToro and Anonymous are presented in Panel C and Panel D, respectively,
in Table 3.4. We find that trade leaders exhibit a significant disposition effect, with
an average DISP spread across all trading periods of 8.63% and 13.63%, depending
on the basis used. With respect to traders on Anonymous, the mean disposition
spreads are 21.64% and 34.92%, which are almost three times larger than the figures
reported for trade leaders on eToro. The disposition ratios corroborate our results,
showing that trade leaders on eToro have an average DISP RATIO between 1.16
and 1.54, while traders on Anonymous have a ratio between 1.52 and 2.59.
All our findings show that, while both trade leaders on eToro and traders on
Anonymous exhibit the disposition effect, this bias is much more pronounced among
the latter. To summarize, the disposition ratios imply that trade leaders are between
16% and 54% more likely to close a winning position relative to a losing one, while
traders on Anonymous are between 52% and 159% more likely to do so.
3.6.1.2 With Trader Clustering
We re-examine the disposition effect in the two data sets; however, we calculate the
disposition spread and disposition ratio for each trader and then average them to
obtain overall mean measures for each trading period. This allows us to account for
potential dependence between trades executed by a certain trader. The results are
presented in four panels in Table 3.5. Panel A shows the results for trade leaders on
eToro throughout 2013 and including all assets offered by the platform. While the
PGR and PLR ratios are still high (between 47% and 53%), these figures are closer
to each other resulting in narrow disposition spreads across all trading periods, and
even in negative spreads when t is large. Moreover, all estimates are statistically
insignificant as indicated by the low t-statistics. While this method aims to account
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for potential dependence among trades executed by a certain trader, it also results
in low parameter values. For instance, the top part of Panel A in Table 3.5 shows
that the trade count of realized gains, realized losses, paper gains, and paper losses
for t ≤ 6 days are very small, which would result in an insignificant t-statistic. This
is due to the fact that trade leaders on average have around one position open in a
given week (see Table 2.1). As such, these results should be analyzed with caution.
Regarding traders on Anonymous (Panel B), we find that the disposition spread
is statistically insignificant when using trade count as the basis for calculating the
gains and losses, but it is significant across all trading periods when using trade
dollar values. This inconsistency may be attributed to the issue mentioned earlier,
where the trade count parameters are very small such that they result in insignificant
test statistics. Nevertheless, the mean DISP spread based on trade dollar values
is found to be equal to 15.15%, which is almost half the value obtained in the
initial analysis where dependency among trades was not taken into account. These
results indicate that the disposition effect is only present in the traditional trading
environment and not in the scopic regime.
For a more comparable analysis between the two trading environments, we re-
estimate the disposition spreads and ratios using an overlapping time-frame, from
January 2013 to September 2013, and we only consider the common subset of the
assets traded, as we did earlier. The results for eToro and Anonymous are presented
in Panel C and Panel D, respectively, in Table 3.5. For trade leaders on eToro, the
DISP spread remains largely insignificant, except for the few cases under the trade
dollar value basis when the trading period t ≥ 12. The t-statistics turn significant,
yet remain close to the critical significance levels. Again, this significance should be
taken with a grain of salt.
Finally, with respect to traders on Anonymous in the common sub-sample, we
find statistically insignificant disposition spreads when using the trade count basis,
but we report significant estimates across all trading periods under the trade dollar
value basis. In particular, the mean DISP spread is equal to 16.82% and the mean
DISP RATIO remains relatively high at around 37.
We summarize our results as follows. First, we find that when dependencies
among trades executed by the same trader are not accounted for, traders under
both scopic and traditional environments exhibit the disposition effect. However,
the disposition effect under the former regime is considerably lower compared to
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traders in a traditional environment. Second, when dependencies among transac-
tions are taken into account, the disposition effect of trade leaders on the STP
becomes statistically insignificant, while the disposition effect of traders on Anony-
mous is only significant when using the trade dollar value basis, and is around half
the estimate obtained when we do not cluster trades. While we recommend cau-
tion when analyzing these results — due to the low trading frequency in the short
trading periods — one may conclude that the scopic environment governing STPs
erodes the disposition effect as traders adjust for this bias by learning not only from
their own past trades, but also from the trades of all other traders on the platform.
Another potential explanation is that the constant scrutiny by investors on STPs
prompts trade leaders to close losing positions with the same propensity of closing
winning positions, in order to avoid holding unjustifiable paper losses.
3.6.2 Cox Regression Results
We conduct a series of Cox regression models on the entire data sets, and on com-
parable subsets. Since we obtain very similar results for each full data set and its
subset, we only report and discuss the results for the common subsets in the sections
below to avoid repetition.
3.6.2.1 eToro Common Subset
We fit the Cox regression models using the subsets of the two data sets with an
overlapping time frame, from January 2013 to September 2013, and we only con-
sider the common assets offered by the two platforms. The results for eToro and
Anonymous are presented in Panel A and Panel B, respectively, in Table 3.6.
Starting with eToro, Model (1) shows that theGain variable is significant and has
a small negative effect on the hazard rate of trades, with an estimate of -0.042. This
means that losses are more likely to be realized relative to gains. The concordance
index for Model (1) is 50.5% , indicating that the model correctly predicts the
survival of trades half of the time. This suggests that Model (1) can be improved
by including other factors that could explain the hazard rate of trades. Next, we fit
Model (2) and find that the effect of the Gain variable turns positive, but remains
small with an estimate of 0.021, which suggests that trade leaders are 2.1% more
likely to close a winning position relative to a losing one. We also find that long
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positions are around 6.8% more likely to be closed compared to short positions, as
indicated by the coefficient of the Long variable.
Regarding limit orders, we report a negative relationship between the take profit,
T/P variable and the hazard rate, with an estimate of around -1.255. The relation-
ship persists even after accounting for the interaction between T/P and Gain. This
may seem counter-intuitive at first in the sense that one would expect take profit
orders to increase the hazard ratio, as profitable positions are closed once the market
price reaches the take profit price. However, the T/P estimate is the effect of take
profit orders on the hazard rate relative to trades that are personally closed by the
trade leader. One explanation for this result is that trade leaders place wide take
profit limits, which would require a longer trade duration for the market price to
trigger the order. As for stop loss orders, we find that the S/L variable also has a
negative effect on the hazard rate with a coefficient of -0.443, even after taking into
account potential interaction with the Gain variable. Again, this can be explained
by the wide stop loss limits used by trade leaders, which would require a longer du-
ration for the price to reach the stop loss level. We argue that the wide take profit
and stop loss levels are a strategic signaling mechanism employed by trade leaders,
where they forgo realizing small profits in hopes of winning big, which would be
perceived as a more attractive achievement by potential investors. Such a strategy
can be implemented by placing wider take profit levels, and allowing for some flexi-
bility for adverse price swings by placing a wider stop loss limit. In support of our
argument, we find that trade leaders who use take profit and stop loss orders on
eToro have average dollar gains and losses of 30.44 and -65.88, respectively, while
those on Anonymous show average gains and losses of 24.56 and -56.1, respectively.
These statistics show that trade leaders on eToro place wider take profit and stop
loss limits. Finally, with respect to leverage, we report that the low leverage ratios
of 5 to 1 and 10 to 1 have negative effects on the hazard rate, while ratios over
50 to 1 have a positive impact. These results are as one would expect since high
leverage ratios translate into large price swings relative to low leverage ratios, which
would accelerate trading activity by allowing trade leaders to realize sizable gains
(or losses) within a shorter period of time. Moreover, the effect of leverage on the
hazard rate as we move from a ratio of 50 to 1, to a ratio of 400 to 1 increases expo-
nentially. This finding emphasizes the accelerated hazard impact that high leverage
ratios have on trades. The concordance index of Model (2) is equal to 72.9%, which
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indicates that the control variables significantly improve the predictive power of the
model.
Finally, in Model (3), we include trader random effects in order to capture het-
erogeneity among trade leaders and dependence among transactions executed by
each trade leader. Interestingly, the coefficient for the Gain variable increases sig-
nificantly to 0.27, meaning that trade leaders are 27% more likely to realize a gain
relative to a loss. This result means that trade leaders exhibit the disposition ef-
fect, which is opposite to what we found when we used the method proposed by
Odean (1998a). Specifically, when we accounted for potential dependence among
trades, the disposition spread decreased and turned insignificant. Given the draw-
backs discussed earlier about calculating the disposition spread in the context of
short term trading, we argue that the Cox proportional hazards method is a supe-
rior alternative since it does not depend on an arbitrary trading time frame. With
respect to the control variables, almost all coefficients decrease slightly yet remain
statistically significant. One exception is that the leverage ratio of 10 to 1 became
insignificant, while the ratio of 25 to 1, which was previously insignificant, became
positive and significant. Nevertheless, this does not change the overall exponential
relationship between leverage and the hazard rate. As for the concordance index, we
report a value of 82.7%, which means that adding trader random effects increases
the predictive power of the model.
3.6.2.2 Anonymous Common Subset
For traders on Anonymous, the results of Model (1) show that the Gain estimate is
statistically significant and equal to 0.433, meaning that a winning position has a
higher hazard rate relative to a losing position. The odds ratio indicates that traders
on Anonymous are 1.75 times more likely to close a winning position compared
to a losing one, and this figure is much higher compared to the result obtained
for trade leaders on eToro (OR = 0.959). The concordance index of the model is
55.1%. The results for Model (2) show that, after including the control variables, the
estimate of the Gain variable rises to around 0.7, which translates into a relatively
high odds ratio of around two, compared to that of trade leaders (OR = 1.09).
This clearly illustrates that traders on Anonymous exhibit a much larger disposition
effect compared to trade leaders on eToro. Regarding the Long variable, we report
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a negative estimate of -0.054, meaning that long positions on Anonymous are closed
at a slower rate relative to short positions, which is opposite to what we found for
trade leaders on eToro. With respect to limit orders, we find that take profit orders
have a positive impact on the hazard rate with a T/P coefficient of 0.59 (OR = 1.8).
This means that take profit orders are 1.8 times more likely to be closed relative to
manual orders, which is in line with our earlier argument that traders on Anonymous
use tight take profit limits. Hence, it is very probable that the market price will
trigger the take profit order and close the trade. This is especially probable since the
Anonymous platform imposes a leverage ratio of 200 to 1, which magnifies the price
swings and increases the likelihood of the limit order being triggered. Similarly for
stop loss orders, the impact on the hazard rate is also positive with a S/L coefficient
of 1.28 (OR = 3.6). This finding is in agreement with the fact that these traders use
tight stop loss orders, resulting in a high probability that even small price swings will
trigger these orders within a very short duration. Since the Anonymous platform
applies a 200 to 1 leverage ratio to all trades, it is not possible to estimate the effect
of the variation in leverage on the hazard rate. The concordance index of Model (2)
is equal to 63.1%, which is an improvement over the predictive power of Model (1).
Finally, Model (3) includes trader random-effects, which increase the coefficient
of the Gain variable to 0.9 (OR = 2.46). This is around three times greater than the
estimate obtained for trade leaders on eToro for the same model. As such, we can
conclude that, all else equal, the disposition effect exhibited by traders in a tradi-
tional trading environment is considerably larger than that exhibited by traders in a
scopic environment. In other words, the scopic regime erodes the disposition effect
of traders, although not entirely. With respect to the Long variable, the coefficient
turns positive and significant, but remains very small, 0.006. The coefficients for
T/P and S/L decrease to around 0.14 and 1.04, respectively, yet remain significant.
As for the concordance index, we report a high value of 82.3%.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the disposition effect of traders in a scopic and a traditional
trading environment in order to test whether high levels of transparency and the
free flow of information decrease this behavioral bias. We build on the existing
literature and argue that traders can learn to adjust for the disposition effect more
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efficiently when they have access to aggregate information on order flow, as compared
to learning only from their own experience. To study this, we use a data set from
the highly popular eToro STP containing over 2.6 million transactions executed
by 77,476 trade leaders, and another data set from a traditional trading platform
called Anonymous, which contains over 6.9 million transactions executed by 22,545
traders. We apply two empirical methods that are used in the literature. Using
the measure proposed by Odean (1998a), we first calculate the disposition spread
without accounting for dependence among trades and find that, while traders on
both platforms exhibit the disposition effect, traders in the scopic environment show
a lower bias. When we cluster the trades by trader, we only find evidence of the
disposition effect for traders on Anonymous.
The second empirical method employs a series of Cox proportional hazards mod-
els, where we find evidence of the disposition effect for traders in both trading envi-
ronments. Moreover, we find that the disposition effect of traders in the traditional
financial environment was around three times larger compared to that of traders in
the scopic environment when we included trader random-effects.
While there are some absolute differences in the results generated by the two
methods, the overall relative conclusion is the same. Specifically, we find ample
evidence showing a weaker disposition effect for traders in a scopic environment
compared to traders in a traditional trading setting. This finding is consistent with
the learning hypothesis discussed in the literature, where trade leaders on STPs can
adjust for this behavioral bias by learning not only from their own historical trades,
but also from the trades of others. As transactions are published by the STP in real-
time, trade leaders can learn to avoid realizing gains prematurely, and understand
how realizing losses is consistent with a tax-efficient strategy. Nevertheless, this
does not suggest that traders in a traditional financial setting do not learn from
their own historical trades. We argue that traders in a scopic environment learn at
a faster rate compared to traders in a traditional trading setting. However, more
work is required to test this proposition, and the argument of whether the scopic
trading environment erodes the disposition effect completely is still debatable and
requires further research.
Academics such as Dhar and Zhu (2006) propose that brokerage firms should
educate their clients about behavioral biases that may adversely impact their per-
formance. While this approach would surely make individuals more aware of the
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factors that influence their trading activity, we show that by simply increasing in-
formation transparency, individuals can very efficiently learn on their own to avoid
the disposition effect by observing the actions of others. This phenomenon is a
manifestation of how efficient markets are self-regulating, as heightened exposure to
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Table 3.1: Investment Universe Provided by the Anonymous Foreign Ex-
change Broker. The following table lists all the currency pairs that are offered to























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Informed Trading on Social
Trading Platforms: An Analysis of
the Predictive Ability of




We investigate the predictive ability of 41,072 position traders and 48,691 intraday
traders in 19 different currency pairs and commodities on a social trading platform,
where individuals have access to high quality order flow data. Based on the em-
pirical methods developed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Fishe and Smith
(2012), we use an unconditional test and identify around 50% of position traders
as informed; however, when we condition on the state of the market, this propor-
tion drops between 0.11% and 1.31%, indicating that few position traders possess
the skill to correctly predict future price movements in both upward and downward
trending markets. Regarding intraday traders, we identify around 15% of the sample
as informed. We find that trading characteristics such as leverage, limit orders, eq-
uity used, trade position, trade duration, trading frequency, and number of different
assets traded offer significant explanatory power about who is informed, especially
when using realized profits as a basis to determine success.
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4.1 Introduction
One of the most intriguing puzzles in finance is to identify informed market partici-
pants and understand the drivers behind their superior predictive ability. According
to Fishe and Smith (2012), informed traders are “those whose actions show they hold
valuable short-term price information.” These actions are reflected in what is known
as order flow, which includes the details of transactions between traders and brokers.
As such, informed trading is associated with how prices respond to order flow, where
steady profits may be a good indicator of who is informed (Fishe and Smith, 2012).
In foreign exchange, the decentralized structure of the market and the lack of
aggregate order flow data have often raised the question of whether information
differentials could allow traders to place informed trades, which would consequently
enhance price discovery (Goodhart, 1988; Lyons, 1997). While the conventional ar-
gument is that all participants in the foreign exchange market have access to the
same publicly disclosed information with virtually no potential for private informa-
tion, some researchers including Lyons (2001) have argued that there exist several
channels, such as order flow, through which private information plays a valuable role.
Several early studies such as Goodhart (1988), Lyons (1997), and Peiers (1997) dis-
cuss how private data on order flow in the foreign exchange market may result in
information differentials that can be advantageously used by brokerage firms and
money managers in order to gauge the fundamental value of currencies. Covrig and
Melvin (2002) present empirical evidence supporting this view, whereby Japanese
banks are found to have a certain degree of price leadership during periods of signif-
icant information differential regarding order flow. Similarly, Marsh and O’Rourke
(2005) examine the information content of customer order flow at a top European
commercial bank, and find significant correlation between order flow and changes in
exchange rates, which suggests that order flow contains valuable information. More
recently, Nolte and Nolte (2012, 2016) investigated the information contained in the
trading activity of around 2,000 individual retail traders on the OANDA FXTrade
platform, and found important non-public information that can be used for short-
term exchange rate forecasting. The evidence presented by the authors supports the
argument that retail foreign exchange traders cannot be wholly dismissed as noise
traders, and that their aggregate information processing ability generates additional
predictive information.
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Nevertheless, the scope of early studies was confined due to the limited access to
data, which prevented in-depth analysis of individual trader behavior in the foreign
exchange market (Lyons, 1995). Hence, most studies focused either on long-term
macroeconomic dynamics of exchange rates (Iwatsubo and Marsh, 2014; MacDonald
and Marsh, 2004; Mark, 1995), the microstructure of the foreign exchange market
(Evans and Lyons, 2002; Lyons, 2001, 1995), the performance of institutional cur-
rency traders and fund managers (Melvin and Shand, 2011; Froot et al., 2011; Po-
jarliev and Levich, 2010; Marsh and O’Rourke, 2005; MacDonald and Marsh, 1996),
or on the predictive power of technical analysis (Abbey and Doukas, 2012; Menkhoff
and Taylor, 2007; Osler, 2003; Curcio et al., 1997).
The restricted access to order flow data on individual currency traders has cre-
ated a significant gap in the literature on the predictive ability of these traders
(Fan and Lyons, 2003). Consequently, many studies on informed trading and the
predictive ability of individual traders focus on the futures markets — since informa-
tion was more readily accessible from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) — and on individual stock traders.
Recent technological innovation has revolutionized the way individuals trade on-
line, and has created a unique environment, such that what was once privately
held order flow data is now publicly and freely disclosed on social trading plat-
forms (STPs) in aim of providing participants with a higher degree of information
transparency. This is the product of social trading, which is a novel concept that
combines the traditional online trading model with the tools and features of social
media networks. Every trade that is executed by all participants on the platform is
publicly disclosed, and anyone can access the details of these transactions. A STP
allows participants to communicate, collaborate, and even copy each other’s trades
in real-time using a mirror trading algorithm. Trading on STPs is done through
a contract for difference (CFD), which is an electronic contract between a trader
and a CFD provider that requires the trader to relinquish physical possession of
the underlying asset for a contract with the CFD provider that offers an identical
economic exposure (Norman, 2009). The high level of transparency on STPs enables
participants to constantly and reciprocally scrutinize each other’s trading activities,
an environment known as a “scopic regime” (Knorr Cetina, 2003). Some of the
information that is published by the STP typically includes a trader’s biography,
advertised trading strategy, posts, historical trades, and current portfolio holdings.
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The reason why participants agree to share their private information with the entire
social trading network is because STPs encourage participants to build a reputation
in order to attract potential copiers, and offer compensation schemes that allow
a trader to earn a performance fee based on the profits generated for his copiers.
Given this highly informal principal-agent relationship, participants on STPs can
be divided into two main groups, which we label as trade leaders and investors (or
copiers). The former are generally experienced traders who manage the capital al-
located to them by the latter in return for monetary compensation that may be
directly or indirectly linked to performance. Doering et al. (2015) provide an exten-
sive overview of the different compensation schemes offered by STPs. An investor
can allocate his capital using the mirror trading algorithm offered by the platform
by easily and explicitly copying the trades of others with a click of a button, thus
receiving a price identical to that received by the copied trade leader. Hence, all
future trades executed by a copied trade leader are automatically replicated in the
investor’s account. Moreover, the relationship between trade leaders and investors
is entirely informal since investors have the liberty to terminate the copying rela-
tionship at any time and without any repercussions. Similarly, trade leaders are
not directly penalized should they go rogue or deviate from their advertised trading
strategy. Nevertheless, our study focuses on the predictive ability of trade leaders,
who execute original trades based on their own analyses and strategies. Hence, we
define a trade leader as an individual who only personally enters trades into the
STP during the period of study, and refrains from explicitly copying others using
mirror trading.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the predictive
ability of individual foreign exchange traders under a scopic regime, where traders
have access to high quality order flow data. We examine the propensity of a trader to
be informed (i.e. the ability to correctly predict future price movements), given that
there are virtually no obstacles in obtaining high quality information in real-time.
We do not focus our analysis on the traders’ ability to generate positive net profits,
but rather on their ability to incorporate information contained in the order flow
when predicting the direction of future price changes. This differentiates our study
from early research done on the predictive power of technical analysis, which focuses
solely on past price movements and a selection of technical indicators (Abbey and
Doukas, 2012). Furthermore, it resonates the work of Hayley and Marsh (2015) on
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the performance, and learning ability of currency traders in a traditional trading
environment, and builds on the empirical evidence of Nolte and Nolte (2016), who
show that the information contained in the aggregate order flow of individual traders
has significant predictive power.
A key challenge in this study is to select a proper measure of a trader’s ability to
predict future price movements. To elaborate, consider a trader who has correctly
predicted future price movements in nine out of ten trades. If we use the proportion
of successful trades as a measure of predictive ability, then one may consider this
trader to be highly informed about the direction of future price changes. Now
assume that the trader realized a gain of $1 in each of the successful trades, and a
loss of −$10 in the tenth trade. If we consider overall profitability as a measure of
predictive ability, then this trader is deemed uninformed. This dilemma becomes
further complicated if we do not take into account the size of the gain or loss relative
to a trader’s wealth. For instance, a given dollar profit may be a significant success
to a small trader, but would be considered a mediocre return for a large trader.
Moreover, if the scenario were reversed where the trader has nine small losses of
−$1 and one large gain of $10, then this trader’s overall profitability may have been
simply due to luck.
The above example illustrates how success measured using dollar values may be a
misleading indicator of predictive ability, whereby a trader may be able to correctly
forecast future price movements, but cannot achieve positive net profits. We highly
stress on the point that overall profitability and predictive ability are two very dif-
ferent concepts, which should not be confused with each other. The former assesses
a trader’s performance and returns generated, while the latter assesses a trader’s
ability to correctly predict future price changes. In response to this issue, and given
the limitations of our data set1, we adopt some of the statistical methods developed
by researchers on informed trading in the futures markets, such as Henriksson and
Merton (1981) and Fishe and Smith (2012). Specifically, we use multiple definitions
of informed trading based on binary profit rules in order to identify individuals with
superior predictive ability and examine their trading characteristics. While binary
profit rules may not be flawless, they resolve many of the issues that arise from using
dollar values, as we discuss later in the methodology section.
1Our data set does not include the account balance of each trader, thus it is impossible for us
to calculate alternative performance metrics such as return on investment.
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Based on the definition of a trade leader, we investigate the effect of the scopic
regime governing STPs on the predictive ability of individual traders. We use a data
set from the highly popular eToro STP and classify over 700 thousand transactions
executed by 41,072 position trade leaders — traders who keep positions open for
more than one trading day — and over 1.7 million transactions executed by 48,691
intraday trade leaders in 19 different assets during 2013. These assets comprise of
16 currency pairs and three commodities. We adopt empirical techniques similar
to those proposed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Fishe and Smith (2012)
in order to identify trade leaders as either position informed, intraday informed,
momentum, contrarian, or uninformed.
First, we use two profit rules based on unrealized profits (or position profits) and
realized profits (or daily trading profits), separately, to assess whether position trade
leaders are informed. In addition, we apply for each profit rule an unconditional test
and a conditional test similar to the method proposed by Henriksson and Merton
(1981) (denoted as HM test), where the former is a binomial test for the expectation
of being profitable more than 50% of the time, and the latter tests whether traders
are able to predict movements in prices in both upward and downward trending
markets.
Second, we analyze intraday profits, and the relationship between position direc-
tion and past price movements in order to identify intraday trade leaders as either
informed, momentum, contrarian, or uninformed. Since we are dealing with thou-
sands of trade leaders, which results in thousands of test statistics, a multiple-testing
problem arises where some tests may be significant due to chance. In order to con-
trol for these luck events, we use the false discovery rate (FDR) method developed
by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), where we apply a 5% critical value.2
For position trade leaders, the unconditional test identifies around 50% of these
individuals as informed, indicating that half of position traders have profitably ex-
ecuted more than 50% of their trades. When we apply the HM test, the proportion
of trade leaders that are identified as position informed drops between 0.11% and
1.31%. This suggests that very few position trade leaders possess the skill to cor-
rectly predict price changes in both upward and downward trending markets. In
order to examine the characteristics of informed position trade leaders, we use a
2Fishe and Smith (2012) discuss how the statistical techniques of earlier studies did not make
any allowance for the multiple-testing problem.
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series of logistic models where the dependent binary variable indicates whether a
trade leader is informed depending on the profit rule and test used. The independent
variables are averaged for each trade leader and include the leverage used, percent-
age of trades that are limit orders, the natural log of the amount of equity used,
the mean duration of a trade, the trading frequency, and the number of different
assets traded. The models based on the daily trading profits rule have a superior fit,
hence we focus the discussion on these results. In particular, individuals identified
as position informed under the unconditional test tend to use higher leverage, apply
limit orders to realize gains and limit losses, use less equity per trade, are gener-
ally successful in long trades, have longer trade durations, trade less frequently, and
trade in multiple assets. When we analyze the characteristics of traders identified as
informed under the HM test, we find that these individuals use less leverage, employ
limit orders effectively, use more equity per trade, are able to short sell profitably,
have long trade durations, trade more frequently, and trade in multiple assets.
With respect to intraday trade leaders, we identify around 15%, 49%, 29%, and
0.3% of the total sample as informed, momentum, contrarian, and uninformed, re-
spectively.3 We also examine the characteristics of these types of intraday traders
using logistic regressions, and find the highest explanatory power for the intraday
informed model. Specifically, we find that intraday informed trade leaders use rela-
tively less leverage, employ limit orders to automatically realize gains and minimize
drawdown, use more of their equity in each trade, are more successful in short
trades, have relatively longer trade durations, trade more frequently, and diversify
their trades in multiple assets.
Research on informed trading in the foreign exchange market has been very
limited, the main hurdle being access to high quality order flow data, not only
for academics, but more importantly for retail traders. This has prevented earlier
studies from investigating how order flow data affects the predictive ability of indi-
vidual traders. Social trading mitigates this issue by offering participants on STPs
a vast amount of high quality information on order flow, thus allowing us to explore
how these individuals incorporate this information into their trading decisions. Our
findings provide insight about whom, if anyone, is informed in the foreign exchange
and commodities markets — given that order flow data is readily accessible to all
3The reason why these percentages do not add up to 100 is because there is an additional
category of traders who are known as random or noise traders; however, we do not include them
in our discussion and analysis.
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participants — and about the trading characteristics of these individuals.
We find that under a scopic trading regime, many individuals trade profitably
more than half of the time. However, very few trade leaders possess the ability to
correctly predict price movements in both upward and downward trending markets.
This suggests that most foreign exchange and commodities trade leaders adopt short
term trading strategies that are specific to the current state of the market, but fail
when there are trend reversals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the
literature on informed trading. In section 4.3 we discuss the methodology used.
Section 4.4 describes the data and variables. We discuss the results in section 4.5.
Finally, section 4.6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Literature Review
The literature on the predictive ability of individual foreign exchange traders is very
sparse, and most early studies focus on the predictive power of technical analysis due
to the popularity of technical indicators among currency traders. Park and Irwin
(2007) conduct a comprehensive review of the empirical papers and find that 24 out
of 38 studies conclude that technical analysis can generate annual profits between
5% and 10%. Nevertheless, these studies do not examine the predictive ability of
individual currency traders, but instead assess how technical indicators perform
when applied to exchange rates. Abbey and Doukas (2012) argue that these studies
suffer from various biases such as ex-post selection of trading rules, data snooping,
and improper accounting of transaction costs. In response to the ambiguity of
earlier studies, the authors use a data set of 428 individual currency traders from
March 2004 to September 2009, and use the four most popular technical indicators
to explain performance. They find that their model explains the cross-section of
daily net returns of individual traders. Their results also show that individuals
who trade based on the most popular technical indicators tend to underperform
relative to those who steer away from these indicators. Nevertheless, the literature
on the predictive ability of currency traders is limited to technical analysis, which
is only one of many strategies that may be used in practice. Thus, focusing solely
on technical trading rules would offer an incomplete assessment of the skills of these
traders.
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In a more recent study, Hayley and Marsh (2015) examine the performance
and learning ability of almost 100,000 retail currency traders on a leading trading
platform and report several main findings. First, they find significant heterogeneity
in trader skills. Second, they find that traders are more likely to cease trading
after experiencing a loss, and that this reaction is more pronounced among traders
who are likely to be learning the most. Third, individuals trade more frequently
and in larger volumes after receiving a positive signal. Fourth, despite the evidence
they find for learning ability, the authors show that even highly experienced traders
perform poorly. Finally, the authors find evidence of deterioration in performance
with experience, which they interpret as “traders learning to fail due to irrational
learning.”
Another study by MacDonald et al. (2009) uses survey data from December
1991 to July 2006 of individual forecasts of three major currency pairs from the
Financial Market Survey (Finanzmarkttest) of the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. Around 75% of participants in the survey
are professionals who work in the banking or bank-related sectors. The authors
conclude that some traders possess superior forecasting ability across currency pairs,
which stems from their knowledge and use of fundamentals to explain exchange rate
behavior, as indicated by more accurate interest rate forecasts. In addition, their
study shows that individuals with superior forecasting skills are more experienced.
However, as Frankel and Froot (1987) state in their own survey study, “Economists
generally distrust survey data. It is a cornerstone of positive economics that we
learn more by observing what people do in the marketplace than what they say.”
Hence, using actual transaction data overcomes this concern.
Studies on informed trading in the futures markets have provided theoretical
insight about the trading motives of individual traders. The notable risk premium
theory developed by Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1946) supports the argument that
rational futures speculators would only enter the market if expected profits are pos-
itive. Moreover, since futures trading is a zero-sum game, this consequently means
that expected profits for hedgers would be negative after accounting for transaction
costs. It follows that if the majority of hedgers hold long positions in the underlying
asset and hedge by shorting futures contracts, futures prices will decrease below
expected spot prices, which provides profitable long opportunities for speculators.
Conversely, if hedgers hold short positions in the underlying asset and long positions
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in futures contracts, then speculators can expect to make profits by shorting futures
contracts. The empirical evidence regarding this theory has been mixed.
Many studies have presented evidence in support of this theory, showing that
speculators earn positive profits. Early studies including Hirshleifer (1988), Bessem-
binder (1992), and De Roon et al. (2000) study risk pricing in the futures and assets
markets, and find that residual risk does not completely explain futures returns.
This is consistent with the hedging-pressure theory, indicating that hedgers pay risk
premiums to transfer non-marketable risks in the futures markets. Leuthold et al.
(1994) examine nine years of daily commitments for large traders in the frozen pork
bellies futures market and find that these traders earn significant profits. The au-
thors show that these traders possess the ability to correctly forecast future price
movements, thus can accumulate invaluable experience and wealth over time. Using
the commitments of traders reports, Wang (2001) examines position-based senti-
ment by trader type in six actively traded agricultural futures markets, and finds
that large speculator sentiment is a good indicator for price continuation, large
hedger sentiment indicates the opposite, and small trader sentiment does not hold
any significant forecasting value. Hence, traders can generate significant profits by
buying when large speculators are bullish and large hedgers are bearish, or by sell-
ing when large speculators are bearish and large hedgers are bullish. Dewally et al.
(2013) use a data set of transactions by large traders in the crude oil, gasoline,
and heating oil futures markets, and find evidence in support of the risk premium
hypothesis. Specifically, the authors find that hedgers exhibit large losses, while
speculators generate significantly positive profits. In addition, individual traders
generate profits when they take positions opposite to those of hedgers in aggre-
gate. The authors argue that the trading profits of speculators are mainly driven
by their use of strategies that exploit the risk premium. Furthermore, Fishe and
Smith (2012) investigate trader positions from 2000 to 2009 for 12 futures markets,
and identify two types of informed traders; those who hold intraday information,
and the overnight informed, who are traders holding information about next day
prices. They find that intraday informed traders hold the best signals for price
changes in the near future (short horizon), and attempt to exploit this information
in their trades. With respect to overnight informed traders, the authors find that
these individuals process information very efficiently.
While there is substantial evidence in support of the risk premium theory, sev-
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eral studies have reported opposing findings. Fama and French (1987) show that
for many commodities, basis variances that are large in absolute terms are in fact
small relative to the variances of realized premiums and changes in sport prices.
Thus, large variances of realized premiums suggest that the average premiums that
are perceived to be economically significant are generally insufficient to conclude
that expected premiums are non-zero. Kolb (1992) examines a data set of 980,800
daily settlement prices in 29 commodities from 1957 to 1988, and finds that most
commodities do not exhibit a risk premium. Hartzmark (1987) also provides evi-
dence of commercial futures traders (or hedgers) earning small positive profits, while
non-commercial traders (or speculators) experiencing losses. In his follow up study,
the author also finds that the proportion of traders exhibiting consistent forecasting
ability is no more than one would expect due to chance (Hartzmark, 1991), and
that traders with superior forecasting ability could only be found in the pork bellies
market, which is generally characterized with high levels of excess speculation (Peck,
1980). As such, he concludes that trader performance is essentially determined by
luck.
Studies on individual stock traders have proposed alternative arguments derived
from behavioral models, which challenge the risk premium and luck theories. For
instance, Odean (1998a) analyses the trading records of 10,000 accounts at a large
discount brokerage, and finds that these individuals exhibit the disposition effect
such that these investors have the tendency to hold on to losing investments too
long and sell winners too soon. Moreover, Odean (1998b, 1999) finds evidence of
overconfidence among individual investors, which results in lower expected utility,
and shows that when information is costly to acquire, individuals who choose to
pay for information trade more frequently but perform worse than those who choose
not to acquire the information. Supporting evidence is also presented by Barber
and Odean (2000), who show that investors who trade frequently tend to underper-
form their peers. Moreover, Barber and Odean (2008) find evidence showing that
investors exhibit attention-based buying patterns, which lead to low returns. While
the evidence provided above shows how behavioral biases hamper one’s ability to
make informed decisions, several researchers have presented arguments to rational-
ize trader behavior. For instance, Bikhchandani et al. (1992) argue that investors
may rationally decide to herd if they believe that other market participants possess
private information or superior investment skills. Moreover, Mahani and Bernhardt
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(2007) and Linnainmaa (2011) propose models where investors rationally choose to
speculate on price movements in hopes of learning whether they are able to trade
profitably, knowing that the majority of traders lose money through speculation.
Based on the findings and arguments presented above, we expect that despite po-
tential behavioral biases, an environment with high levels of transparency regarding
order flow information should increase the overall prospects of informed trading.
4.3 Methodology
Researchers have questioned whether some individuals possess the ability to predict
future price movements correctly and consistently, and have proposed empirical
frameworks to identify them (Hartzmark, 1991; Leuthold et al., 1994; Fishe and
Smith, 2012). In this study, we follow a methodology similar to that used by Fishe
and Smith (2012) to identify informed trade leaders. We define the sequence of
positions held by a trade leader in asset k on day t as {OIk0,t, OIk1,t, . . . , OIkJk,t},
where a positive value indicates a long position while a negative value indicates a
short position. A trade leader opens a position OIk0,t, and after Jk trades he is left
with position OIkJk,t. Note that each closed trade in a CFD is essentially made up
of two positions, a long (short) position to open the trade followed by a short (long)
position — with the same amount of the underlying asset — to close the trade. Since
the data used in this study includes all closed positions by trade leaders, we are able
to observe intra-day position changes. Aggregating across all trades (j = 1, 2, . . . , J)
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, (4.1)
where P kj,t is the price of asset k at the time of trade j. The initial price of the asset
that is bought or sold on day t is given by P k0,t, and the final price on that day,
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where P k∗,t signifies a reference price, typically the price at which the CFD is closed.
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Equation 4.2 expresses daily profits as a function of observable variables and one











P kt − P k∗,t
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(4.3)
where ∆P kt = P
k
t − P kt−1 represents the change in end of day closing prices for the
kth asset, and ∆OIkt = OI
k
t −OIkt−1 is the change in position direction between day
t− 1 and t. The first term in equation 4.3 is called the position profit or unrealized
profit, which measures the profit if a trader keeps a position open until the next
trading day. The second term represents the trading profit or realized profit, which
is the profit resulting from a change in position direction (i.e. closing of a trade).
To illustrate, consider the example where a trader buys an asset for 50 at time t−1,
and the asset rises in value to 60 at time t. Since the position is still open then the
second term in the above equation is zero as ∆OIkt is zero, which leaves a position
profit of 10. Now assume that between times t− 1 and t, the price of the asset rises
and the trader sells it for 80. By inserting these numbers into the above equation,
the overall profit would be equal to 30, which is essentially the selling price less the
initial price.
4.3.1 Measures of Position Trading Predictive Ability
We use binary profit-based measures of success similar to those used by earlier
studies, such as Hartzmark (1991), Leuthold et al. (1994), and Fishe and Smith
(2012). In particular, we specify two profit rules using the binary variable θ in order
to assess the success of a trade as follows:






















The position profits variable, θpt , accounts for unrealized profits prior to a trade
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being closed, and it is equal to one if the net open interest of a trader on a specific
day is positive. In other words, the position profits rule measures the proportion of
days a position was profitable (i.e. exhibited an unrealized gain) prior to it being
closed. Conversely, the daily trading profits variable, θct , only considers days when
a trade has been closed and the gain or loss is realized. We use the term “daily”
in order to differentiate this measure from the intraday trading profits. While some
early studies, such as Leuthold et al. (1994), only consider actual trading profits
as an indicator of success, this study considers both unrealized and realized profits
separately as measures of a trader’s predictive ability.4 As such, a successful trading
decision means that either θpt or θ
c
t is equal to one, which indicates that the trade
is profitable based on the closing prices on day t. The profit rules discussed above
aggregate position profits and trading profits daily, hence, a large position taken in
an asset may override the gains or losses of smaller positions in the same asset, on
the same day.
In addition to the drawbacks mentioned earlier regarding the use of dollar profits
as a measure of success, binary profit rules are more favorable than using actual
dollar profits due to the fact that the average daily profits of traders are not normally
distributed, which may lead to inappropriate statistical inferences and hypothesis
tests (Cressie, 1980). Using a binary measure of success allows us to better control
for the presence of kurtosis, leading to more accurate detection of informed traders
(Fishe and Smith, 2012). Nevertheless, Fishe and Smith (2012) argue that, despite
the benefits of using binary measures of success, we may fail to identify some types
of informed traders, specifically, 1) those who profit from skewness by sacrificing
small losses in hopes of realizing sizable gains, and 2) those who are informed only
infrequently and hold positions for only a few days. Given these arguments, the
results obtained in this study represent only a subset of the informed trade leader
population.
To implement the abovementioned procedure, we virtually close all positions
using end-of-day closing prices in order to obtain the daily unrealized profit for each
position. Next, we aggregate positions for each trader, within each asset and on
each day, then we test the null hypothesis that the trader is successful half of the
time. Specifically, we test H0 : E(θ
p
t ) = 0.5 for position profits and H0 : E(θ
c
t ) = 0.5
4Leuthold et al. (1994) argue that realized profits represent the ultimate decision of a trader;
however, analyzing position profits as well allows us to properly assess the profitability of passively
managed accounts.
148
for daily trading profits. This is called the unconditional test to identify informed
traders. As such, a trader who randomly places trades is expected to be profitable
only 50% of the time, given that there is no systematic bias in daily prices of the
assets traded. Nevertheless, some traders may benefit from price trends, as described
by Moskowitz et al. (2012), hence we also conduct the test proposed by Henriksson
and Merton (1981), which we call the HM test. The latter is a conditional test where
the null hypothesis of no informed trading is defined as
H0 : Pr(i ∈ Long|piLi > 0) + Pr(i ∈ Short|piSi > 0) = 1, (4.4)
where i is a trade leader, piLi are the gains or losses contingent on the trades being
long positions, and piSi are the gains or losses contingent on the trades being short
positions. A trader is considered to be informed if both his long and short positions
are profitable more than 50% of the time, such that the combined probabilities in
equation 4.4 exceed one. This means that traders are informed if they can correctly
identify and trade profitably in both upward and downward market trends. As a
robustness check, we also conduct the HM test using a logistic model (Hartzmark,
1991; Leuthold et al., 1994), which is expressed as:
log
(
Pr (z(t) = 1)
Pr (z(t) = 0)
)
= α + βU(t), (4.5)
where z(t) is a binary variable that is equal to one if the price of the underlying has
increased between time t and t+ 1, and zero otherwise. The parameter U(t) is also
a binary variable that indicates the trader’s prediction at time t, and is equal to one
if the position is long, and zero if it is short. The coefficient of β is equal to zero
when the trader possesses no forecasting ability. If β is significantly greater than
zero, this indicates that the trader is informed and can differentiate between upward
and downward trending markets, and if β is significantly less than zero, this means
that the trader possesses inferior forecasting ability. The results obtained based on
the logistic model are very similar to those obtained from applying the Fisher exact
test to the null hypothesis in equation 4.4, hence we do not report these results to
avoid repetition.
The unconditional and HM tests compliment each other in the sense that the
unconditional test is sensitive to the success rate, while the HM test is focused
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more on the relationship between trade direction and profit. Nevertheless, each test
adopts a different definition of “informed trading,” thus the individuals identified as
informed under each approach may not be the same and may have entirely different
trading characteristics.
4.3.2 Measures of Intraday Predictive Ability
In the previous section, we discussed how to identify position informed trade leaders
by analyzing the daily profits of trades that have a duration greater than one trading
day. Nevertheless, a trade leader may decide to adjust positions during the day,
especially if his trading strategies or private information are time sensitive. As
such, we identify intraday informed traders, and distinguish them from other types
of intraday traders based on position information and past price movements. In the
spirit of Fishe and Smith (2012), we categorize intraday trade leaders into one of four
types: informed, uninformed, momentum, and contrarian.5 Informed trade leaders
open profitable positions prior to price changes, whereas uninformed trade leaders
open positions that are unprofitable given future prices. Momentum and contrarian
trade leaders execute trades in response to past price changes, such that momentum
traders open positions in the same direction as past price change, while contrarian
traders open positions in the opposite direction (Conrad and Kaul, 1998).
In order to separate trade leaders into the abovementioned types, we define a
binary measure of success to determine the profitability of intraday trades. Specifi-
cally, we apply the following rule:











t − P ko,t) > 0
0, otherwise.
The intraday trading profits variable, θdt , indicates whether a position that has
been opened and closed in the same day is profitable. Both informed and momentum
trade leaders would exhibit E(θdt ) > 0.5, while uninformed and contrarian trade
leaders would exhibit E(θdt ) < 0.5. In order to separate these types of traders, we
5Fishe and Smith (2012) identify two additional types of intraday traders, which they label as
large liquidity demanders and large liquidity suppliers. However, these categories are not applicable
in our context since our data is composed of small retail traders who do not possess the resources
to open significantly large positions that might affect the liquidity of the asset traded, especially
in the foreign exchange market.
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require more information regarding the behavior of trade leaders. To elaborate,
consider a group formed of informed and momentum traders. Momentum traders
can be identified by their expected response to the previous day’s price change,
P kt−1−P kt−2. As such, momentum traders will use this information in their strategy,
and we would expect to observe a positive correlation between the position direction
and the direction of the previous price change. On the contrary, informed traders do
not consider past price fluctuations, as their trades are forward looking by definition.
Given these arguments, we define one additional rule that will be used in a joint
test. Specifically, the momentum trading rule measures the propensity for a trade
leader’s position to react to the previous day’s price change:











o,t − P kt−1) > 0
0, otherwise.
Trade leaders who adopt a momentum trading strategy would have E(θmt ) > 0.5,
while informed trade leaders would exhibit E(θmt ) = 0.5. Similarly, contrarian
trade leaders would exhibit E(θmt ) < 0.5, while uninformed trade leaders would
have E(θmt ) = 0.5. Moreover, under the null hypothesis of no relation between
position direction and price changes, θdt and θ
m
t are independent and are both equal
to one with a probability of 0.5. This null hypothesis can be formally expressed
as H0: E[(1 − θmt )θdt ] = 0.25. It follows that one would expect informed trade
leaders to perform at least as well as a trader placing random trades, such that
E[(1 − θmt )θdt ] > 0.25. This joint test identifies informed traders, where a trade
is successful given that it was not placed in response to the previous day’s price
change.6 Since the joint test offers some flexibility in how the null hypothesis is
rejected for informed trade leaders, Fishe and Smith (2012) propose refining the
test by imposing that E(θdt ) > 0.5.
To summarize, we classify intraday trade leaders as follows:
• Informed: E[(1− θmt )θdt ] > 0.25 and E[θdt ] > 0.5
• Momentum: E[θmt ] > 0.5
6Fishe and Smith (2012) use the joint test, E[(1 − θmt )θdt ] = 0.25, to identify both intraday
informed traders and liquidity demanders, and apply an additional rule in order to differentiate
between these two types of traders. However, given that our data set is composed of small retail
traders whose positions are not large enough to impact liquidity, we simplify the identification
process by arguing that the traders identified by the joint test are all informed intraday.
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• Contrarian: E[θmt ] < 0.5
• Uninformed: E[θmt (1− θdt )] > 0.25 and E[θdt ] < 0.5.
4.3.3 Multiple Testing Correction
Since we are testing the predictive ability of thousands of trade leaders, the tradi-
tional levels of significance give rise to a multiple testing problem (Miller, 1981). To
overcome this issue, we recalculate the probabilities obtained from the significance
tests in order to retain a prespecified family-wise error rate, α. This correction de-
creases the likelihood of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis; Type I error. We use
the framework proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) in order to control the
false discovery rate (FDR), which is the percentage of rejected hypotheses that were
falsely rejected.7
To understand how the FDR method works, assume that there are three types
of trade leaders: informed (positive predictive ability), uninformed (negative pre-
dictive ability), and null traders (no predictive ability). Moreover, let pi0 denote the
proportion of the population of trade leaders that are null. For each trade leader,
j = 1 → n, we compute a statistic, zj, which has an asymptotic standard normal
distribution under the null hypothesis of no predictive ability, and is centered away
from zero under the two alternative hypotheses (informed and uninformed trade
leaders). Suppose that for every trade leader, we employ a critical value denoted
by c to test the one-sided hypothesis that the trade leader is informed. Hence, for
trader j for whom the null hypothesis was rejected, the probability that this trader
is actually null is given by:
FDR(c) =Pr(j ∈ {null}|zj > c)
=
Pr(zj > c|j ∈ {null})Pr(j ∈ {null})
Pr(zj > c)
=




We choose the minimum value for c such that FDR(c) ≤ 0.05, and we reject the
null hypothesis for each trade leader with a z-statistic that exceeds c. As such, the
7While there are more stringent methods to correct for false discoveries, such as the Bonferroni
correction, the FDR method has greater power; however at the cost of a higher potential occurrence
of Type I errors (Shaffer, 1995).
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group of trade leaders that is identified as informed is expected to contain no more
than 5% who have been falsely discovered.
The FDR method has several important characteristics as highlighted by Fishe
and Smith (2012). First, it adjusts the critical values based on the location of the
informed trader. Hence, a larger critical value is chosen when the null and alternative
hypotheses are close together, and a smaller value is chosen when the hypotheses
are far apart. The second key feature of the FDR method is that the critical value,
c, is independent of the number of traders, since it controls the proportion of null
traders for whom the null hypothesis is rejected. Finally, the critical value is adjusted
based on the proportion of traders who are null. As this proportion increases, the
likelihood that a successful trader is simply lucky also increases. To account for this,
the FDR method selects a larger critical value when the proportion of null traders
increases.
4.4 Data and Measures
We use a data set from the popular eToro STP, which contains the trading activities
of all participants during 2013. The STP records the details of every trade, including
the opening and closing prices and timestamps, the leverage ratio used, the direction
of the trade, as well as the asset being traded. We define a trade leader as a trader
whose transactions were all entered manually into the STP during 2013. In other
words, a trade leader is a trader who is original in his trades and who abstains
from explicitly copying others through mirror trading. As such, we apply the latter
criterion to select trade leaders from the entire population of eToro participants. In
addition, we only study the trading activities of these traders in the 19 assets listed
in Table 4.1, which include 16 currency pairs and three commodities.
The final sample contains over 700 thousand transactions executed by 41,072
position trade leaders, and over 1.7 million transactions executed by 48,691 intraday
trade leaders. We calculate several descriptive statistics for each asset separately
by averaging across all trades, and find that around 53% of transactions are in the
three most liquid currency pairs, EUR/USD, USD/JPY, and GBP/USD. Moreover,
14 out of the 19 assets are net long positions, and the proportion of stop loss orders
triggered is around double that of take profit orders across all assets. The table
also shows that higher leverage is applied to more liquid currency pairs, such as
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EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, and USD/JPY with ratios between 203 to one and 229 to
one. Similarly, the debt-to-equity ratio shows that higher leverage is used in more
liquid currency pairs such as, EUR/USD and USD/JPY, with ratios of around 127
and 148, respectively. Finally, we observe that the transactions in the more liquid
assets have shorter durations compared to transactions in exotic currency pairs.
The latter may be a consequence of using high levels of leverage when trading liquid
assets, which magnifies price movements and decreases the time needed for a trade
to potentially generate a desired profit amount.
In order to study the behavior of position informed, intraday informed, momen-
tum, and contrarian trade leaders, we define several trading characteristics. The
variable Leverage is the average leverage ratio used across all trades, and is a proxy
for the risk appetite of a trade leader. The variables TP and SL are the propor-
tions of a trade leader’s transactions that are closed due to take profit and stop loss
orders, respectively. The natural logarithm of the equity used by a trade leader,
denoted by log(Equity), is an indication of how confident a trader is in his decision,
such that a larger amount of equity signifies greater confidence. The Long variable
is the proportion of a trade leader’s transactions that are long positions, while the
variable Duration is the average duration of trades measured in seconds. We use
seconds to measure duration since trading on STPs is often very short term due to
the roll over fees associated with keeping positions open overnight. Choosing a dif-
ferent time measure does not affect our results. The variable Trades is the number
of trades executed by a trade leader during the period of study. Finally, the variable
Assets is the number of different assets traded, and is an indication of the degree of
specialization or diversification of a trade leader’s strategy.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Identifying Position Informed Trade Leaders
We apply the FDR method to identify position trade leaders who possess superior
forecasting ability. Table 4.2 presents the number and proportion of position trade
leaders that are identified to be informed in each of the 19 traded assets based on
the position profits and daily trading profits rules, and using both the unconditional
and HM tests. These numbers signify a lower bound of the true number of position
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informed trade leaders. By setting the FDR critical value equal to 5%, we require
that at least 95% of those identified as informed to be truly informed.
Using the position profits rule, we assess the predictive ability of a trade leader
based on the daily price changes of the traded asset. We identify a total of 20,403
unique position informed trade leaders under the unconditional test, which is around
50% of the position trade leader sample. To understand this figure, recall that
the position profits rule considers unrealized profits on each day a position was
open prior to it being closed. In other words, this rule measures the proportion of
days a position trade was profitable. Thus, our result means that around 50% of
position trade leaders exhibited unrealized gains more than half of the time their
trades were open. Several of these individuals possess predicting ability in multiple
assets, and are mostly concentrated in the major currency pairs such as EUR/USD,
USD/JPY, GBP/USD, NZD/USD, AUD/USD, and USD/CHF. Nevertheless, this is
expected since there are more individuals trading these major currency pairs relative
to the exotic ones. When we apply the HM test on position profits, the number of
unique position informed trade leaders drops to 46, making up only 0.11% of the
sample. The reason for this significant drop is that the HM test is more stringent
since it requires that trade leaders possess good predicting skills in both upward
and downward trending markets. Our results suggest that very few position trade
leaders exhibit unrealized gains more than half of the time, in both upward and
downward trending markets. One may infer that very few of these individuals can
appropriately predict price movements in both good and bad market conditions.
The position informed trade leaders under the HM test are also found in the major
currency pairs.
When we apply the daily trading profits rule, we are essentially assessing the
predictive ability of a trader based on the final outcome of the trades. We identify a
total of 21,541 unique position informed trade leaders (around 52% of the sample)
based on the unconditional test, who are mostly found in the major currency pairs.
This means that around half of position trade leaders realize a gain in more than
half of their trades. When we apply the HM test, we identify 537 unique position
informed trade leaders, which make up around 1.31% of the sample. This suggests
that very few position trade leaders realize a gain in more than half of their trades,
in both upward and downward trending markets. Again, the significant drop in the
number of individuals identified as informed is due to the high threshold required
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by the HM test.
The results presented above clearly show that there is a significant difference in
the way the unconditional and HM tests identify position informed trade leaders.
The reason is that each rule defines informed traders differently. In the following
section, we investigate the trading behavior of position informed trade leaders.
4.5.2 Position Informed Trade Leader Characteristics
In order to examine the characteristics of position informed trade leaders, we run a
series of logistic models for each profit rule and identification test, where the binary
dependent variable takes the value of one if the trader is identified as informed.
The independent variables, discussed in section 4.4, capture the trading behavior of
these individuals. Table 4.3 shows the results of the four logistic models. Regarding
the position profits rule, the regression based on the unconditional test shows that
there is a small but positive relationship between the average leverage ratio used
and the likelihood of being informed, with a coefficient of 0.0015. This means
that individuals whose positions exhibit an unrealized gain more than half of the
time are slightly more aggressive in their strategies, which suggests that leverage
plays a key role in allowing these traders to benefit from very small price swings.
The TP variable is statistically significant with a coefficient of around -0.37. To
explain this, recall that under the position profits rule we are assessing the predictive
ability of a trade leader for each day the trade remained open. In other words, we
are estimating the proportion of days of a trader’s open trades that exhibit an
unrealized gain. As such, a take profit order would trigger a winning trade to
be closed, which decreases (or limits) the overall number of days where a trade is
showing an unrealized gain. Consequently, a trader would have a lower proportion of
days with winning trades, leading to a lower likelihood of being informed given the
definition of informed trading under the position profits rule. With respect to the
SL variable, we also report a significant and negative relationship with a coefficient
of -0.51. One explanation for this is that position trade leaders may be choosing
stop loss levels that are very close to the current market price in order to avoid
large losses. Given that a position is typically opened with a negative net profit due
to the bid-ask spread, any slight change in price, coupled the magnification effect
of leverage, would trigger the stop loss limit. While a trader’s strategy may be to
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use stop loss orders in order to minimize downside risk, accepting many small losses
increases the aggregate number of days where a trader is experiencing a loss. This
translates into a lower likelihood of being informed under the position profits rule.
In support of our argument, Table 4.1 shows that the proportion of trades closed due
to stop loss limits ranges between 14% and 31% across all assets, which is around
twice the figures reported for take profit orders. This clearly indicates that there
is a higher probability for a stop loss order to be triggered relative to a take profit
order. Regarding the amount of equity invested, we report a coefficient of -0.106
for the variable log(Equity). This indicates that position informed trade leaders use
relatively smaller amounts of their capital in each trade, which is consistent with a
strategy where a trader is willing to accept multiple small losses in hopes of winning
big. We find a negative relationship between the Long variable and the likelihood of
being informed, which means that position informed trade leaders typically execute
more short trades. We find that informed individuals have shorter average trade
durations as indicated by the coefficient of the Duration parameter, which is equal
to -8.7e−7. While this figure may seem very small, recall that Duration measures
the number of seconds a trade is kept open. To put this into perspective, keeping
a trade open for one day (86,400 seconds) decreases the likelihood of being position
informed by around 7.5%. The total number of trades executed, given by the variable
Trades, also has a significant and negative relationship with being informed. This
suggests that position informed trade leaders execute fewer trades, which may be an
indication that they take into account trading costs when optimizing their strategies.
As for the variable Assets, the coefficient is positively significant and equal to 0.34,
meaning that position informed trade leaders seek trading opportunities in multiple
assets. The pseudo R2 for this model is 12.34%.
When we apply the more stringent HM test, the Leverage, TP, and log(Equity)
parameters turn insignificant. This may be due to the fact that the HM test identifies
very few position informed trade leaders (46 out of 41,072), which may not be
sufficient to make proper inferences about the characteristics of these individuals.
Nevertheless, we find that the SL parameter turns positive with a coefficient of 1.76.
This suggests that these informed individuals apply stop loss limits in a manner that
decreases the number of days a position is exhibiting a loss. The Long parameter
remains negative and significant with a coefficient of -1.07, while the coefficient for
Duration turns positive. The latter indicates that traders who are identified as
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position informed in both upward and downward trending markets tend to have
longer trade durations. Moreover, these informed individuals trade more frequently
as indicated by the Trades coefficient of 0.002, and seek trading opportunities in
multiple assets as shown by the positive coefficient of the Assets parameter. Finally,
the pseudo R2 for this model is 18.21%. Given the low proportion of informed trade
leaders under the HM test, the characteristics presented above should be taken with
a grain of salt.
Next, we examine the trading characteristics of position informed trade leaders
under the daily trading profits rule. Starting with the unconditional test, we find
that Leverage has a coefficient estimate of 0.0015, indicating a positive impact on
the likelihood of being position informed. This is similar to our initial finding,
where leverage allows individuals to benefit from small price swings. Regarding limit
orders, we find that TP has a positive effect with a coefficient of around 1.69, while
SL has a negative effect with a coefficient of -4.08. To understand these results, recall
that the daily trading profits rule assesses the predicting ability of a trader based on
the final outcome of the trades, and not on the daily changes in price levels. As such,
a take profit order is triggered when the position has made a profit, indicating that
the trade was successful and that the trader made a correct prediction. Conversely, a
stop loss order is triggered when the position exhibits a loss, which occurs when the
price moves adversely to the trader’s prediction. It follows that a take profit (stop
loss) order is triggered when the trader’s prediction is correct (false), thus increasing
(decreasing) the likelihood of being informed. We report a negative coefficient of
-0.15 for log(Equity), which is similar to what we found in our initial analysis.
Regarding the Long parameter, we report a significant and positive coefficient of
around 0.15, which means that informed traders have more accurate predictions
when they are buying an asset relative to when they are selling one. We find
that Duration has a positive effect on being position informed, meaning that these
individuals keep trades open for a longer period until the market price reaches their
target price. Similar to our initial analysis, we report a negative coefficient for the
Trades parameter, and a positive coefficient for the Assets parameter, indicating
that position informed trade leaders execute fewer trades in multiple assets. The
pseudo R2 for this model is 48.1%, which indicates that the model has a good fit.
Finally, when we apply the logistic model to the results of the HM test under
the daily trading profits rule, we find that those identified as informed tend to
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use less leverage, meaning that these trade leaders implement more conservative
strategies. Regarding limit orders, we find a positive coefficient of 0.96 for the TP
parameter and a negative coefficient of -4.09 for SL, which are results similar to those
obtained under the unconditional test. The log(Equity) parameter has a positive
effect on the likelihood of being identified as position informed, with a coefficient of
0.49, which may be an indication that these individuals are aware of their superior
forecasting ability, such that they are confident in investing more of their capital in
each trade. We also find that position informed trade leaders engage more in short
selling as indicated by the negative Long coefficient of -1.05. Contrasting this with
the positive figure obtained under the unconditional test, this suggests that these
informed individuals use short selling effectively as they are able to differentiate
between upward and downward trending markets. The duration of a trade has a
positive effect, which is similar to what was reported under the HM test based
on position profits. In addition, we find that position informed traders under the
HM test trade more frequently and in multiple assets as indicated by the positive
coefficients of 0.01 and 0.03 for the Trades and Assets parameters, respectively. The
pseudo R2 for this model is also high and equal to 48.1%.
We focus the discussion on the results of the daily trading profits rule due to
the superior fit of the models, and because realized profits represent the ultimate
decision of a trader (Leuthold et al., 1994). The differences in trading character-
istics presented above explain why a trade leader is identified as informed under
one identification test and not the other. For instance, informed traders under the
unconditional test are found to use more leverage compared to those under the HM
test. Given the definitions of these tests, this means that the use of leverage plays
a detrimental role in the performance of traders when the market changes direc-
tion. Hence, using less leverage allows informed traders to avoid large losses when
the market changes direction. Similarly, the amount of equity invested by informed
traders under the HM test is relatively larger indicating that these individuals are
more confident about their predictions, considering the state of the market. More-
over, these individuals use short selling profitably, which is why they are identified
as informed even in downward trending markets.
The above analysis shows that each profit rule and identification test identifies a
different group of position informed trade leaders with different trading characteris-
tics. In the following section, we use the FDR method to identify intraday informed,
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momentum, contrarian, and uninformed trade leaders.
4.5.3 Identifying Intraday Informed Trade Leaders
We use the FDR method using a 95% confidence interval and identify intraday trade
leaders as informed, momentum, contrarian, or uninformed based on the rules de-
fined in section 4.3.2. One point we highlight here is that a trader may be identified
differently depending on which asset is being examined. For example, a trade leader
may be identified as informed in the EUR/USD currency pair, but uninformed in
oil trading. This means that a trader possess superior predicting ability only in
a specific asset, which raises the question of how to classify this individual. As a
remedy to this issue, we adopt a simple arithmetic approach where a trade leader is
exclusively identified as one of the four types depending on how he is predominantly
identified across all 19 assets. To illustrate, if a trader is found to be informed in
the EUR/USD and GBP/USD currency pairs, but as a contrarian in the EUR/JPY
currency pair, then this trade leader is exclusively identified as informed. The num-
ber and proportion for each type of trade leader in each of the 19 traded assets are
presented in Table 4.4.
Given the rules defined in section 4.3.2, we identify 7,354 unique intraday in-
formed trade leaders, which constitute around 15.1% of the sample. These individu-
als are mostly concentrated in major currency pairs such as EUR/USD, USD/JPY,
GBP/USD, and NZD/USD. Regarding momentum and contrarian trading, we find
that 23,903 (around 49%) and 14,195 (around 29%) trade leaders follow these strate-
gies, respectively. Again, we find that the major currency pairs exhibit the highest
number of traders following these strategies. Finally, we identify only 147 intra-
day uninformed trade leaders, which is relatively low compared to the number of
informed traders in the sample. Given these figures, it is clear that there is a signifi-
cant number of trade leaders who possess the ability to predict future price changes.
4.5.4 Intraday Informed Trade Leader Characteristics
We study the trading characteristics of intraday trade leaders by employing three
separate logistic models, where the binary dependent variable takes the value of
one if the trader is identified as informed, momentum, or contrarian, respectively.
The independent variables are the same ones used earlier. We present the results in
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Table 4.5.
Starting with intraday informed trade leaders, we find that these individuals
tend to use slightly lower leverage ratios as indicated by the Leverage coefficient of
-0.0005. This suggests that these individuals are slightly more conservative relative
to other types of intraday traders. With respect to limit orders, we report a positive
coefficient of 1.14 for TP, and -4.43 for SL. This means that a take profit (stop
loss) order is executed when the trade is showing a gain (loss), which consequently
increases (decreases) the probability of being identified as intraday informed. The
log(Equity) parameter has a coefficient of 0.07, indicating a positive relation to the
likelihood of being informed. Hence, informed intraday traders are confident in
their decisions such that they are willing to invest more of their equity in each trade
compared to other traders. Furthermore, we find that intraday informed individuals
trade more successfully in short positions compared to long ones, as indicated by
the negative Long coefficient of -0.27. The duration of trades for intraday informed
traders is typically longer, which is similar to our findings for position informed
traders under the HM test. In addition, we find that informed individuals trade
more frequently and in multiple assets as indicated by the positive coefficients of
0.0006 and 0.04 for the Trades and Assets parameters, respectively. The pseudo R2
for this model is equal to 20.93%, which indicates a good model fit.
Next, we examine but very briefly discuss the trading behavior of both momen-
tum and contrarian trade leaders because 1) these traders are not the main focus of
this study, 2) the logistic models are a poor fit, and 3) almost all coefficient estimates
in the two models exhibit the same signs, hence we avoid repeating the discussion.
We begin our analysis with the Leverage parameter, where we report a small but
significant coefficient of 0.0008 for momentum traders, while this parameter is sta-
tistically insignificant for contrarian traders. Both momentum and contrarian trade
leaders exhibit negative TP coefficients of -0.36 and -1.12, respectively. Given that
the TP coefficient for intraday informed traders is positive, this suggests that take
profit orders are associated with informed trading strategies. Both momentum and
contrarian trade leaders use stop loss orders as indicated by their respective SL
coefficients of 0.3 and 0.99. This is in contrast to intraday informed traders who
are around 83 times less likely to have a stop loss order triggered. Hence, informed
traders either avoid using stop loss orders, or place wider stop loss limits, which are
less likely to be triggered throughout the life of a trade. The log(Equity) parameter
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has a negative coefficient of around -0.03 and -0.04 for momentum and contrarian
traders, respectively, which suggests that both types of traders use relatively less of
their capital in each trade. With respect to the Long parameter, we find that the
trades executed by momentum traders are predominantly long, while those executed
by contrarian traders are predominantly short. This is an indication that the overall
trend across all assets was upward during the period of study. The Duration param-
eter indicates that both momentum and contrarian traders generally have shorter
trade durations as compared to intraday informed traders. Moreover, we find that
momentum trade leaders execute slightly fewer trades and trade in multiple assets,
as indicated by the Trades and Assets coefficients of -0.0016 and 0.05, respectively.
Both of these parameters are statistically insignificant for contrarian trade leaders.
Finally, the pseudo R2 for the momentum and contrarian models equals 1.6% and
4.88%, respectively, indicating that these models have a poor fit.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the predictive ability of individual foreign exchange
and commodities traders under a scopic regime. We use a data set from the highly
popular eToro STP, and classify over 700 thousand transactions by 41,072 position
trade leaders, and over 1.7 million transactions by 48,691 intraday trade leaders
during 2013, in 16 currency pairs and three commodities. We adopt some of the
methods applied in the literature to identify trade leaders as position informed,
intraday informed, momentum, contrarian, and uninformed.
For position informed trade leaders, we focus on the daily trading profits rule —
because the models have a superior fit, and realized profits represent the ultimate
decision of a trader (Leuthold et al., 1994) — and summarize the findings as follows.
When we apply the unconditional test, we find that around 50% of position trade
leaders are informed, which means that half of the position traders have profitably
executed more than 50% of their trades. These individuals 1) tend to use slightly
more leverage, 2) apply take profit and stop loss orders to realize gains and minimize
losses, respectively, 3) use less of their equity in each trade, 4) are more successful
in long positions relative to short selling, 5) have longer trade durations, 6) trade
less frequently, and 7) seek trading opportunities in multiple assets.
Next, we apply the HM test in order to identify individuals who are able to
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correctly predict future price movements in both upward and downward trending
markets, and find that only 1.31% of position trade leaders possess this skill. This
figure is similar to the finding by Linnainmaa (2010), who shows that around 1.2%
of investors possess genuine trading skills. Moreover, this also adds to the finding
of Hayley and Marsh (2015), who show that even the most experienced traders still
underperform. Our analysis shows that these informed trade leaders 1) tend to
use lower leverage ratios compared to the total sample including those identified as
informed under the unconditional test, 2) apply take profit and stop loss orders to
realize gains and minimize losses, respectively, 3) use more of their equity, which is
a sign of confidence in their decisions, 4) use short selling profitably, 5) have longer
trade durations, 6) trade more frequently, and 7) trade in multiple assets.
With respect to intraday trade leaders, we find that these individuals constitute
around 15% of the intraday sample. Moreover, we find that intraday informed trade
leaders 1) use slightly lower leverage ratios, 2) employ take profit and stop loss orders
like position informed traders to realize gains and minimize losses, respectively, 3)
use more of their equity in each trade, 4) are able to short sell consistently and
profitably, 5) have relatively longer trade durations, 6) trade more frequently more,
7) and trade in multiple assets. These characteristics are similar to those of traders
identified as position informed based on the daily trading profits rule under the HM
test.
Our findings show that there is a positive relation between the degree of infor-
mation transparency and the prospects of informed trading in the short term. We
show that, although many trade leaders can predict price changes in a consistent
manner in only one state of the market, very few individuals possess the skill to
distinguish between different market states. Further research is required in order to
investigate whether this short-term outlook and inability to recognize shifts in the
market is due to behavioral biases such as herding, the disposition effect, overconfi-
dence, or limited attention. Nevertheless, the evidence presented shows that STPs
offer a source of valuable information, and that these platforms have the potential
of creating short term information differentials in the foreign exchange as well as
the commodities markets. This argument is in agreement with the evidence pre-
sented by Nolte and Nolte (2016), who show that the information contained in the
order flow of individual foreign exchange traders may be used to explain, as well as
forecast short-term price changes.
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Investors who allocate their capital to trade leaders should be aware of this
short-termism, and should diversify their investments accordingly in order to avoid
large losses when market conditions change. Hence, investors can either take an
active management approach and invest with trade leaders who possess predictive
ability in only one market state, or take a passive approach and invest with those
who possess the ability to predict price changes under any market condition. While
our study focuses on the predictive ability of traders, further research is required in
order to examine the overall profitability of these individuals in order to determine
whether they add any value in absolute terms. Moreover, as social trading increases
in popularity and becomes an integral component of financial markets, an intriguing
puzzle is to analyze whether the value provided by these platforms will cease to exist
as individuals take advantage of the information contained in order flow data.
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Conclusion and Future Work
The contributions of this PhD are both theoretical and empirical. In the first study,
we examine herding behavior among 77,476 trade leaders during 2013 on the popu-
lar eToro STP. The main theoretical contribution is that the scopic regime, charac-
terized by high information transparency and constant investor scrutiny, produces
levels of, and persistence in herding behavior that exceed those found in a tradi-
tional financial environment. We use two herding metrics developed by Lakonishok
et al. (1992) and Frey et al. (2014) in order to provide a range for the true level
of herding among trade leaders. In general, we find that the level of herding for
the entire sample of trade leaders lies between the lower LSV measure of 16.5% and
the upper FHW measure of 23.9%. These levels exceed those reported in the liter-
ature for both institutional and retail traders in traditional financial environments.
Moreover, we find that as the number of active trade leaders in a security increases,
the level of herding decreases proportionally. This is due to higher herding levels in
less traded assets, which is evidence of information cascades that motivate herding
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Second, we find that trade leaders who use high lever-
age ratios tend to herd less, which suggests that these individuals are overconfident
in their own skills and decisions (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Odean, 1998; Gu¨mbel,
2005). Third, we examine the association between herding and trade size and find
that the larger the trade size — the more a trader has to lose — the higher the like-
lihood of herding with the general consensus. This is related to the feeling of regret
traders would experience had they invested differently from and underperformed
their peers. One exception to this is the level of herding in the smallest trade sizes,
which is high and may be the result of trade leader sophistication on this platform
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(Doering et al., 2015). To elaborate, small trades may be regarded as an option for
the trade leader to imitate others, such that one can increase exposure if the strat-
egy is profitable, or simply cut losses should the strategy be unprofitable. Finally,
we examine persistence in herding behavior by computing the mean contemporane-
ous and time-series correlations of purchase intensities based on the method used
by Barber et al. (2009). We find a significant and almost perfect contemporaneous
correlation of 98.5%, which further confirms our earlier findings. In addition, we
report significant evidence on persistence in herding across several time horizons,
which fades away very slowly compared to what is reported in the literature for
retail traders in a traditional trading environment (Barber et al., 2009; Merli and
Roger, 2013). This shows that a scopic regime increases the likelihood of constant
and perpetual herding. Our findings support the notion of intentional herding, as in-
dividuals seek information from, and try to emulate the success of other participants
on the platform by mimicking their current as well as historical trading activity.
In the second study, we test whether trade leaders on the eToro STP exhibit the
disposition effect, which is understood as the tendency to realize gains and hold on
to losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). Our theoretical contribution builds on the
learning theory discussed by many academics in the literature (Shapira and Venezia,
2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006;
Chen et al., 2007; Boolell-Gunesh et al., 2009; Seru et al., 2010). Specifically, we
argue that the scopic environment — which is rich in information and requires
participants to disclose all their trading activities — erodes the disposition effect as
trade leaders adjust for this bias by learning not only from their personal trades, but
also from the trades of others. Hence, as information on order flow becomes more
accessible, trade leaders learn from these “experiences” in order to adjust for the
disposition effect. We use a sample from the eToro STP with over 2.6 million trades
executed by 77,476 trade leaders in 2013. We adopt two empirical methods: the
first, proposed by Odean (1998), requires the calculation of the disposition spread,
which is the difference between the proportion of gains realized and the proportion
of losses realized, and the second is based on the Cox proportional hazards model.
Furthermore, we compare the results obtained for trade leaders on eToro to those
of traders on a traditional online trading platform called Anonymous. Under both
empirical methods, we find weaker evidence of the disposition effect in the scopic
environment relative to the traditional financial setting, which suggests that high
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information transparency and constant reciprocal scrutiny erode this behavioral bias,
although not completely. We argue that traders in a scopic environment learn at a
faster rate compared to traders in a traditional financial setting; however, more work
is needed in this respect. Another potential explanation for the weak evidence of the
disposition effect in the scopic environment is that the constant scrutiny by investors
may drive trade leaders to close losing positions with almost the same propensity
of closing winning positions, in order to avoid holding unjustifiable paper losses.
From a “best practice” viewpoint, some academics have proposed that brokerage
firms should educate their clients about behavioral biases that may adversely impact
their performance (Dhar and Zhu, 2006). Our study shows that, while this may be a
commendable initiative on behalf of brokerage firms, simply increasing information
transparency would allow individuals to efficiently learn on their own to avoid the
disposition effect by observing the actions of others.
In the third study, we investigate the predictive ability of traders under a scopic
regime, where individuals have access to high quality order flow data on a social
trading platform. This social trading setting differentiates our study from earlier re-
search done on the predictive power of technical analysis, which focuses solely on past
price movements and a selection of technical indicators (Abbey and Doukas, 2012).
Furthermore, it complements the work of Hayley and Marsh (2015) on the perfor-
mance, and learning ability of currency traders in a traditional trading environment,
and extends the findings of Nolte and Nolte (2016), who show that the information
contained in the aggregate order flow of individual traders has significant predictive
power. Our proposition is that, despite potential behavioral biases, an environment
that is highly transparent regarding order flow information should increase the over-
all prospects of informed trading. To test this, we use a data set from the highly
popular eToro STP and classify over 700 thousand trades executed by 41,072 po-
sition trade leaders, and over 1.7 million trades executed by 48,691 intraday trade
leaders in 16 currency pairs and three commodities during 2013. We apply empirical
methods similar to those developed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Fishe and
Smith (2012) in order to identify trade leaders as either position informed, intraday
informed, momentum, contrarian, or uninformed. In particular, we use two binary
profit rules based on unrealized profits (position profits) and realized profits (daily
trading profits), separately, to test whether position trade leaders are informed. Ad-
ditionally, we apply for each profit rule an unconditional test and a conditional (HM)
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test similar to the method proposed by Henriksson and Merton (1981), where the
former is a binomial test for the expectation of being profitable more than 50% of
the time, and the latter tests whether traders are able to trade profitably in both
upward and downward trending markets. Moreover, we analyze intraday profits and
the relationship between position direction and past price movements in order to
identify intraday trade leaders as either informed, momentum, contrarian, or un-
informed. We use the false discovery rate (FDR) method with a 5% critical value
to correct for the multiple-testing problem, which arises due to having thousands
of test statistics (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). For position trade leaders, the
unconditional test identifies around 50% of these individuals as informed; however,
when we apply the HM test, this proportion drops between 0.11% and 1.31%. This
suggests that, while many position traders can predict future price changes in one
specific state of the market, very few possess predictive ability in both upward and
downward trending markets. We examine the characteristics of position informed
trade leaders using a series of logistic models. The models based on the daily trad-
ing profits rule have a superior fit, hence we focus the discussion on these results.
Specifically, individuals identified as position informed under the unconditional test
tend to use more leverage, apply limit orders to realize gains and limit losses, use less
equity per trade, are more successful in long positions, have longer trade durations,
trade less frequently, and trade in multiple assets. When we study the characteristics
of traders identified as informed under the HM test, we find that these individuals
use less leverage, employ limit orders, use more equity per trade, apply short-selling
profitably, have long trade durations, trade more frequently, and trade in multiple
assets. With respect to intraday trade leaders, we identify around 15%, 49%, 29%,
and 0.3% of the sample as informed, momentum, contrarian, and uninformed, re-
spectively. When we examine the characteristics of these types of traders, we find
the highest explanatory power for the intraday informed model. In particular, we
find that intraday informed trade leaders use relatively less leverage, employ limit
orders, use more of their equity in each trade, are more successful in short-selling,
have relatively longer trade durations, trade more frequently, and trade in multiple
assets. Our findings show a positive relation between transparency regarding order
flow data and the prospects of informed trading, at least in the short term. We
find that, although the majority of trade leaders are consistently able to predict
price changes in a specific state of the market, very few individuals possess the skill
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to distinguish between different market states. However, the evidence we present
supports the idea that STPs offer a source of valuable information, and that these
platforms have the potential of creating short term information differentials that can
generate profitable opportunities in the foreign exchange as well as the commodities
markets.
This thesis presents significant evidence on how the scopic environment influences
trader behavior. We have shown that an environment, which encourages information
transparency and allows constant reciprocal scrutiny by all participants leads to
higher levels of, and persistence in herding behavior. Moreover, such an environment
allows traders to learn not only from their personal past trades, but also from the
trades of all other participants in order to adjust for the disposition effect. Trader
behavior on STPs is significantly different compared to the behavior of traders in a
traditional financial setting as presented in this thesis, and this can be attributed to
technological innovation, which has considerably changed the online trading model.
As such, technological innovation has an indirect impact on the behavior of traders.
Consequently, one should expect the behavior of traders to change as new financial
tools and features are introduced into the trading environment.
We briefly conclude by discussing future work we aim to undertake. While the
first paper in this PhD dissertation examines herding behavior among trade leaders,
another research puzzle is to investigate the explicit herding relationship between
investors and trade leaders, which arises when investors opt to copy the future
trades of trade leaders. The process of copying a trade leader, or terminating this
relationship, is similar in concept to the dynamics of fund flows, which has been
studied extensively. Some of the research questions that we aim to answer are:
1) What are the characteristics of the most popular trade leaders? 2) How does
trade leader performance impact the number of copiers they have? 3) What are the
events that drive an investor to terminate a copying relationship? 4) Do investors
overreact to a trade leader’s poor performance such that they terminate the copying
relationship prematurely? To our knowledge, no research has been conducted to
answer these questions, and one main reason for this is restricted access to data.
Nevertheless, we are in the process of negotiating a non-disclosure agreement with a
STP, which has agreed to provide us with the necessary data to proceed with such
a study.
Another aspect of social trading we aim to investigate is the longevity of trade
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leader accounts. Since CFDs are based on margin trading and on excessive use
of leverage, a prolonged period of bad performance may result in trade leaders
closing their accounts completely — whether voluntarily or not. This event has
consequences to investors, who may have invested a large portion of their capital
in this socio-financial asset, which has suddenly ceased to exist. Thus, we aim to
examine the factors that affect the longevity of trade leaders and the termination
of their accounts. This study will require a data set that spans a longer period
compared to the one we are currently using, which an anonymous STP has agreed
to provide us.
A challenging objective for future research is to incorporate complex social data,
such as discussion posts, into the financial framework. Hence, the richness of social
trading information may require methodological contributions in order to better
understand the performance and relationships between participants on STPs.
As stated earlier, technological innovation has an indirect impact on trader be-
havior. As the social trading environment evolves with technology, this dynamic
will open up new avenues for exciting research, both theoretical and empirical.
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